MUGHAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS IN THE DECCAN DURING THE REIGN OF MUHAMMAD SHAH

THESIS

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BY

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UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

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Abstract of the Thesis

The Deccan literally means the southern and peninsular part of the great landmass of India. The *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* mention it as *Dakshinapath*. In describing this area the author of *Periplus* also calls it *Dakshinabades*. In the *Markandya, Vayu and Matsya Puranas* the term *Dakshina* or *Dakshinapath* also denotes the whole peninsular south of the *Narmada*. *Rajshekhara* (c. 11th century) states that *Dakshinapath* or *Dakshinadesa* is the portion of the Indian peninsula lying to the south of *Mahishmati*.

The Imperial Gazetteer of India defines the Deccan that it "includes in its widest sense the whole of peninsular India lying south of the *Vindhya* mountains and the *Narmada* river which separate it from the North."

M. Athar Ali in his '*Nobility under Aurangzeb*' argues that the Deccan presented a sharp contrast to northern India, where the Mughal conquest has been as quickly consolidated as they were made. There were geographical reasons as the hills there made transport difficult and did not allow great fortresses to be built, which may be held partially responsible for the slowness of the Mughal progress in the Deccan.

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In spite of all the difficulties, the Deccan had always been an important possession for the Mughals. Jadunath Sarkar calls the Mughal expansion into the Deccan as 'a sleepless aim of the Mughal Emperors'. Thus Deccan occupied an important place in the History of Mughal Empire in India from the very beginning.

The aim of the present work is to bring into light the administrative problems faced by the *Subedar* of the Deccan during the reign of Muhammad Shah who ascended the throne in 1719 A.D and reigned till 1748 A.D. Further an attempt has been made to analyse the political developments and growing problems at the Centre which in turn disturbed the administrative stability of the Deccan province and how far the *Subedar* of the province was successful in crumbling all these problems.

Through the study it has also been tried to find out the answer to the questions whether Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf jah maintained an allegiance to the Mughal court or he carved out an independent kingdom for himself in the Deccan and put aside the imperial claims, the scheme of his administrative reforms and maintenance of law and order was guided in accordance with the imperial rules or he tried new pattern in the Deccan. What were the process of appointments, promotions and the allotments of various grants like *madad-i-mash* and *wazifa.*

The Present Study has been covered the period from 1719-1748 A.D, and the work is divided into the following Chapters

In the first chapter entitled '*Deccan under the Mughals: An Overview'*, an attempt has been made to draw a picture what has happened from the time of Akbar, when after consolidating his position in the North, he moved to south to expand his domain, up to the accession of Muhammad Shah who was involved in the court politics so much that he had not tried to resolve the problems faced by the *Subedar* of the Deccan or the other administrative problems at the centre.

The next Chapter discusses the accession of Muhammad Shah in 1719 A.D with the help of Saiyid brothers who made him a puppet and all the real powers vested in their hands. Apart from the political problems which Muhammad Shah was facing, there were acute administrative problems as well, which Aurangzeb left unsolved. His successors were not strong and able enough to take effective measures to solve the problems. Among the major administrative problems, the *Jagirdari* crisis, the financial bankruptcy which resulted in the introduction of *Ijara* System and the selling of the offices.

The role of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I in the Deccan during the reign of Muhammad Shah has been discussed in the third chapter. He

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became Viceroy of the Deccan for the first time (1713-1715 A.D) during the reign of Farrukhsiyar.

He was the leading personality in the Deccan during the reign of Muhammad Shah and after 1724 A.D all the Deccan affairs were passed into his hands and he retained his position until his death in 1748 A.D. Nizam in his last testament, which he made before his death, he advised his successors to keep intact the traditional relations of loyalty with the Mughal Government.

"Under all circumstances remember that the governance (*riyasat*) of the Deccan is depended on our constant service and fidelity to the emperor. It is necessary that you should under no circumstances be remiss in showing the proper respect (*adab*) to the Emperor.....you should under no circumstances be cursed (*mat'un*) for violating the bonds of respect."

In the fourth Chapter, I have discussed the administrative organisation of the Deccan *Suba*, including the administrative division of the six Subas, various officers responsible for the smooth working of the administrative machinery.

The fifth Chapter throws light on the working of Revenue administration, what were the sources of revenue in the Deccan? , The collection of

revenue from the various divisions and the officers responsible for the revenue administration.

The chief sources of revenue in the Deccan were:

1. *Mal, Mal-o-Jihat* and *Sair-i-Jihat.*
2. Rural taxes and exactions other than land revenue *Wujuhat* (*jihat* and *sair jihat), Rahdari,* etc.
3. Peshkash from various personnel like Zamindars, officials, semi-officials, private persons etc.
4. *Baghat* (irrigated lands, especially gardens).
5. Customs from the ports.
6. Salt monopoly at Machlipatam [*Mahal-i-Shura-wa-namak*]
7. Diamond mines
8. Mints

The taxes levied in the Mughal *Suba* of the Deccan under Nizam-ul-Mulk can be broadly classified into two heads *Mal* and *Wujuhat*, the latter is further divided into *jihat* and *Sair Jihat.* Whenever was imposed on cultivated land as per the schedule rate of assessment was termed as *mal*, the *jihat* were the taxes levied to meet the expenses of government incurred in making the assessment of *Mal*, and S*air Jihat* were the other

taxes realized from the Market and transit duties.

The various types of *wujuhats* levied and collected in the Deccan during the Nizam's viceroyalty were *Abi*, *Baghat*, *Bhat*, *Bhant*, *Chahurrum*, *Dastur*, *Gumashta*, *Itlaq*, *Kalali*, *Khurakh*, *Mahsuldari*, *Muhtarfa*, *Muqtadari*, *Muqarrari* or *Patta Muqarrari*, *Patti Qusur*, *Rahdari*, *Rusum Rusum-i-Sardeshmukhi*, *Sardeshmkhi*, *Sarf-i-Sihbandi*, *Siwai-teh-bazari*, *Srideh*, *Srisad*, *tabi*, *Tahir*, *Tasarruf-i-amil*, *tehbazari* etc.

The last Chapter deals with the growing Maratha problem in the Deccan. The growing Maratha power could not be crushed with the meagre resources of the *Subedar*, who was constantly asking the centre for help in both men and money but he get nothing out of the imperial treasury or any military help. The Emperor himself was facing the economic problem set in, in the preceding years. The *Jagirdari* problem, financial bankruptcy and the court politics left no space for the Emperor to turn his attention towards the growing Maratha problem in the Deccan *Suba*.

Warid Tehrani the contemporary writer mentions about the state of affairs in these words, "whenever the news of any Maratha incursion reached to the court from the Deccan, the Emperor instead of finding

solution to the problem went to the plains for hunting or in the gardens to see the blooming flowers and fish in the ponds to soothe his heart."

The Maratha menace have grown too much that they started encroaching into the Mughal provinces of Deccan and collected *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* which constituted the half of the revenue of the *Suba* mentioned by Khafi Khan and corroborated with the documental evidences.

The Marathas were only one of the many problems faced by the Nizam. The other active groups were the Afghans, Berads and Telugus. They saw the Nizam and his supporter as their political rival in the Deccan. And they were not easily going to sacrifice their political and economic autonomy in the region without giving tough competition to the emerging power.

In these circumstances it was not possible for the Nizam to solely rely on the Mughal institutional structures in the Deccan to implant his authority. The condition of the *Suba* was also not satisfactory because of the incessant war in the region in the previous times. Another serious problem before the Nizam was to bridge the cultural differences between the new ruling elite and the many of their subjects. The Nizam was fully aware of their different historical, political and cultural traces, and it was not possible to apply the same approach to all the groups.

But the Nizam had deep personal knowledge of the region's political, social and economic networks which helped him in dealing with all the odds, this insight came from the time spent in the region as we all know that the Nizam served the Deccan thrice as a governor. The Nizam had full idea of which groups had to deal with diplomacy and which through the use of violence. Here the armed strength of the Nizam played a vital role. Nizam had a group of loyalists as well on his side, despite the ethnic diversity the Nizam's supporters proved their cohesiveness and loyalty. Although the *Turanis* were important supporters of the Nizam, his household forces also include many *Afghans*, *Shaikhzadas*, *Khatris*, *Kayasthas*, *Bundelas*, *Rajputs* and *Dakhinis*.

After losing the *Wizarat*, the Nizam was not very sure of his political career at the court and moved to Deccan his recent viceroyalty for the second time and now he started building a base for himself in the Deccan and appointed family members and imperial loyalists on important posts across the Deccan. High *mansabs* and fertile *jagirs* were given to them and direct control over the revenue and intelligence department was established which was out of the reach of previous governors. The tribute extracting expeditions were launched in order to gain economic stability.

Till the end of his life and was all the time busy in maintaining law and order in his province and partly succeeded in his scheme. However the Suba constantly broke the basic imperial administrative rules like officials were not transferred as frequently as required. The multiple posts were combined within a single person, complex process of bargaining rather than surveys tended to determine the revenue payments by *Zamindars*, many of the revenue offices were allowed to turn hereditary and revenue farming (*ijaradari*) was accepted.

Mansaram in his contemporary account *Masir-i-Nizami* gives the Nizam's quote stating that 'for the efficient administration of the *Suba* it is absolutely essential that three communities should be avoided..... first *Afghans*, second *Deccanis* and the third *Marathas*.' While in his last testament Nizam advised his successors that, 'it is necessary for the ruler of the Deccan who desires his own safety, peace from the war and prosperity of his country to have peace with Marathas who are the landholders of this region.' Nizam's changing attitude can be seen in these two statements which he experienced in his journey from the first viceroyalty till his death. And it also shows the gravity of the problem faced by the Nizam in the Deccan *Suba*.

The death of Nizam in1748 A.D, produce an immediate succession disputes of the heirs of the Nizam and they became part of a larger war

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between the English and the French. The allegiance which was shown by the Nizam towards the Mughal Emperor was not retained by his successors and the Hyderabad state became an independent under the rule of the Asafjahi dynasty which was carried out after the name of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I and his successors continued to rule until it was finally annexed.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Ahwal= Ahwal-ul-Khawaqin

APSA= Andhra Pradesh State Archives, Hyderabad

ASB= Asiatic Society of Bengal

Basatin= Basatin-us-Salatin

Briggs= *The Nizam, 2 Vols*

C.A.S =Centre of Advanced Study

Dilkusha=Nuskha-i-Dilkusha

Duff=*History of the Marathas*

E&D=Elliot and Dowson

I.H.C= Indian History Congress

I.H.R.C=Indian Historical Records Commission

IJC=Inayat Jung Collection of Documents, National Archives Delhi

Irvine=Later Mughals, 2 Vols

Lahori=*Badshahnamah*

MF=Microfilm

MAL=Maulana Azad Library

Masir=Masir-i-Nizami

MSS=Manuscript

Munshat= Munshat-i-Mausavi Khan

Muntakhab=Muntakhab-ul-Lubab

OMLRI=Oriental Manuscript Library and Research Institute, Hyderabad

Orme= *Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan.*

OUL= Osmania University Library

Parties and Politics=*Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court 1707-1740*

Risala= Risala-i- Darbar-i- Asafia

R=Rotograph

Sawaneh=Sawaneh-i-Deccan

Seir=Seir-ul-Mutakhkhirin

Shahnama=Shahnama-i-Munawwar Kalam

S.P.D=*Selection from the Peshwa's Daftar*

Tuzuk= Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri

Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukhsiyar= Tarikh-i-shahadat-i-Farrukhsiyar-wa-Julusi-Muhammadshahi

Umara=Masir-ul-Umara

Yusuf Hussain= *The first Nizam,Nizam-ul-Mulk, Asaf Jah I*

Z.U. Malik= *The Reign of Muhammad Shah 1719-1748*

INTRODUCTION

Geography of the Region:

The regional history cannot be completed without giving the specific regional location and the conditions of the region which marked its differences with the other regional identities. Deccan has always been treated as the different terrain from that of the northern plains.

The Deccan literally means the southern and peninsular part of the great landmass of India. The *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* mention it as *Dakshinapath.* In describing this area the author of *Periplus* also calls it *Dakshinabades.* In the *Markandya, Vayu and Matsya Puranas* the term *Dakshina* or *Dakshinapath* also denotes the whole peninsular south of the *Narmada. Rajshekhara* (c. 11th century) states that *Dakshinapath* or *Dakshinadesa* is the portion of the Indian peninsula lying to the south of *Mahishmati.*[1]

The Imperial Gazetteer of India defines the Deccan that it "includes in its widest sense the whole of peninsular India lying south of the *Vindhya* mountains and the *Narmada* river which separate it from the North."[2]

The Geographical limits of the Deccan are defined by the *Deccan History Conference,* "The Deccan shall be deemed to mean the region from the Tapti in the North to the edge of the plateau in the South and from sea to sea."[3]

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1 Maheshwara on the South Bank of Narmada. *Kavyamimasa,* ed. C. D. Dalal, and R.A Shastri, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1961, p-93.

2 *Imperial Gazeteer of India,* XI, p-205.

3 *Proceedings of the Deccan History Conference,* Hyderabad Session, 1945, p-19.

At one place the author of *Tarikh-i-Ferishta* use the term in the comprehensive Geographical sense, when in the introduction to his history, he personifies India as *Hind* and says, "Dakhan the son of *Hind* had three sons and the country of Dakhan was divided among them. Their names are *Marath, Kanhar*, and *Tilang*''. At present these races reside in the Deccan.[4] On the other places in his history, Ferishta like other Persian writers uses the term Deccan to indicate Bahmani Deccan.

As far as the Modern Historians are concerned they generally treated the Deccan as a Geographical entity so far separated from northern India, the Delhi Sultans and the Mughals in order to extend their frontiers beyond the *Vindhyas* have been looked upon as over ambitious.[5]

M. Athar Ali in his '*Nobility under Aurangzeb*' argues that the Deccan presented a sharp contrast to northern India, where the Mughal conquest has been as quickly consolidated as they were made. There were geographical reasons as the hills there made transport difficult and did not allow great fortresses to be built, which may be held partially responsible for the slowness of the Mughal progress in the Deccan.[6]

In spite of all the difficulties, the Deccan had always been an important possession for the Mughals. Jadunath Sarkar calls the Mughal expansion into the Deccan as 'a sleepless aim of the Mughal Emperors'.[7] Thus Deccan occupied an important place in the History of Mughal Empire in India from the very beginning.

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4 Muhammad Qasim Ferishta, *Tarikh-i-ferishta*, Munshi Naval Kishore Press, Lucknow 1864, Vol 1, p-16.

5 Ishwari Prasad, *History of Medieval India*, Allahabad 1952, p-23.

6 M. Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, Bombay 1966, p-102.

7 Jadunath Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, Calcutta, 1919, Vol IV, p-5.

The aim of the present study is to bring into light the nature of the administrative problems faced by the *Subedar* of the Deccan Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I during the reign of Muhammad Shah who ascended the throne in 1719 A.D and reigned till 1748 A.D. Further an attempt has been made to analyse the political developments and growing problems at the Centre which in turn disturbed the administrative stability of the Deccan province and how far the *Subedar* of the province was successful in crumbling all these problems.

Through the study it has also been tried to find out the answer to the questions whether Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf jah maintained an allegiance to the Mughal court or he carved out an independent kingdom for himself in the Deccan and put aside the imperial claims, the scheme of his administrative reforms and maintenance of law and order was guided in accordance with the imperial rules or he tried new pattern in the Deccan. What were the process of appointments, promotions and the allotments of various grants like *madad-i-mash* and *wazifa.*

The Present Study has been divided into the following Chapters

In the first chapter entitled '*Deccan under the Mughals: An Overview'*, an attempt has made to draw a picture what has happened from the time of Akbar, when after consolidating his position in the North, he moved to south to expand his domain, up to the accession of Muhammad Shah in 1719. The struggle for the control of Deccan and its complete absorption was the main focus of the Mughals during this period. The opposition from the independent kingdoms of Deccan was growing and they were trying hard to retain their possessions and did not leave any chance of opposition against the imperial authorities, the Marathas on the other hand also tried their own power and tried to mobilise the coming of prince Akbar into their territory which

became futile when Aurangzeb personally moved to the Deccan and the final annexation of the Deccan states was realised.

The conquest by which Deccan came under the Mughal sway, and the problems faced by the viceroys of the Deccan to get control of the conquered territories has also been discussed.

The next Chapter discusses the accession of Muhammad Shah in 1719 with the help of Saiyyad brothers who made him a puppet and all the real powers vested in their hands. Apart from the political problems which Muhammad Shah was facing, there were acute administrative problems as well, which Aurangzeb left unsolved. His successors were not strong and able enough to take effective measures to solve the problems. Among the major administrative problems, the *Jagirdari* crisis, the financial bankruptcy which resulted in the introduction of *Ijara* System[8] and the selling of the offices made the situation worst.

The factional politics was so strong at the court during the period (1719-1748) that one group consisted of Koki Jieu, Khidmatgar Khan, a eunuch of the palace and the other partisans of their group enjoyed all the royal favours and the appointments on important posts were made according to their own wishes. The Emperor's personal character was such that he had not taken the things seriously, the contemporary chronicles shed light on the prevailing conditions during his reign. The Emperor's decisions were guided by the people who had strong impact on Emperor's mind. After the fall of one powerful group another rise who had started dominating the politics.

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[8] The selling of the right to collect the revenue of the *jagirs* or even of the *Khalisa* lands to the highest bidders.

The role of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I in the Deccan during the reign of Muhammad Shah has been discussed in the third chapter. He became Viceroy of the Deccan for the first time (1713-1715) during the reign of Farrukhsiyar but soon he was replaced by Hussain Ali Khan, one of the Saiyyad Brothers.[9]

In 1720-1722, he became viceroy for the second time but this time he was called by the emperor to look after the matters of *Wizarat* (1722-1724), but soon Nizam-ul-Mulk left Delhi in disgust and moved to Deccan to retain his position as a viceroy. In 1724 he finally succeeded in getting the viceroyalty of the Deccan for the third time after his victory against Mubariz Khan in the Battle of Shakarkheda 1724.

He was the leading personality in the Deccan during the reign of Muhammad Shah and after 1724 all the Deccan affairs were passed into his hands and he retained his position until his death in 1748. On his part the Nizam tried to maintain law and order in the *Suba* and also worked for the improvement of revenues and other administrative settlements. He left the offices open to the worthy irrespective of their caste and religion. He had taken good care of the subjects and also advised his successors to take care of them. The last testament of Nizam-ul-Mulk which is produced by five contemporaries emphasised on the humanity and good of the human beings. Nizam had great regards for the Sufis as well and advanced the patronage to them.

In the fourth Chapter, I have discussed the administrative organisation of the Deccan *Subah,* its administrative divisions for the better understanding of the working

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[9] The Saiyyad brothers were known in the history of the period as the King makers. One was Hussain Ali Khan Barha and the other was Abdullah Khan Barha. They were responsible for the deposition of Farrukhsiyar and after him they put three emperors on the throne, Rafi-ud-Daulah, Rafi-ud-Darajat, and finally Muhammad Shah in the year 1719.

of various offices, and the appointments made by *Nizam* for the efficient working of the administration after he had taken the viceroyalty of the Deccan into his hands.

The Deccan *Suba* in 1719 was divided into six *Subas* namely Aurangabad, Berar, Bidar, Bijapur, Khandesh and Hyderabad. The *Suba* of Aurangabad had 12 *Sarkars* and 147 *Mahals, Suba* Berar had 11 *Sarkars* and 252 *Mahals*, in the *Suba* Bidar, there were 6 *Sarkars* and 76 *Mahals*, Bijapur comprised of 17 *Sarkars* and 252 *Mahals* while Hyderabad had 42 *Sarkars* and 405 *Mahals.*

The *Suba* of Bijapur was divided into two sub-divisions Bijapur and Bijapur Karnataka, likewise the *Suba* of Hyderabad was also divided into two regions namely Farkhurda Bunyad Hyderabad and the Karnataka Hyderabad, and the latter was further divided into *Balaghat* and *Painghat* region. In the Hyderabad two *Sarkars* of Tanjawar and Trichnapally were under *Zamindars.*

The administrative organisation of the *Suba* has also been discussed, the provincial administration of the Mughals was the miniature of the Central administration but it was not uniform in all the provinces due to the different political, social and economic conditions and it was made adaptable according to the needs of the province and Nizam had taken steps in accordance to the need of the Suba.

We find that Deccan was full of forts and some of them were strategically very important and strong holds, for the administration of forts special administrative personnel were appointed and separate *jagirs* were reserved for them to fulfil their needs and these *jagirs* were termed as *Jagir-i-Ahsham.*

The fifth Chapter throws light on the working of Revenue administration, what were the sources of revenue in the Deccan? , The collection of revenue from the various divisions and the officers responsible for the revenue administration.

The chief sources of revenue in the Deccan were:

1. *Mal, Mal-o-Jihat* and *Sair-i-Jihat.*
2. Rural taxes and exactions other than land revenue *Wujuhat (jihat* and *sair jihat), Rahdari,* etc.
3. Peshkash from various personnel like Zamindars, officials, semi-officials, private persons etc.
4. *Baghat* (irrigated lands, especially gardens).
5. Customs from the ports.
6. Salt monopoly at Machlipatam [*Mahal-i-Shura-wa-namak*]
7. Diamond mines
8. Mints

The taxes levied in the Mughal *Suba* of the Deccan under Nizam-ul-Mulk can be broadly classified into two heads *Mal* and *Wujuhat*, the latter is further divided into *jihat* and *Sair Jihat.* Whenever was imposed on cultivated land as per the schedule rate of assessment was termed as *mal*, the *jihat* were the taxes levied to meet the expenses of government incurred in making the assessment of *Mal*, and S*air Jihat* were the other taxes realized from the Market and transit duties.

The various types of *wujuhats* levied and collected in the Deccan during the Nizam's viceroyalty were *Abi*, *Baghat*, *Bhat*, *Bhant*, *Chahurrum*, *Dastur*, *Gumashta*, *Itlaq*, *Kalali*, *Khurakh*, *Mahsuldari*, *Muhtarfa*, *Muqtadari*, *Muqarrari* or *Patta Muqarrari*, *Patti Qusur*, *Rahdari*, *Rusum Rusum-i-Sardeshmukhi*, *Sardeshmkhi*, *Sarf-i-Sihbandi*, *Siwai-teh-bazari*, *Srideh*, *Srisad*, *tabi*, *Tahir*, *Tasarruf-i-amil*, *tehbazari* etc.

For this Chapter the Persian Manuscript '*Sawaneh-i-Deccan*' of *Munim Khan Aurangabadi* was of immense use. The Manuscript of the said source is available in the *Oriental Manuscript Library and Research Institute, Hyderabad.* The name of each and every *Sarkar* with the number of its *mauzas* and the revenue yielded were given in the Manuscript.

The last Chapter deals with the growing Maratha problem in the Deccan. They were continuously encroaching into the Mughal territories of the Deccan and harassing the peasantry for the collection of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi.* Nizam-ul-Mulk was all the time busy in liquidating their power but his wishes were not fulfilled, on many occasions serious fights were made by the Nizam but all in vain. On the closing of the first half of 18th Century large number of territories had gone under the Marathas possession what were the affects of their growing powers on the political, administrative and economic conditions of the Mughal Empire in general and that on Deccan in particular.

It was the battle of Bhopal fought between the Nizam and the Marathas in 1738 in which Nizam was defeated and thus changed his policy towards the Marathas, he now realises that

For the writing of the present thesis the following Persian sources are proved very useful, *Ahwal-ul-Khawaqin, Tarikh-i-Hindi, Sawaneh-i-Deccan, Khulasat-ul-Hind, Munshat-i-Mausavi Khan, Masir-i-Nizami, Muntakhab-ul-Lubab, Masir-ul-Umara, Shahnama-i-Munawwar-ul-Kalam, Tarikh-i-Asafjahi* and the administrative documents preserved in the *National Archives*, New Delhi and the *Andhra Pradesh State Archives* Hyderabad.

Chapter – 1

Deccan under the Mughals: An Overview

1.1. Conquests from Akbar to Shahjahan:

During the last quarter of the 15th century, the Bahmani Kingdom had gradually disintegrated giving rise to five independent kingdoms. Berar under the Imad Shahi [1484-1572 A.D], Bidar under the Barid Shahi [1492-1609 A.D], Ahmadnagar under the Nizam Shahi (1490-1637 A.D), Bijapur under the Adilshahis (1489-1686 A.D), and Golconda under Qutb Shahi [1489-1686 A.D].

Since there were no clearly defined boundaries of these newly independent kingdoms, their rulers were constantly at war over territorial disputes reinforced by other controversies. In a few years the kingdom of Bidar and Berar were subdued by their powerful neighbours. The remaining three continued to flourish for almost 100-150 years before they were engulfed by the Mughal Empire.[1]

Modern writers have ascribed different motives to Akbar for adopting his policy towards the Deccan. Three specific suggestions have been made that "he cherished hopes of destroying the Portuguese dominion on the western coast",[2] or he desired to safeguard the trade route to the Gujarat sea ports and to dominate "Surat Hinterlands",[3]

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1 Beni Prasad, *History of Jahangir*, Allahabad, 1962, p.233.

2 V.A. Smith, *Akbar the Great Mughal*, New Delhi, 1958, p.263.

3 Satish Chandra, 'The Deccan Policy of the Mughals – A Reappraisal, Indian Historical Records Commission, Vol. IV, No.1, 1977-78, pp.326-27.

or finally that in the Deccan "he was seeking larger revenues".[4] All of these are relevant. It is also sometimes believed that this derived from Akbar's desire to be a '*chakravartin*' or from his self imposed obligation to provide 'good government'.[5]

By the 1590's Akbar's Empire encompassed almost the whole of northern India barring some parts of Bengal. For the Mughal arms to turn now in the direction of the Deccan was natural. Akbar annexed Berar by 1596 A.D and Khandesh by 1601 A.D.[6] Ahmadnagar too was formally annexed but its actual absorption had only progressed partially after Akbar's death.[7]

Akbar's earliest move towards Khandesh began with the annexation of Malwa (1562 A.D), and with this annexation the Mughals came to have a common frontier with Khandesh. A Mughal army under Adham Khan and later under Pir Muhammad Khan had occupied Malwa. In pursuit of Baz Bahadur, Pir Muhammad Khan invaded the territory of Khandesh.[8] In 1564 A.D, when Akbar came to Malwa to suppress the rebellion of Abdullah Khan Uzbek,[9] the Mughal army also entered into Khandesh

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4 Shireen Moosvi, 'The Mughal Empire and the Deccan Economic Factors and consequences', Proceedings of Indian History Congress, Kurukshetra, 1982, pp.365-66.

5 B.P. Saxena, *History of Shahjahan of Delhi*, 2nd ed., Allahabad 1976, pp.127-8.

6 Abul Fazl, *Akbarnama*, ed. by Maulvi Agha Ahmad and Maulvi Abdur Rahim, Bib. Indica, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1897-1921, Vol.III, p.760. Henceforth it will appear as *A.N.*

7 No *Jama* figures or other details for Ahmadnagar are given in the *Ain-i-Akbari* as it gave details of all the other conquered Subas.

8 *A.N.*, Vol.II, pp.134-35, Muhammad Qazim Ferishta. *Tarikh-i-Farishta*, Vol.I, Munshi Naval Kishore Press, Lucknow, 1864, pp.250-51.

9 Abdullah Khan Uzbek was one of the officers of Humayun, who rebelled under Akbar, to see the biography, *Masir-ul-Umara*, Vol.II, ed. by Abdur Rahim and Mirza Ashraf Ali, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1890, pp.764-69.

territory and captured Bijagarh.

This annexation alarmed Mubarak Shah who apparently wanted to avoid further confrontation with the Mughals and entered into a matrimonial alliance with Akbar.[10] He also transferred some more territories belonging to *Sarkar* Bijagarh and Handia to the Mughals in the form of Dowry[11], thus providing the Mughals an important foot holds to the south of Narmada. When Bahadur Shah, the next Sultan was not ready to submit, Abul Fazl was entrusted with the task of occupying Khandesh territory. He sent troops in different directions and within a short time almost whole of Khandesh with the exception of fort of Asirgarh, was under the Mughal occupation. After a prolonged siege the fort of Asirgarh was surrendered by its Garrison to Akbar in 1601 A.D. Bahadur Shah was sent to Gwalior Fort. With this Faruqi dynasty of Khandesh came to an end.[12]

In 1573 Mir Muhsin Rizvi, a Mughal envoy returned from Ahmadnagar who went to demand the surrender of Muhammad Hasan Mirza and also to advise Murtaza Nizam Shah I to follow in Abul Fazl words 'the path of obedience'.[13] But Murtaza Nizam Shah did not pay any heed. In 1576 A.D, a Mughal envoy, Baqi Khan, was sent to Ahmadnagar, in 1579 A.D another two envoys Peshrau Khan and Hakim Ali Gilani were sent to Ahmadnagar and Bijapur respectively asking the rulers of these states

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10 *A.N*, op.cit, Vol.II, p.30.

11 Abdullah Muhammad, Haji-ud-Dabir, *Zafar-ul-Waleh bi Muzaffar wa Alihi c.* (1606-11) ed. by E. Demission Ross, tr. by M.F. Lokhandwala Vol.I, Baroda, 1970, p.60.

12 *A.N*, Vol.III, pp.766-67.

13 Ibid, Vol.I, pp.77-78; Husain Mirza was the Mughal rebel who took shelter in Ahmadnagar after the fall of Gujarat, for details see *Tarikh-i-Ferishta*, Vol.I, pp.259-61.

accept Akbar's over lordship.[14]

The opportunity to intervene in the affair of Ahmadnagar presented itself to Akbar when Burhan-ul-Mulk, a younger brother of Murtaza Nizam Shah and the competitor for the Nizam Shahi throne came to take refuge at the Mughal court in 1583 A.D. Burhan-ul Mulk is reported to have described to the Mughal authorities the chaotic condition then prevailing in Ahmadnagar.[15] An army was sent under Aziz Koka but no substantial advance could be made.[16]

In 1588, following the death of Murtaza Nizam Shah I, a civil war began over the issue of succession and with Raja Ali Khan of Khandesh's help Burhan get the throne and assumed the title Burhan Nizam Shah II.[17]

After his accession he did not send any customary *peshkash* to the Mughal court making the situation more resentful towards him.[18] In 1591 A.D, Akbar sent four envoys to the four Deccan Kingdoms, namely Shaikh Faizi to Khandesh, Khwaja Aminuddin to Ahmadnagar, Mir Muhammad Amir to Bijapur and Mir Bunir to Golconda 'warning' that if they do not accept his overlord ship, an imperial army would be dispatched against them.[19]

In 1593 A.D, the envoys returned from the Deccan, Faizi's embassy to Khandesh was successful to some extent, but Burhan Nizam Shah II ignored the

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[14] *A.N*, Vol.III, pp.266-67,280.

[15] *A.N*, op.cit, Vol.II, p.407.

[16] Ibid p.489, Abdul Qadir Badauni, *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh* ed. Maulvi Ahmad Ali and Kabiruddin Ahmad, Vol.II, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1868, pp.360-62.

[17] *Tarikh-i-Farishta*, op.cit., Vol.II, p.151.

[18] *A.N*, Vol.III, pp.596-97,

[19] *Tarikh-i-Ferishta*, Vol.I, p.267.

demand to acknowledge Akbar as his overlord.[20]

The death of Burhan Nizam Shah in 1595 A.D provided the Mughals convenient opportunity to intervene in the affairs of Ahmadnagar. Initially Burhan was succeeded by his son Ibrahim, who invited a conflict with Bijapur, and was killed in the battlefield.[21]

Murad and Sadiq Khan were supervising the siege operations. The Ahmadnagar garrison however defended the fort under the command of Chand Bibi, who clad in full armor would often appear in the midst of Nizamshahi troops defending the fort.[22] After a prolonged siege Chand Bibi realized that they could no longer withstand the mounting Mughal pressure.[23] Ultimately Chand Bibi decided to open negotiations and it was accepted by Murad.[24]

The treaty was signed in 1596 A.D and the terms were:-

a) Bahadur Shah is recognized as the ruler of Ahmadnagar.[25]

b) He would accept Akbar's over lordship.

c) Territory of Berar ceded to the Mughals.

d) The Ahmadnagar authorities shall give valuable gifts to Akbar.[26]

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20 *A.N*, Vol III p.639, *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, Vol.II, p.389.

21 *Tarikh-i-Ferishta*, op.cit., Vol.II, pp.156-57.

22 Khafi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*, ed. Kabiruddin Ahmad and Wolsely Haig, Bib. Ind., Calcutta 1860-74, Vol.I, pp.204-207.

23 Ibid, Vol.I, pp.207-8.

24 *A.N*, op.cit, Vol III, pp.699-700.

25 Chand Bibi, the sister of Murtaza Nizam Shah I espoused the cause of Ibrahim's Infant son Bahadur, after 1595 when Ibrahim was killed, *Tarikh-i-Ferishta*, op.cit Vol.II, p.162.

Even after the settlement the struggle between them continued, and finally a battle fought on 8th February, 1597 A.D at Ashti and Mughals achieved a significant victory.[27] The conquests of the forts of Ahmadnagar (1600 A.D) and Asirgarh (1601 A.D) established Mughals in the Deccan on firm footing. Akbar returned from Burhanpur after having conferred the territories of Khandesh, Berar and Ahmadnagar upon Prince Daniyal.[28]

In August 1600 A.D, Ahmadnagar fort finally fell to the Mughals who carried into captivity the state's reining Sultan. For the next six years Malik Ambar[29] and Raju Deccani,[30] picking up the pieces of the shattered Nizamshahi kingdom, resisted Mughal occupation, but Mughal armies did not quit the Deccan.[31]

After Akbar's death in 1605 A.D the new Emperor Jahangir came to the throne determined to consolidate Mughal authority over the territory. General after General was dispatched to the Deccan to do away with Ambar and his puppet Sultan Murtaza Nizam Shah II, son in law of Malik Ambar,[32] but not one of them could capture or neutralize the charismatic Ethiopian. In 1610 A.D he even managed to expel Mughals from Ahmadnagar Fort. In warfare, in command, in sound judgments, and in

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26 *A.N*, Vol.III, pp.699-708, *Tarikh-i-Ferishta*, Vol.II, p.162.

27 Ibid Vol.III, pp.717-20.

28 *A.N*, Vol III, op.cit, pp.774-75.

29 An Ethiopian slave of Changez Khan who held the office of Peshwa or Chief Minister of the *Nizamshahi* ruler of Ahmadnagar.

30 Slave of Sadat Khan who himself was slave of Sultan Burhan II, Richard M. Eaton, *A Social history of the Deccan* 1300-1761, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.115.

31 Ibid, p.118.

32 Radhey Shyam, *Life and Times of Malik Ambar*, New Delhi, 1968, pp.38-39.

administration he had no rival or equal. He well understood the predatory (*Kazzaki*) warfare, which in the language of *Dakhani* is called *Bargiri*.[33]

Refusing to engage in pitched battle against the Mughals imposing façade of artillery, infantry and heavy cavalry, Ambar had deployed surprise night attacks, harassed enemy supply lines, and drawn Mughal forces into wooded and rugged ravines, where they could be hacked to pieces by his light cavalry. It is also revealing that the Mughal term for guerilla warfare *bargiri*, referred to units of Marathas – indigenous Marathi-speaking warriors who were trained by the state and paid directly out of the state's central treasury.[34] The Ahmadnagar Sultanate under Ambar's direction had effectively become a joint Habshi-Maratha enterprise.[35]

The pre-occupation of Jahangir in internal affairs after his accession, failure of Mughal arms in the Deccan and the successes of Malik Ambar led Bijapur, the largest and best organized state in the Deccan to change its attitude towards the *Mughals*. Ibrahim Adil Shah decided to ally himself with Malik Ambar in trying to expel the Mughals from the territories they had seized in Ahmadnagar.[36] And Jahangir was keenly watching these developments in the Deccan. Thus Parvez was removed from the

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[33] Mutamid Khan, *Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri* in *History of India as told by its own Historians* ed. and tr Henry M. Elliot and Dowson,Vol VI, Allahabad, 1964, pp.428-29.

[34] *Life and Times of Malik Ambar*, op.cit, p.96-98.

[35] Some of the more important maratha chiefs in Akbar's service were Shahji Sharofji, Maloji, parsoji, Manbai, Nagoji, Trimbakji Hambir Rao, Chavan, Nar Singh Raj, Ballala Tripul, Vithal Roy, Kavata, Dattaji, Naganath, Narsingh Pingle and Sunder Jagdir, Radhey Shyam, *Kingdom of Ahmadnagar*, Delhi, 1989, p.277.

[36] 'The Deccan Policy of the Mughals: A Reappraisal', op.cit, p.330.

Deccan and prince Khurram was given the charge.[37]

It is to Jahangir's credit that he understood the importance of the Marathas in the Deccan. He declared the Maratha *Sardars* to be the centre of resistance in that country, and made efforts to win them over to his side.[38]

Khurram arrived in the Deccan and his arrival brought about the desired change in the political atmosphere. The consequence of his arrival was that in 1616 the combined Deccan armies were defeated. Ibrahim Adil Shah had sent away twenty thousand troops under Mulla Mohammad Lari and Qutb Shah had sent five thousand horses. In the battle outside Khirkee,[39] Malik Ambar suffered heavy losses. The Bijapur and Golconda forces also suffered heavily and, Khirki was thoroughly ravaged.[40]

The Adilshahis and Malik Ambar found that it is difficult to win over prince Khurram. They offered presents worth of one million and five hundred thousand rupees. Malik Ambar returned Balaghat and agreed to surrender Ahmadnagar and other forts.[41]

In 1620, the combined armies of the three Deccan states again challenged the Mughals. Malik Ambar had some success at first. In 1621 A.D prince Khurram entered

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37 Jahangir, *Tuzuk*-i- *Jahangiri*, tr Rogers and Beverige, Vol I, p336.

38 *The Mughal Empire*, ed. by R.C. Majumdar, Bombay, 1974, p.181.

39 Khirki was the town near Daulatabad that Ambar had founded and which was later renamed Aurangabad, the defeat quarters of Khirki, there named after prominent Maratha chiefs i.e., Malpura, Khopura Paraspura, Vithalpura, Promod B., Gadre, *Cultural Archaeology of Ahmadnagar during Nizamshahi Period (1494-1632)*, Delhi, 1986, p.182.

40 Jahangir, *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, ed. Saiyid Ahmad Khan, Ghazipur and Aligarh, 1963-64, Vol.I, pp.312-14.

41 Muhammad Amin Bin Abul Husain Qazvini, *Badshahnama* (c-1636-37), BR M, MS, or 173, Rieu i/258b, Rotograph 191, CAS, Department of History, f. 71.

Burhanpur, the Deccanis did not pay any heed to it but the prince made arrangements to deal a quick and effective blow at the Deccan states.[42] And at last the Mughals forced the Deccanis to raise the siege of Ahmadnagar. Thus once again by a combination of force and tact Shahjahan patched up a peace in Deccan.

Jahangir did not try to go beyond the settlement arrived at by Akbar, except marginally contenting himself in 1622 A.D with fourteen Kos of additional territory and an indemnity of 50 lakh rupees from the three Deccan States.[43]

After 1622 A.D, both Bijapur and Malik Ambar bid for an alliance with the Mughals. Jahangir apparently decided that an alliance with a restless, ambitious person like Malik Ambar would draw the Mughals into the internal politics of the Deccan states. On the other hand, for the stabilization of the salvation in the Deccan and for peace, it was more necessary to isolate Malik Ambar. This perhaps was the background to the Mughal alliance with Bijapur.[44]

Thus Jahangir's main objective in the Deccan was the maintenance of Akbar's settlement of 1600 A.D.[45] After the death of Malik Ambar (1626 A.D), the struggle between the Mughals and the Nizamshahi nobles had ceased for sometime.[46]

When Shahjahan ascended the throne on 29th January 1628 A.D, his first concern as Emperor was to recover the territories lost to the Nizam Shah which included Balaghat and adjoining territories surrendered to the Nizam Shahi authorities

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[42] Ibid, f. 93.

[43] *Tuzuk*, (ed) Vol.I,pp. 206-8.

[44] *Tuzuk*, (ed) op.cit, pp.288, 296, Mutamid Khan, *Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri*, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, 1865, Vol III, pp.223-4.

[45] Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, Aligarh 1959, p.332.

[46] *Tuzuk*, (ed)Vol I, p.194.

by Khan-i-Jahan Lodhi towards the last days of Jahangir's reign. Khan-i-Jahan Lodhi's rebellion and subsequently his being given shelter by Burhan Nizam Shah III was additional setback for the Mughals.[47]

Burhan Nizam Shah III also secured military assistance from the rulers of Bijapur and Golconda. On coming to the throne Shahjahan therefore began his diplomatic moves to isolate Nizamshahis from the other two Deccani Kingdoms. He sent two brothers, Shaikh Muinuddin and Shaikh Muhiuddin, as envoys to Bijapur and Golconda respectively.[48]

Shahjahan appointed Iradat Khan entitled Azam Khan, as the new *Subedar*. He deputed a well equipped army to pursue Khan-i-Jahan Lodhi[49] who was killed in a struggle at Sihonda on January 26th, 1631 A.D.[50] During this time Shahjahan's diplomatic mission to Bijapur proved to be a futile exercise.

When the situation was not improved, Shahjahan decided to proceed to Deccan personally and reached Burhanpur in February 1630 A.D.[51] Shahjahan's well planned and well executed military operations soon had the desired effect on the rulers of Golconda and Bijapur. First Abdullah Qutb Shah compelled with the dictates of Shahjahan in April 1636 A.D.[52] Soon after him, Muhammad Abul Shah of Bijapur also

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47 For details of Khan-i-Jahan's rebellion. See Hamid Lahori's *Badshahnama*, ed. by Kabiruddin Ahmad and Abdur Rahim, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1868, Vol.I, pt.I, p.289.

48 Qazvini op.cit, ff.214ab.

49 Qazvini, Vol I, f.175b, See also Lahori's *Badshahnama*, Vol.I, pt.1, p.257.

50 Ibid, ff.216b-17b.

51 Ibid, f.189b.

52 Lahori, op.cit., Vol.I, pt. II, pp.178-80.

followed suit by agreeing to a formal settlement with the Mughals in May 1636 A.D.[53]

The terms of the treaty were that Adil Shah had to recognize the Mughal sovereignty, to pay two millions of rupees as peace offering, to maintain peace with Golconda, and to submit it to the Emperor's arbitration as regards to his quarrel with Qutb Shah. Further Shahjahan defined the boundaries of Bijapur, and assigned a part of the Nizamshahi territories to the Adilshahis. And finally each side undertook not to reduce the officers of the other from their master's side, and Adil shah agreed to cooperate with the Mughals in reducing Shahji, the Maratha Sardar to Submission.[54]

After the settlement of 1636 A.D, Aurangzeb was appointed Subedar of the Deccan, thus the peace between the Mughals and the Deccan states resulting from the settlement of 1636 A.D continued for about twenty years. Hence no forceful military demonstrations were held on the Mughal frontier in the Deccan during 1636-56 A.D.[55]

H.K. Sherwani however argues that the Mughals were not able to make any further military move for checking the southward expansion of Bijapur and Golconda as there were frequent changes of 'viceroys' particularly after 1644 A.D. As many as five 'Viceroys' were successively appointed between; 1644-1652 A.D. According to him, owing to administrative uncertainty caused by the transfer of the "viceroys", the Mughals were not able to effectively intervene in the affairs of Deccan.[56]

He further suggests that the rapid changes of 'viceroys' also worsened the economy of the Deccan provinces. It was after 1652 A.D when Aurangzeb was

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[53] Ibid, pp 167-74.

[54] Qazvini, ff.381-83b, Lahori, Vol.I, pt. II, pp.167-74.

[55] J.F. Richards, *The Mughal Empire*, Oxford University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p.138.

[56] H.K. Sherwani, *History of Qutb Shahi Dynasty*, Delhi, 1974, p.430.

appointed 'viceroy' of the Deccan for the second time; that steps were taken to improve the Mughal position in the Deccan.[57]

From January 1658 A.D when Aurangzeb left the Deccan to contest the throne of his father till March 1682 A.D when he returned to the south to wear out the last quarter century of his life in ceaseless warfare, a period of 24 years intervened, during which there were five viceroys of the Mughal province of the Deccan, among whom prince Shah Alam held the office for 11 years, Bahadur Khan for 6 years, Shaista Khan for 4 years Jai Singh for nearly two and Diler Khan for one year.[58]

Aurangzeb wanted the annexation of the entire kingdom of Golconda and had used all kinds of arguments to persuade Shahjahan to order annexation. However Shahjahan's objectives were limited, he wanted to fleece Qutb Shah in the name of compensation. By the treaty the Mughals also gained Ramgir district which was an added bonus.[59] For Bijapur, Shahjahan instructed Aurangzeb to annex, if possible the whole of the kingdom, else to recover the old territory of Ahmadnagar and to spare the rest for an indemnity of one and a half Gores and the recognition of the emperor's suzerainty, that is the reading of *Khutba* and issuing *Sikka* in his name.[60]

By the treaty of 1657 A.D Bijapur was compelled to agree to surrender the Nizamshahi areas ceded to it by the accord of 1636 A.D and the demand on Golconda to cede with the Mughals, the rich and fertile tract on the coromandal as part of Mir

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57 Ibid, p 430.

58 History of Aurangzeb, op.cit, Vol IV, p.10.

59 Jadunath Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, Vol.I, Calcutta, 1930, pp.133-34.

60 Ibid, p.147.

Jumla's *Jagir*.[61]

These wars in 1656-57 A.D against Golconda and Bijapur satisfied nobody, Aurangzeb who had advocated annexation of the two states, was enraged and frustrated at the compromise agreement. Thus the conditions were created for a union of hearts between the Mughals and the Deccan states becoming 'a psychological impossibility'.[62]

1.2. Aurangzeb's Advances:

As viceroy of the Deccan, Aurangzeb had been a leading advocate of the 'forward policy' in the Deccan. It might have been expected that after seating on the throne surely, he would pursue such a policy vigorously. However Aurangzeb adopted a cautious policy of limited advance. He desired that the Adil Shah should be made to fulfill the treaty of 1657 A.D.[63]

Jadunath Sarkar is right in thinking that the growing feebleness of Bijapur following the accession of the boy king Sikandar in 1672 A.D, and faction fights at the Bijapur court were the starting point of a new forward policy in the Deccan signalized by the replacement of Shah Alam by the energetic and successful general Bahadur Khan as a *Subedar* of Deccan (1673 A.D). This marks the beginning of the second phase of Aurangzeb's policy in the Deccan. During this phase, Aurangzeb's objectives were still limited. No forces were assigned to Bahadur Khan.[64]

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[61] W.H. Moreland, *Akbar to Aurangzeb: A Study in Economic History*, New Delhi 1972, p.140.

[62] *History of Aurangzeb*, op.cit., Vol. IV, p.6.

[63] Satish Chandra, *Mughal Religious Policies, the Rajputs and the Deccan*, Delhi, 1993, p.139.

[64] *History of Aurangzeb*, op.cit., Vol.IV, p.160.

The arrival of Aurangzeb in the Deccan in pursuit of Prince Akbar did not lead to any immediate change in the Mughal policy towards the Deccan states.[65] It was by 1684 A.D Aurangzeb came to the conclusion that he could not achieve his objectives without first undertaking the outright annexation of one or both the Deccani states. We may consider this as the third and final phase of Aurangzeb's Deccan policy.[66]

At the time of Jai Singh's appointment Aurangzeb instructed him to punish both Shivaji and the Bijapur king. But Jai Singh had pleaded that it is not better to attack both at the same time.[67] The aim of the Mughals is clear from Jai Singh's secret dispatch to Aurangzeb "The conquest of Bijapur is the preface to the conquest of all Deccan and Karnatak".[68]

Jai Singh's invasion of Bijapur 1665-66 was a military failure. Not as inch of territory, not a stone of a fortress, not a piece of indemnity was gained. In addition to the thirty lakh of rupees from the imperial treasury, Jai Singh had spent more than a crore out of his own pocket.[69] The escape of Shivaji from Agra (August 1666 A.D) added to Jai Singh's trouble, he was held to be in some way responsible for the conduct of his son Ram Singh who was suspected of helping in Shivaji's flight. On 23rd March 1667 A.D he was recalled to count and the viceroyalty of the Deccan was given to Prince Muazzam.[70]

In 1672, Ali Adil Shah II died, at this time Aurangzeb appointed the energetic

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65 Mirza Ibrahim Zuberi, *Basatin-us-Salatin*, Hyderabad, Deccan 1824, p.530.

66 *History of Aurangzeb*, op.cit., Vol.IV, pp.335-58.

67 Ibid., p.27.

68 Muhammad Kazim, *Alamgirnama*, Bib. Ind, Calcutta, 1865-73, p.913.

69 Bhimsen, *Nuskha-i-Dilkusha*, ed and tr, V.G. Khobrekar, Bombay, 1972, p.56.

70 *Alamgirnama*, op.cit, p.1037.

viceroy Bahadur Khan, Khan-i-Jahan Bahadur Kokaltash. The mild and supine administration of prince Muazzam was to be replaced by a forward policy in the Deccan.[71]

But the second in command Diler Khan wrote to the Emperor accusing Bahadur Khan of having formed a secret alliance with the three Deccani power and of being really hostile to the success of imperial enterprise there.[72] Bahadur Khan was recalled by Aurangzeb. He left the province early in September 1677 A.D.[73]

Diler Khan and Bahlol, the regent and the patron of the Afghan faction at Bijapur became friends and secured the removal of Bahadur Khan. Bahlol died in December 1677, and Masaud was installed as Regent in February 1678 A.D. Diler Khan became viceroy of Deccan in 1678 A.D and he began his task in the approved Mughal fashion by reducing the Bijapuri officers with promise of *mansab* and *jagirs* under the Emperor.[74]

Diler Khan demanded that Masaud should resign the regency and retire to his fief while the Bijapur government would be carried on by the creature of the Mughals but Masaud rejected the proposal as a plan of the Mughals for putting an end to the Adilshahi dynasty.[75]

The rivalry between Diler Khan and Shah Alam made his efforts failure, and his viceroyalty ended in October 1678, when Shah Alam had arrived at Aurangabad to fill

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71 Saqi Mustaid, Khan, *Masir-i-Alamgiri*, tr. J. Sarkar, ASB, Calcutta, 1947, p.123-4.

72 *Dilkusha*, p.146.

73 Ibid, p.157.

74 *Dilkusha*, op.cit, p.158.

75 *Basatin-us-Salatin*, op.cit., p.490.

that office for the fourth time.[76] But Aurangzeb was not satisfied with their viceroyalty and appointed Khan-i-Jahan as Subedar of the Deccan for second time.[77]

When Aurangzeb moved to the Deccan personally in 1681 in pursuit of his fugitive son, finally the annexation of Bijapur and Golconda was realized. The siege of Bijapur began on 1st April, 1685 A.D. On 12th September, 1686 Adilshahis capitulated.[78] The fall of Golconda occurs on 21st September, 1687 A.D.[79]

By the end of the year 1689, Aurangzeb was the unrivalled lord, paramount of Northern India and the Deccan alike. Adil Shah, Qutb Shah and Raja Shambhuji had all fallen and their dominions had been annexed to his empire.[80] All seemed to have been gained by Aurangzeb now, but in reality all was lost. It was the beginning of his end. The endless war in the Deccan exhausted his treasury. Napoleon used to say 'It was the Spanish ulcer which ruined me'. The Deccan ulcer ruined Aurangzeb.[81]

1.3. Up to 1719 A.D:

Aurangzeb died on March 3, 1707, in his encampment at Ahmadnagar in the Deccan. In a written will the emperor made a futile attempt to divide the empire between his three living sons. Instead, the usual war of succession, so long delayed, broke out almost immediately among Prince Azam Shah, Muazzam and Muhammad

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76 *Masir-i-Alamgiri*, op.cit., p.169.

77 *Dilkusha*, op.cit, pp.156, 163.k

78 Jadunath Sarkar, *Short History of Aurangzeb*, Calcutta, 1830, pp.245-46.

79 Khafi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*, E & D, Vol.VII, pp.331-36.

80 *Masir-i-Alamgiri*, op.cit, p.331; *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*, ibid., pp.383-89.

81 *History of Aurangzeb*, op.cit, Vol.IV, p.484.

Kam Baksh.[82] At a site just north of Lahore, Muazzam declared his accession to the throne and took the title of 'Bahadur Shah'.[83]

One most important point to be stressed here is the hesitation of the two main groups of leading nobles Irani[84] and Turani,[85] at the Imperial Capital, to participate in the civil war. The Nizam his father their supporters were thus faced with the real possibility that the next Emperor would destroy their collective power. They were going to sit out the much anticipated war of succession, maintaining strict neutrality towards the rival contenders. At the same time, they prepared themselves for the possibility of princely aggression. Their keenness to be left alone in the Deccan, their old connections with the Deccani nobles and the desertion of a large number of Deccani soldiers, with them all this indicate that the intents of both the groups were already centered not in the capital but in the Deccan itself.

Towards the end of Aurangzeb's reign, the Nizam and his family began hoarding weapons especially artillery. The buildup did not go unnoticed and in 1703 a letter from Aurangzeb to his grandson, Bidar Bakht, states

[.....Khan Firoz Jung's expenses for his followers are greater than the requirements for his rank and salary (*zyada-az zabit-i-mansab wa Tankhwah*). I noticed all manner of

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82 William Irvine, *Later Mughals*, New Delhi 1971, Vol.I, p.66.

83 *The Mughal Empire*, op.cit, p.253.

84 Zulfiqar Khan, Asad Khan, Daud Khan Panni, Sarbuland Khan, Abdul Samad Khan, Shahnawaz Khan, *Masir-ul-Umara*, ed. Maulavi Abdur Rahim and Mirza Ashraf Ali, ASB, Calcutta, 1890, Vol.III, pp.801-806.

85 Nizam-ul-Mulk, Hamid Khan, Muhammad Amin Khan, Zakariya Khan, Iwaz Khan Muhammad Samad Khan; *Umara*, Vol III, pp.837-848, 765-769, Vol.I, pp.346-350, Vol.II, pp.106-107, Vol.III, pp.69-74.

guns.....horsemen with weapons.....and many other things, some of which are necessary and others not. As a result I confiscated many of those things.][86]

If Aurangzeb's decision to confiscate some weapons proved a setback, it nonetheless was only a temporary one. Nizam-ul-Mulk seems to have maintained a large number of elephants even so late as about 1730-31 A.D, when on a campaign to the north of his dominion in the direction of the Tapti, he had with him 1026 elephants of which 225 were provided with armor and presumably were used in battle.[87] After the introduction of fire arms and the gradual extent ion of their use, elephant ceased to be of much value in the fighting line of battle. Soon they were more largely employed as beasts of burden or as aids in the transport of heavy guns.[88]

The *Subedari* of the Deccan assumed great importance as a prize possession for the nobles. Whether the ruler was Azam, Muazzam, Kam Baksh, Azimushan, Jahandar, Farrukh Siyar or any other prince, the Subedari of the Deccan was coveted by the Chief Minister, Zulfiqar Khan, Minim Khan, Syed Husain Ali Khan, Nizam-ul-Mulk and other. Disgusted with the rulers at Delhi, they sought refuge in Deccan.[89]

In a battle fought Kam Baksh was wounded and died shortly.[90] Bahadur Shah after his accession offered the viceroyalty of Deccan to his son Prince Azimush-Shan but he refused and finally it was conferred on Zulfiqar Khan, with full powers and

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[86] Aurangzeb, *Ruqat-i- Alamgiri*, ed. Sayyid Muhammad Majeed, Kanpur 1916, p 31-32.

[87] Aurangabadi, Muhammad Qasim, *Ahwal-ul-Khawaqin*, BM, MS, Rieu I, Add 26, 244, R 36, C.A.S, A.M.U, Aligarh, f 218b.

[88] Irvine, *Army of the Indian Mughals*, op. cit, pp 179-80.

[89] H.K. Sherwani & P.M. Joshi edt. *History of Medieval Deccan*, Vol.I, Andhra Pradesh, 1973, p.609.

[90] *Later Mughals*, op.cit, pp.62-65.

authority in all matters pertaining to the revenue and administration of the Deccan.[91]

He was allowed to remain at the capital and to combine his appointment with his previous post of *Mir Bakshi*. Zulfiqar Khan's associate Daud Khan Panni was allowed to remain in the Deccan as his deputy with a higher mansab of 7000/5000 with the governorship of Bijapur. Berar and Aurangabad and was permitted to make Aurangabad his headquarters.[92]

By virtue of holding two such important posts Zulfiqar became one of the most powerful nobles in the Empire. Munim Khan, the *Wazir* realized that with such multiplicity of offices Zulfiqar Khan was leading for something more than the *Subedari*. He therefore wanted to minimize his power as far as possible.

He argued that the province of Burhanpur (Khandesh) and more than half of Berar, known as *painghat* did not form a part of the Deccan at all, and that these *Subas* should be included in the provinces dependent on Delhi. But Bahadur Shah did not accept these changes and allowed the previous arrangements to continue.[93] Thus Zulfiqar Khan remained the viceroy of the Deccan with sole authority over its affairs.[94]

There is no doubt that the delegation of large powers to the viceroy of the

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[91] *Parties and Politics*, op.cit, p.82, Zulfiqar Khan was appointed on 4 *Zulqadah*, 15 January 1709, though a *farman* was not issued till 10th March 1709.

[92] Ghulam Hussain, *Siyar-ul-Mutakhirin*, Litho, Lucknow edition, 1784, Vol.I, p.4.

[93] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p.626-27, Zulfiqar Khan's Diwan in the Deccan was Diyanat Khan Khafi, the son of the ex Diwan of the Deccan, Amanat Khan. At the instance of Munim Khan, Diyanat Khan was superseded by Murshid Quli Khan, the Diwan of Bengal. It seems that Munim Khan wanted to use Murshid Ali Khan as check for Zulfiqar Khan, but Murshid refused and soon Zulfiqar Khan appointed Amanat Khan as *diwan* and Diyanat Khan was made his deputy.

[94] *Muntakhab*, Vol II, p.625-26.

Deccan, or to his deputy was an administrative necessity, but in the background of the growing feebleness of the central government made the nobles ambitious to secure the post. Along with the posts of *Wazir* and *Mir Bakshi*, the post of the viceroy of Deccan became one of the Chief Prizes in the struggle between parties and factions at the court.[95]

Zulfiqar Khan presented an application before the Emperor for the grant of the *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* for the six *Subas* of the Deccan to Shahu on the condition of restoring prosperity to the ruined land. At the same time Munim Khan presented Yadukesh the *wakil* of Tara Bai, praying for a *Farman* in the name of her son, Shivaji II. She asked only for a *Sardeshmukhi, Chauth* was not discussed and also offered to suppress other insurgents and to restore order in the country. In the end Bahadur Shah ordered that *Sanads* for *Sardeshmukhi* be given in compliance with the requests of both Munim Khan and Zulfiqar Khan.[96] In other words, he refused to recognize Shahu as the rightful Maratha King.

Zulfiqar Khan who was a man of wide experience and well aware of the Maratha character and politics felt that this is the suitable time for a bold and far reaching re-orientation of policy in the Deccan with the objective of making Marathas partners. In 1710, a large band of Marathas entered the *Suba* of Bijapur and moved in the director of Ahmadnagar the governor Rustam Khan Bijapuri was not able to control

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95 *Parties and politics*, op.cit. p.84.

96 *Muntakhab*, Vol.II, pp.627, 783; Shahnawaz Khan says that Bahadur Shah granted 10% as Sardeshmukhi out of the total collection of (only the five) Subahs of Aurangabad, Khandesh, Berar, Bijapur and Bidar, *Umara*, op.cit, Vol II, p.351.

the Marathas.[97]

With the efforts of Daud Khan Panni towards the end of 1710 Rao Rambha Nimbalkar joined the Mughals and was awarded with the *mansab* of 7000/6000. Paima Raj Sindhia, Chandrasen Jadhav also joined hands with Mughals in 1711.[98] It seems that about this time Daud Khan entered into a private Pact with Shahu. According to which the *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of the Deccan was promised to Shahu, but it was not collected by the Maratha agents but by Daud Khan's deputy, Hiraman who would pay it to the Marathas. No written confirmation of this agreement was given to Marathas.[99]

But the agreement failed to bring peace to the Deccan, in fact it gave birth to infinity of bickering and troubles, which always ended in some blood the hands of the Marathas, stretched everywhere, their agents appeared in all places according to usage and levied *Chauth.*[100] Thus it appears that Bahadur Shah was unable to formulate a clear cut and decisive policy in the Deccan. Confusion and lawlessness prevailed.

After the death of Bahadur Shah in 1712, struggle started amongst the sons of the Emperor, Rafi-ush -Shah, Jahan Shah, Jahandar and Azim-ush-Shan. Jahandar Shah was able to succeed to the imperial throne after defeating Rafi-ush- Shan and Jahan Shah. As in 1707, the Nizam again took the extraordinary decision of being neutral in the succession. This naturally did not endear him to the next Emperor Jahandar Shah.

Jahandar was even further irritated to Nizam's threat to again resign all imperial

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[97] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol II p.666.

[98] *Parties & Politics*, op.cit, p.87.

[99] *Muntakhab*, Vol.II, p.788.

[100] Ibid, p.742.

commissions including the governorship of Malwa, if the Emperor continued to favour individuals whom the Nizam did not consider worthy.[101]

During the rule of Jahandar Shah, Zulfiqar Khan exercised almost uncontrolled authority and his father Asad Khan continued as *Wakil-i-Mutlaq*.[102] The Nizam, his family and supporters were not going to be trusted and were not going to be admitted in the inner circle of the Emperor. This was the price for having been so closely associated with Aurangzeb against his sons and grandsons.

Zulfiqar Khan became *Wazir*, and he also retained the viceroyalty of the Deccan which he continued to govern through his deputy, Daud Khan, granted with the *mansab* of 10000/10000, and the title of *Yar-i-Wafadar* (faithful Friend).[103]

Farrukh Siyar, the second son of Azim-ush-Shan, proclaimed himself Emperor at Patna with the help of the Saiyid brothers, Saiyid Husain Ali, Governor of Bihar and his brother Saiyid Abdullah Khan, Governor of Allahabad.[104] The battle was fought among the claimants of the throne on 10 January 1713; Nizam-ul-Mulk played no part in Farrukhsiyar's accession. Jahandar was imprisoned and then put to death on the orders of Farrukh Siyar who proclaimed himself Emperor.[105] This was followed by the execution of Zulfiqar Khan.[106]

Through the early years of Farrukhsiyar's reign, the Nizam's political and military strength vis-à-vis the imperial court declined as his diverse and often fractious

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[101] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol II, p 689.

[102] *History of Medieval Deccan*, op.cit., Vol.I, p.613.

[103] Yusuf Husain, *Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I*, Mangalore, 1936, p.47.

[104] *Umara*, op.cit, Vol.I, p.629.

[105] *Parties and Politics*, op.cit., pp.84-85.

[106] J.G. Duff, *History of the Marathas*, London, 1912, Vol.I, ed. J. P. Guha, Delhi 1971, p.239.

coalition of family members, political allies and clients fell apart. Muhammad Amin Khan, in particular, proved a weak link for he had not accepted the Nizam as the head of the extended family after the death of Ghazi-ud-din Khan in 1710.

But in view of the neutrality of the Turani nobles under Chin Qilich Khan (Nizam-ul-Mulk), the new Emperor conferred upon him the viceroyalty of the Deccan with the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk Fateh Jang.[107]

The arrangement made by Daud Khan Panni when he was the deputy of governor Zulfiqar Khan with Shahu was not accepted by Nizam-ul-Mulk and Daud Khan Panni was transferred to Gujarat.[108]

During his short stay in the Deccan Nizam-ul-Mulk was able to restore the prosperity of the *Suba* "by strict economy and the management of the finances as well by reorganizing the revenue system which had become corrupt and iniquitous. In the II R.Y of Farrukhsiyar, Nizam-ul- Mulk after the Eid-ul-Fitr prayer, with the five six thousand soldiers and heavy cannons moved to fight with the Maratha forces. On the other hand he had sent Ghiyas Khan and his *Diwan* Khem Karan to look after the administration of the *parganas*.[109] But in April 1715 he was replaced by Husain Ali Khan as the viceroy of the Deccan.[110] Nizam-ul-Mulk Chin Qilich Khan was posted as the *Faujdar* of Moradabad.[111]

The relation between the Emperor and the Saiyid brothers were very much

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[107] *Umara*, Vol.II, p.63, 513, 832.

[108] *Duff, op.cit*, Vol.I, p.240.

[109] *Muntakhab*, Urdu, tr, Muhammad Ahmad Faruqi, Karachi, 1964, Vol, IV, p 192.

[110] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol IV (Urdu trs), pp 189-92.

[111] G.S. Cheema, *The Forgotten Mughals, A History of the Later Emperors of the house of Babur 1707-1857*, Delhi, 2002, p.117.

strained from the very beginning. Nizam-ul-Mulk tried to reassert his importance in Mughal politics by helping Muhammad Amin Khan in bringing downfall to the Saiyid brothers.[112] To buttress himself against all eventualities, Husain Ali opened negotiations with Balaji Vishwanath, the Peshwa. The latter demanded the recognition of Shahu's succession to Shivaji's Kingdom, the right of levying *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* on the six provinces of the Deccan.[113]

The Emperor sent a letter to Daud Khan to take over the governorship of Khandesh and to March on the Deccan to destroy Husain Ali Khan's power. He also instigated Shahu to help Daud Khan in his efforts. As a result Daud Khan and Syed Husain Ali met in a deadly combat near Burhanpur on 6 September 1715, when Daud Khan was killed and Husain Ali Khan became viceroy of the Deccan without an apposition.[114]

Husain Ali Khan appointed his nephew Alim Ali Khan as his representative in the Deccan during his absence. In the meantime Farrukhsiyar had been deposed, blinded and killed, there came about a change in the policy of the Syeds towards Nizam-ul-Mulk. He was offered the *Suba* of Malwa, because he would have no scope in that province to bid for power.

When Nizam-ul-Mulk left Delhi in 1719, he had taken away his whole family with him and the army which he had, consisting mainly of the Mughals.[115] The Nizam found the condition of the *Suba* in a state of confusion and the constant Maratha

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[112] *Ahwal*, op.cit, f 152a-178a.

[113] *Seir*, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.91-92.

[114] *Muntakhab*, Vol.IV, (Urdu trs) pp 199-202.

[115] *Ahwal*, op.cit, f.152b.

invasions made the province lawless and the internal security was threatened. He thus tried to develop the military power to counter with the problem.[116]

Nizam-ul-Mulk accepted the offer at that time (in 1715) on condition that he was not to be removed or transferred to any other province.[117] But he was recalled on the plea that it was necessary in the interest of the Deccan that Husain Ali Khan should also have the charge of Malwa in addition to the Deccan. Niam-ul-Mulk was now asked to choose any one of the four provinces, Akbarabad, Allahabad, Multan and Burhanpur. Since it was the breach of the agreement entered upon between them, the apprehended worse consequences were ready to come.[118]

The Syed brothers sent Alam Ali Khan and Dilawar Ali Khan to check the advances of Nizam-ul-Mulk, who marched straight for the Narmada. In the battle that was fought near Khandwa Dilawar Ali Khan was struck by a bullet and killed.[119]

The news of the death of Dilawar Ali Khan created panic and consternation in the minds of the Syed brothers who were now greatly concerned over the safety of their families. They now tried to appease Nizam-ul-Mulk by bestowing on him the viceroyalty of the Deccan. "Accept my congratulations", wrote Husain Ali Khan "Alim Ali Khan my adopted son and my family propose to return to this country. Kindly furnish them with an escort and see that they are not molested on the way.[120]

But Alam Ali Khan was preparing for the final action. He mounted his elephant,

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[116] *Muntakhab,* op.cit, Vol. II, p.848.

[117] Shivdas, *Shahnamah-i-Munnawwar-ul-Kalam,* tr. Hasan Askari, Patna, 1980, p.70.

[118] *Shahnama,* op.cit, pp.74-75.

[119] *Later Mughals,* op.cit., Vol II, pp.3, 29.

[120] *Later Mughals,* Vol II, p.36.

and taking his place in the centre with an army of about 16,000 he attacked Nizam-ul-Mulk. The battle was fought ending in Alam Ali Khan's death and complete victory of Nizam-ul-Mulk.[121]

Thus after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, there was constant struggle among the nobles for the control of the viceroyalty of Deccan. This shows the importance of Deccan during the period, the reason it seems that all the nobles were aware of the declining authority of the centre and they had better chances for their independence or at least non interference from the Centre.

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[121] *Shahnamah*, op.cit., p.75.

Table I- List of the *Subedars* of Deccan 1596-1707

Year	Name	Post	Source
1596-1597	Murad	*Subedar*	*AN, III, 752*
1598-1599	Daniyal	„	*AN, III, 756*
1599-1605	Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khana	„	*AN, III, 837; MR, II, 497, 501*
1609-1613	„	„	*MR, II, 521, 519 Tuzuk, 108*
1616-1617	Khurram	„	*Tuzuk, 167*
1617-1619	Abdur Rahim	„	*Tuzuk, 257* *E.F., I, 170*
1619-1620	Khurram	„	*Tuzuk, 332*
1621	Khwaja Abul Hasan	„	*E.F., I, 270*
1621-1622	Khurram	„	*Tuzuk, 353*
1622-1623	Parvez	„	*Tuzuk, 360*
1626-1628	Pir Khan Khan Jahan Lodhi	„	*Qazvini-131b* *lahori, I, 75*
1628-1629-	Mahabat his son Khan-i-Zaman followed him as Deputy Subedar	„	*Lahori, I, 199* *Qazvini, 152, 6*
1629	Mir Muhammad Baqar	„	*Lahori, I, 257, 293*
1629-1630	Iradat Khan	„	*Qazvini, 190 b* *Lahori I, 424*
1631-1632	Mahabat Khan, Kha-i-Zaman Deputy	„	*Ibid.*
1632-1633	Iradat Khan	„	*Ibid.*

1634-1636	Mahabat Khan	„	*Lahori, I, 440*
1636-1637	Aurangzeb Mirza Abu Talib Deputy	Subedar	*Lahori I ,205b* *Lahori I, 271b*
1637-1638	Shaista Khan	„	*Lahori I, 288b*
1644-1645	Aurangzeb	„	*Lahori II, 376*
1645-1648	Ikhtisas Khan	„	*Lahori II, 430, 679, Waris 17 a*
1648-1649	Shahnawaz Khan	„	*Waris 17 a*
1649-1650	Muhammad Baksh	„	*Waris 87 b*
1650-1652	Shaista Khan	„	*Waris 142 a*
1652-1656	Aurangzeb	„	*Waris 259 a*
1657-1668	Shah Alam	„	*Dilkusha 69 b*
1672-1676	Bahadur Khan	„	*Ibid*
1674-1678	Shaista Khan	„	-
1678-1679	Jai Singh	„	-
1679-1680	Dilir Khan	„	*Dilkusha b 8a*
1680-1688	Khan-i-Jahan Zafar Jung Kokaltash	„	-
1688-1707	Ghazi-ud-din Khan	„	-

MUGHAL EMPIRE
AT THE TIME OF
MUHAMMAD SHAH'S
ACCESSION 1719
Empire Boundary
Suba Boundary
0 100 200KM.
THE UZBEK KHANATE
THE SAFAVID EMPIRE
KABUL
KASHMIR
HORE
MULTAN
DELHI
AJMER
AGRA
AWADH
MURUNG
TIBET
Nepal
Bhutan
ASSAM
SIND
MALWA
ALLAHABAD
BIHAR
BENGAL
GUJARAT
KHANDESH
BERAR
AHMADNAGAR
BIJAPUR
HAIDARABAD
GOLCONDA
ORISSA
UNSUBJUGATED TRACT
PEGU (BURMA)
ARAKHANG(ARAKAN)
ARABIAN SEA
BAY OF BENGAL
MALABAR
CEYLON
Kandy
Colombo
Goa (Portuguese)
Daman (Portuguese)
Laccadiv Islands (To Malabar)
Lesser Tibet
Greater Kashmir Tibet
Kabul
Ghazni
Qandahar
Balkha
Oxus R.
Indus R.
Lahore
Multan
Sirhind
Delhi
Agra
Akbarabad
Bayana
Lucknow
Awadh
Allahabad
Jaunpur
Patna
Benares
Akbarnagar (Rajmahal)
Murshidabad
Dacca
Bhakkar
Sehwan
Jodhpur
Ajmer
Chitor
Thatta
Ujjain
Mandu
Ahmadabad
Cambay
Surat
Burhanpur
Ellichpur
Deogarh
Gadha
Battha
Surguja
Khokhra
Cuttack
Bastar
Aurangabad
Daulatabad
Ahmadnagar
Bidar
Golkanda
Hyderabad
Bijapur
Masulipatam
Bednur
Calicut
Tanjavur
Madura
Kumaon
Sirmur
Sialkot
Chamba
Kuch Bihar
Gharaon
Merank-u
Jumna R.
Ganges R.
Chambal R.
Sone R.
Narbada R.
Godavery R.
Krishna R.
Penneru
Coovery R.
Tapty R.
Sutlej R.
Ravi R.
Jhelum R.
Kabul R.
Brahmaputra R.
Lesser Cutch
The Rann

THESIS

Chapter – 2

Accession of Muhammad Shah (1719-1748) and the Problems before Him

Accession of Muhammad Shah 1719:

Delhi was in a terrible turmoil after Farrukh Siyar's execution, and the Saiyyid brothers were all in all, dethroning one Emperor and setting up another. The year 1719 actually saw three Emperors on the throne with high sounding titles but without power, these were Rafi-ud-Darajat, Rafi-ud-Daulah and Roshan Akhtar. The intelligent but consumptive twenty year old son of Rafi-ush-Shan was elevated to the throne on Wednesday 9th *Rabi*, 1131 *A.H,* (28 February, 1719), on the very day of the deposition of Farrukh Siyar. He reigned for 3 months and 10 days, and died after 15 days retiring in favor of his elder brother on 8 *Rajab A.H.* 1131 (16 May 1719).[1]

The death of Rafi-ud-Daulah left the throne open for Roshan Akhtar, son of Prince Jahan Shah, the son of Emperor Bahadur Shah. Abul Muzaffar Nasiruddin Muhammad Shah was the title adopted by Roshan Akhtar at the time of his accession[2], silver and gold coins were distributed on the occasion, *khutba* was read in his name.[3] The installation ceremony was done on September 18, 1719.[4]

As prince he held the rank of 8000 *zat* and 2000 *sawar* and frequently received

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[1] *Shahnama,* op.cit, p.170, Khafi Khan gives the date of Rafi-ud-Darajat's death as 1719, 28 May 20 *Rajab A.H.* 1131.

[2] *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab,* Urdu tr, Mahmood Ahmad Faruqi, Karachi, 1964. Vol IV, p 366.

[3] *Seir*, op.cit, pp.128-29.

[4] *Ahwal,* op.cit., f.92 ab.

Khilats at the court of Bahadur Shah his grandfather.[5] His father Jahan Shah had been killed in the battle of succession against Jahandar Shah at Lahore on 27 March 1712 and since then until his accession Roshan Akhtar had stayed with his mother Qudsia Begum in the royal palace at Delhi.[6] For the seven years from 1712-1719, the prince was entrusted neither with military commands nor civil responsibilities. The time when the prince could learn the art of kingship was wasted in the semi confinement.[7]

In his early life, he had received training in archery, riding and music and received the conventional education usually imparted to the princes of royal blood. He was good at Turkish and composed beautiful lyrics in Hindi. He was a brave and handsome youth, averse to cruelty and prone to forgiveness.[8]

When after the death of Rafi-ud-Daulah, Saiyyad brothers proposed for the accession of Roshan Akhtar, his mother Qudsiya Begum welcomed the proposal and with marks of great Joy, she allowed her son to depart. But soon after the accession, Muhammad Shah and his mother realized that the Emperor is only in name and all the real powers vested in the hands of the Saiyyads who used him as a puppet. Muhammad Shah and his mother had appealed to Nizam-ul-Mulk one of the powerful nobles of that time to liberate him from the clutches of the Saiyyads.[9]

Problems Faced by Muhammad Shah after his Accession:

At the time of Muhammad Shah's accession, the Empire consisted of twenty

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[5] Muhammad Hadi Kamwar, *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtai,* MSS, No.40/2, Lytton Collection, MAL, AMU, Aligarh, ff.308a, 315a.

[6] *Ahwal,* op.cit., f.42b.

[7] Z.U. Malik, op.cit., p.53.

[8] *Muntakhab,* op.cit., Vol.II, p.840.

[9] *Parties and Politics,* op.cit., p.154.

GENEOLOGICAL CHART OF MUHAMMAD SHAH (1719-1748)





Emperor Muhammad Shah 1719-1748 A.D.

five *subas*, two hundred and twenty seven *Sarkars*. The amount came from these divisions in the Royal treasury was stood at three Arab, ninety eight crore, fifty three lakhs, seventy five thousands, three hundred thirty six rupees 3,98,53,75,336 Rs.[10]The Mughal Empire at the time of Muhammad Shah's accession was at the zenith of its territorial expansion. The age of conquest had ended that of corrupt politics and internal strife begins. Political developments in the country, the wrangling of parties and groups at the court and the weakening of the administrative system, all added to the problems of Muhammad Shah. Maratha inroads into the Mughal territory became a recurring feature.[11]

The powerful nobles of the Empire set out to carve semi-independent principalities for themselves. The struggle between the groups of powerful nobles turned to weaken into the hot bed of intrigues. These developments were accompanied by and closely related to an ever deepening crisis in the *jagirdari* system.[12] The victory of Nadir Shah in the battle of Karnal in 1739 destroyed the morale and prestige of the Mughal military power.

2.1. The Financial Problem:

The death of Aurangzeb on 3 March 1707[13] at Ahmadnagar was followed by a war of succession among his three surviving sons, Shah Alam, Azam Shah and Kam Baksh.[14] Finally Shah Alam Bahadur Shah became victorious in the battle of Jajau on

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[10] Lachmi Narayan Shafique, *Khulasat-ul-Hind*, Transcript 58, CAS, Department of History.

[11] Noman Ahmad Siddiqui, *Land Revenue Administration of the Mughals*, 1700-1750, Bombay, 1970, p.1.

[12] Ibid, p 2.

[13] *Dilkusha*, op.cit, f.161a.

[14] *Muntakhab*, op.cit., Vol.II, pp.589-90.

18 June 1708.[15]

Another war of succession was fought after the death of Bahadur Shah, amongst the surviving princess Jahandar Shah, Azimush-Shan, Jahan Shah and Rafiush-Shahn.[16] From this war Jahandar Shah emerged victorious. During his eleven month rule Jahandar Shah showed no interest in the affairs of the state and administration.[17]

Farrukh Siyar, son of Azimush-Shan revolted against Jahandar Shah and with the help of Saiyyad brothers defeated the armies of Jahandar Shah in a battle fought on 10 January 1713 near Agra.[18]

Under the strain of war, the strict rules and regulations in the government departments broke down, the whole administration was neglected and there were heavy losses in men and money both, in this war of successions, and the imperial treasury sunk. The problems of post war adjustment deepened the economic crisis. The weak successors of Aurangzeb did not try to repair the ravages of the wars.[19] Whatever money flowed into the treasury was spent on the personal comforts and the luxuries of the court.

During his march from Kabul to Agra, to fight the war of succession, Bahadur Shah had taken the money available in the provincial treasuries and spent it for mobilization and military purposes. Khafi Khan writes that during his five years reign,

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[15] *Muntakhab*, Vol II, p.598.

[16] *Later Mughals*, op.cit, p.158-60.

[17] Yahya Khan, *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, R.81, CAS, Department of History, A.M.U, Aligarh, f.119a.

[18] Z.U. Malik, op.cit, p.10.

[19] Ibid, p.13.

he spent no less than 83 crore rupees.[20] But this money was not sufficient for him to pay the salaries of the soldiers and he had to depend on Azim-ush-Shan's treasury for day to day expenses of the court.[21]

In the eleven month rule of Jahandar Shah, the financial condition of the Empire deteriorated further. The new emperor needed money to pay off the long standing arrears of salary to the old soldiers. First the cash available in the treasury was used then the gold vessels and other precious articles, stores of rich cloth and carpets were distributed among the soldiers to be sold in the markets. The ceilings construction plated with gold were broken up, the store homes within the forts were made empty and their contents were supplied to the troops.[22]The lavish expenditure on amusements and gifts to the favorites completed the financial ruin of the government.[23]

Soon after this accession Farrukh Siyar issued orders to governors of the provinces and the officers to send the revenues they had collected since the death of Aurangzeb.[24] The Emperor utilized his new resources to finance military operations against rebels and reward his adherents liberally. He also spent money lavishly to raise the prestige of the monarchy in public appearances in the court.

According to the contemporary sources the reign of Farrukhsiyar opened with two disastrous famines. In the beginning of the Farrukhsiyar's reign, the author of *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk* mentions that, 'the calamities of death and the scarcity of food

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[20] *Muntakhab,* op.cit, Vol.II, pp.574, 576, 577, 578.

[21] *Ibid,* p.684.

[22] Shafi Warid Tehrani, *Mirat-i-Waridat,* MSS No.43, MAL, Aligarh, p.474.

[23] Jonathan Scott, *History of Deccan,* Vol.II, part IV, p.81, Munshi Nawal Kishore Press, Lucknow, 1864.

[24] *Ahwal,* op.cit., f.60b.

grains reached a limit that nobody had ever seen or heard of in the past.'[25] A widespread epidemic raged in the wake of the famine. Scarcity of rain, shortage of food and the epidemic took hundreds and thousands of lives of men and animals.[26] Owing to the great famine and the severe epidemic, scores of common people and imperial troopers died in Delhi for want of bread.[27]

In the 2nd R.Y., Farrukh Siyar directed Hussain Ali Khan to crush the revolt of Ajit Singh, and gave his Rs.3 crores to cover the expenses. He also received the *hundies* from the court during the course of operations.[28]

The financial situation in the Deccan was also not satisfactory. Aurangzeb's wars with the Maratha put serious strains to the treasury, and the demands made by the Marathas for *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* was not resisted by the governors of the province. Zulfiqar Khan's deputy arrived at the settlement to pay the Maratha's claim of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi,* after collecting it by his own officers and not by Shahu's agents.

However, Nizam-ul-Mulk on his part tried to follow vigorous policy against the Marathas, when he was appointed the *Subedar* for the first time in 1713, he ordered the *Faujdars* of the province to oust the agents of the Marathas from Aurangabad and the other places, but the Nizam was failed in his efforts and the Marathas continued to plunder the imperial territories of Deccan.[29]

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[25] *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, op.cit, f.122b.

[26] *Ahwal*, op.cit, ff.62b-63a.

[27] *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i- Chaghta*, op.cit, f.340a.

[28] *Shahnama,* op.cit, ff.62-64.

[29] *Muntakhab,* op.cit, Vol.II, pp.742-45.

Thus due to the political disorder, the civil and military expenditure increased in the provinces, the lack of good management and confusion in the revenue collection and its administration showed a sharp decline in the revenues of the state. On the other hand the corrupt officers tried to make their fortunes by accepting the tribes from the needy.[30]

2.2. Problems in the *Jagirdari* System and the Growing Tendency of *Ijara*:

Under the Mughals the imperial territory for the purpose of land revenue administration, was divided into two broad categories, the *khalisa* and the *jagir Mahals,* the *Mahals* which were not assigned yet formed a sub-category known as *mahal-i-pai baqi.*[31] The bulk of the imperial territory consisted of *Jagir* lands and the revenue of these lands was assigned to imperial servants known as *mansabdars* in lieu of their salaries according to their ranks (*Zat*) in the imperial service. These *mansabdars* were permitted to collect the revenues from their assignments as *jagirdar* of that *mahal.*[32]

Each *mansabdar* held a definite rank in the imperial service which was either a single *Zat* rank or a double rank comprising *Zat* and *Sawar* ranks. The pay scales of *Zat* and *Sawar* ranks were separately laid down and the salary of a *mansabdar* holding a certain ranks was calculated in terms of *dams.*[33] An area comprising a single *mahal*, a part of *mahal* or more than one *mahal*, yielding an estimated income equal to the salary

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[30] *Muntakhab*, Vol II, pp.775-76.

[31] Anonymous, *Khulasat-us-Siyaq,* Aligarh MSS, MAL, Aligarh, f.48b.

[32] Anand Ram Mukhlis, *Mirat-ul-Instilah, Anjuman-i-Taraqi-i-Urdu Library,* Delhi, MF 165, CAS, Department of History, Aligarh, f.15a.

[33] *Khulasat-us-Siyaq,* op.cit, ff.76-77b.

calculated was assigned to the person (assignee) as his *jagir*.[34]

The salary of the *mansabdars,* however, could also be paid in cash and those *mansabdars* were knows as *Naqdis* in the administration.[35]

The lands assigned as *jagirs* were administered by dual authorities, the state and the *jagirdars.* The revenue ministry calculated the estimated income of the *jagir* whereas the actual assessment and collection were made by the *jagirdars* or his agents.[36] In the assessment of the individual holdings, the *jagirdars* had to confirm the rates sanctioned by revenue ministry.[37]

The *jagirdari* system was a mode of payment by assignment of land. The *jagirdars* were entitled to collect the revenue from the assigned land in order to meet his expenses and those of the contingent maintained by him for the service of the emperor. But his claim was strictly limited to the revenue of the assigned *jagir*.[38]

The order of assignment implied that the *jagirdar* could not claim any right or title to the land in the *mahal* assigned to him. The right of assessment and collection of the land revenue in his assigned area for a considerable time could be availed of to create some sort of permanent right or claim to land or to establish local connections which might be utilized for acquiring the right of property in land. To avoid this, the

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[34] Muhammad Saleh Kamboh, *Amal-i-Saleh,* Bib. Indica, Calcutta, 1923-46, Vol.III, pp.65, 149.

[35] Ali Muhammad Khan, *Mirat-i-Ahmadi,* ed. Syed Nawab Ali, Baroda, 1927-28, vol.I, pp.227-29.

[36] *A.N.*, op.cit., Vol.III, p.381.

[37] *Khulasat-us-Siyaq,* f.48b.

[38] The *Deshmukhs, Muqaddams* and Cultivators were instructed to acknowledge the person (assignee) as the Jagirdar of the said amount and to pay land-revenue and other taxes to his agents. *Selected Documents of Shahjahan's Reign, Daftar-i-Diwani*, Hyderabad, 1950, pp 4 ,5, 17-18, 23, 147.

practice of constant transfer of the *jagirs* was adopted. It was Akbar who deliberately planned to transfer the *jagirs* of the prominent nobles.[39]

Besides this the organization of the local administrations served as a check on the working of the land revenue administration within a *jagir.* Whereas the right to assess and collect the revenue vested in the *jagirdar,* the executive authority vested in the *faujdar*, who was associated with land-revenue administration and exercised general supervision over its working within a *jagir.*[40]

By the close of the 17th century, however the smooth working of the system was seriously impaired and it had began to show signs of becoming an institution which tended to be static and failed to adapt itself to the changed political and agrarian conditions. The resources of the Empire were almost exhausted by providing *jagirs* to the mansabdars who were newly recruited.[41]

At the time of Aurangzeb's death, the institution of *jagirdari* was faced with a number of developments which constituted a serious threat to the stability of the institution. As early as 1691, the system was faced with the problem of providing *jagirs* to an ever increasing number of *mansabdars*, although the number of available *jagirs* was very small.[42]

During the ten or twelve years that followed the death of Aurangzeb and accession of Muhammad Shah, the problem of the inflated *Jama* and the keen

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[39] *Akbarnama*, op.cit., Vol.II, pp.332-33.

[40] Noman Ahmad Siddiqi, 'The faujdar and faujdari under the Mughal's'' in *The Mughal State* 1526-1750, Calcutta, 1998, pp.234-251.

[41] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, pp.396-97, 602-3.

[42] *Dilkusha*, op.cit, f.169ab, *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, pp.396-97, 411-12. The quote used by the historians for the lack of *jagirs*, *Yak Anar Sad Bimar*

competition among the *mansabdars* of the old families (*khanazads*) and the new recruits became a recurring feature. These developments and the weakening of the central authority gave rise to the process of disintegration and by the time Nadir Shah invaded Delhi; the system had seen a complete breakdown.[43]

Abul Fazl Mamuri, a contemporary of Aurangzeb, calls the problem as '*bejagiri*' and says, "A world became *jagirless* and there was no *paibaqi* left". Due to the lack of *paibaqi*, the *jagirs* were assigned to the high officers at the time of military assignments, after cancelling the assignment of other men, and this became a cause for the ruin of the helpless and penniless ones.[44]

According the writer, this was the direct result of the recruitment of large number of Deccani nobles by Aurangzeb in order to win them over to his sides, and prevent them from becoming rebels.[45]

The scarcity of *paibaqi* made it very difficult to work the *jagirdari* system properly. People who were assigned *mansab* were not able to get their *jagirs* and many of the *mansabdars* did not get their *jagirs* for four or five years.[46] Aurangzeb is reported to have said repeatedly that the available area of *paibaqi* was like one pomegranate requires serving a hundred sick men.[47]

In this situation, influence and money played a significant role in all the *jagir* assignments. To secure one's *jagir* one needed a patron, very hard working agent

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[43] Noman Ahmad Siddiqi, *Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals 1700-1750,* Bombay, 1970, p 115.

[44] Abul Fazl Mamuri, *Tarikh-i-Auraungzeb*, f.157a, qf, M. Athar Ali *Nobility under Aurangzeb*, Delhi, 1997, p 92..

[45] Ibid, ff.156b-157a, *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 396.

[46] *Muntakhab* Vol II, p 395.

[4747] Ibid, pp 602-03.

(*Wakil-i-Dilsoz*), and an enormous payment of bribes (*Sakht-i-rishwat*) for the work to be done properly.[48]

The author of *Nuskha-i-Dilkusha*, recording the events of the 1st R.Y. of the emperor Bahadur Shah, says that all the *mansabdars* of Aurangzeb's reign were granted in their *mansabs* and were honored with titles. According to the author even clerks secured high *mansabs*.[49]

The sons of the Emperor were elevated to high *mansabs* along with the nobles. These careless and profuse grants of *mansabs* and *jagirs* made by the emperor deteriorated the standards of administration. The contemporary authorities agree that Bahadur Shah was by temperament affable and generous and had little interest in the administrative details.[50]

Qazim Aurangabadi, comments that the majority of *mansabdars* who did not deserve the rank of 500 had been granted the rank of 5000 and 7000 and had acquired vast *jagirs*. But when they were called in an emergency to serve militarily, they failed to fulfill the obligation and completely useless for military service.[51] Another authority *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab* also recorded the similar developments.[52]

Some influential officers captured the high *mansabs* by force and fraud. They had succeeded in obtaining *jagirs* which yielded the maximum revenue at the cost of

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[48] *Muntakhab*,op.cit, Vol II, pp 396-97.

[49] *Dilkusha*, op.cit, ff 167a, 169ab.

[50] *Muntakhab*, Vol.II, p 630, The author writes that Bahadur Shah was so indifferent and badly informed about the state business that some impertinent persons calculated his date of accession in the chronogram '*Shah-i-Bekhabar*' or the king without any information.

[51] *Ahwal*, op.cit., ff 182ab, 183a.

[52] *Muntakhab*, Vol.II, p.775.

other section of the *mansabdars*, and it had become difficult for others to get *jagirs*.[53]

During his brief rule of eleven months, Jahandar Shah showed complete indifference to the affairs of the state and administration.[54] Due to his indifference, the emperor was not liked by the people and they did not have any regards for him.[55]

The same disorder prevailed during the reign of Farrukh Siyar. The persons who accompanied the Emperor from Bengal, Bihar and Awadh were absorbed in the administration.[56] Similar was the rise of *Kashmiris* to high posts which hurt the pride of the older nobility.[57]

There was enormous increase in the number of the *mansabdars* of 7000, 6000 and 5000 which rose to twenty, twenty eight, twenty two respectively, in compare to Aurangzeb's reign when only six *mansabdars* had the rank of 7000 *Zat*, twelve of 6000 *Zat* and thirty three of 5000 *Zat*.[58] The number increases during the reign of Muhammad Shah remarkably and reached to forty four, forty four and forty seven respectively.[59]

The income of *mansabdars* of lower ranks was so meager that it was virtually impossible for them to fulfill their military obligations. Even in the case of *mansabdars*, the *Jama* had become so inflated that the real produce from their *jagirs* was not enough to maintain the contingents as required against their *mansab* and salary

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[53] *Later Mughals*, op.cit., Vol.I, p 334.

[54] *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, op.cit., f 119a.

[55] *ibid.*, f 365b.

[56] *Shahnama*, op.cit, f 3.

[57] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 771, 793.

[58] M. Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, Delhi, 1997, Appendix, pp 175-179.

[59] Z.U., Malik, op.cit., p 378.

assignment.[60]

The crisis of *jagirdari* produced its decisive impact on the agrarian relations and growth of agriculture. The *mansabdar* struggling with the financial problems, tried to solve it by imposing illegal taxes, which was resented by the *Zamindars* and cultivators. The intensive tussle between the *jagirdars* and *Zamindars* on the issue of assessment often resulted in the armed struggle.[61] The direct result of this was the flight of the peasants from land.[62] Bernier argues that the uncertainty on the part of *mansabdars* due to frequent transfer of their *jagirs,* resulted in the oppression of the peasantry, because a *mansabdar* was uncertain whether he would remain in the *jagir* following year or not.[63]

Bernier describes the outlook of *jagirdars* in a well known passage:

[The *Timariots*[64], governors and revenue contractors on their part reason in this manner: "why should the neglected state of this land create uneasiness in our minds? And why should we spend our money and time to render it fruitful? We may be deprived of it in a single moment, and our exertions would benefit neither ourselves nor our children. Let us draw from the soil all the money we can though the peasant should starve or abscond and we should leave it, when commanded to quit.][65]

The crisis in the *jagirdari* system affected every branch of state activity. The

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[60] Z.U Malik, op.cit, p 379.

[61] *Parties and politics*, op.cit, p 32.

[62] Bernier, *Travels in the Mughal Empire* 1656-68, tr. A. Constable, 2nd ed. Rev. V.A. Smith, London, 1916, pp 225-26.

[63] Ibid p 226.

[64] Bernier used the term Timariot for *Jagirdar*, Ibid,p 224.

[65] Ibid , p 227.

mansabdars possessing no *jagirs* found it beyond their means to raise the required quota of contingents out of their meager resources. Khafi Khan writes how the nobles were greatly agitated over the deduction of their emoluments for feeding the animals (*khurak-i-dawab*), till these were virtually remitted altogether.[66]

The last attempt to save the system from complete breakdown was made by Nizam-ul-Mulk, who assumed the office of *Wizarat* in 1722. He had proposed reforms.[67] But he was met with stiff opposition from his rivals such as Samsam-ud-Daula[68] and Haidar Quli Khan,[69] who had vested interests in the mismanagements at the court. The Emperor was induced to humiliate Nizam-ul-Mulk who left the capital in disgust in 1724.[70]

The *jagirdari* crisis affected the efficiency of the administrative system at various levels because the *thanadars*, the *faujdars* and the *subedars* were in great financial distress owing to the poor yields from their jagirs. Dissatisfied and frustrated *jagirdars* could not be expected to perform their executive or military duties efficiently as they could neither muster the required contingents nor adequately maintain the essential staff.

The crisis in the *jagirdari* system was accompanied by the wide spread practice of revenue farming (*Ijara)*, which owed its origin partly to the inflated nature of *Jama* figures and partly to the growing weakness of land revenue administration at various levels.

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[66] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vool II, pp 602-3. *Mughal Nobility*, op.cit, pp 50-7.

[67] *Ahwal*, op.cit., ff 182, 183a.

[68] Samsam-ud-Daula was the *Mir Bakshi* with the rank 8000/8000, *Ahwal*, f 176a.

[69] Haidar Quli Khan was *Mir Atish* and held the rank 6000/3000, ibid, f 176b.

[70] *Seir*, op.cit., Vol.II, p 456.

This practice of *Ijara*,[71] especially in the *Khalisa* lands, constitutes an important development in the first half of 18th century, which was generally not accepted and approved by the Mughal emperors and on the whole it was very limited, but it had been a common practice with the *jagirdars*, whenever it suited to their needs.

The *Ijaradar* was required to pay the fixed amount as agreed between him and the *jagirdar* in the installments without any reference to increase or decrease in the collections, and he was not entitle to make any representation.[72]

One form of *Ijara* was known as *Rasad Afzud*, in this type of agreement, a village for which the *Jama* was deceased due to the natural calamities; it implied an agreement on part of the *Ijaradar* for the collection and payment of a sum lower than the original *Jama* in the first instance. The agreement however fixed on annual increase in the amount to be paid by the *Ijaradar* till it reached the original *Jama*.[73]

In the *Risala-i-Zirat*, there is a mention of another form of *Ijara* known as *Mutahidi*, the main difference between the two was that the former agreement was made without any condition except the full payment as agreed. The latter, on the other hand implied the agreement to collect the assessed revenue from the *Zamindars* of the *pargana* and remit it to the treasury. Thus the main difference was that the *Mutahidi*, the person concerned was treated as the government servant and was entitled to deduction in case the crops were damaged on account of natural calamities provided

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[71] With the growing laxity in the central administration, the majority of *jagirdars* adopted the practice of farming out revenues of their Mahals to the local powerful chiefs and military leaders because it not only furnished them with money in advance but also saved them from the trouble of assessment and cost of collection through their agents.

[72] Yasin Khwaja, *Glossary of technical terms*, B.M. MSS, Add. 6603, Rieu/801b, R.244, 231, CAS, History, Aligarh, f 48b.

[73] Ibid, f 48b, 49a.

that the government was convinced to accept the genuineness of the fact.[74]

An *Ijaradar* was thus considered an intermediary for collecting land revenue, however he acquired no proprietary right in the land and on this point he was different from the *Zamindars* who were the hereditary right as intermediaries. It seems that the *Ijaradar* settle an agreement on amount a little less than the expected income from the *Mahal*, thus he gets a margin from that. With his efforts, if he was able to collect more than the estimated *Jama*, he was not answerable to the *jagirdar* and he could make no claims on the excess amount. The *Ijaradar's* income also lay in finding out and assessing newly reclaimed lands and in the collection made such heads of taxation as *bala dasti*.[75]

The *ijaradar* also enjoyed the right to assess the land under cultivation on the basis of measurement and prepare a new *Jama*.[76] Thus in the *Ijara* system, the *Ijaradar* gained at the cost of peasants and *Zamindars*, and if the *Ijaradars* exactions ruined cultivation it directly gave set back to the revenues of government.

The *Ijara* was a well known practice under the Sultans of Delhi but it was abandoned under Sher Shah and Akbar but during the reign of Jahangir it again appeared, and became widespread in the course of 17th century. In Bengal, certain Mahals were obtained by the Portuguese on *Ijara* in the reign of Shahjahan.[77]

Aurangzeb on his part tried to curb down the evil practice, when he issued a *farman* to Rasik Das in which he ordered to note the number of revenue farmers and

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[74] Anonymous, *Risala-i-Zirat*, MSS Edinburgh University, No.144, M.F., 146, CAS, History, Aligarh, ff 13b-18a.

[75] Ibid, f 13b.

[76] Ibid, ff 13ab.

[77] Muhammad Saleh Kamboh, *Amal-i-Saleh*, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, 1923, Vol.I, p.495.

cultivators in every village.[78] There is another order in the *Mirat*-i-*Ahmadi*, prohibiting the practice of *Ijara* in the *Khalisa* and *jagir* lands. The order was issued that no one should be allowed to acquire *Ijara* rights in the *Khalisa* and *jagir* lands and that *Diwan* should issue orders to the *Amins* for necessary action.[79]

It seems that the strict rules and regulations for transacting business in all departments were disregarded since the reign of Jahandar Shah.[80] However under Farrukh Siyar, the evil practice of Ijara was encouraged under Ratan Chand, the *Diwan* of Abdullah Khan (*wazir*).[81]

According to Khafi Khan, Ratan Chand interfered in the affairs of the Revenue Ministry so much that the *Diwan-i-Tan* and *Diwan-i-Khalisa* were so much disgusted with their sub-ordinate position and leased out the *Khalisa* lands in *Ijara* like the sale of a commodity, bringing lakhs of rupees to Ratan Chand. This practice intensified the Emperor's displeasure towards Abdullah Khan.[82]

The evil practice of *Ijara* continued till the middle of 18th century, when Nizam-ul-Mulk assumed the *Wizarat*, he drew up a scheme for reforms. One of his main proposals was to abolish the practice of revenue farming, in the *Khalisa* lands.[83] But his efforts were not succeeded and the *Wazir* was alienated from the Emperor and leave

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[78] Munshi Malihzada, *Nigarnama-i-Munshi*, MSS, 36, CAS, Department of History, Aligarh. The farman is of the 8th R.Y. year of Aurangzeb.

[79] Muhammad Ali Khan, *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, Bib. Ind. Baroda, Vol.I, p 292. The order was issued in 1087 A.H. 1676 A.D. to the provincial Diwans.

[80] *Later Mughals*, op.cit, Vol.I, p 335.

[81] Shakir Khan, *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khan*, R.7, 20, CAS, History, AMU, Aligarh.

[82] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, pp 773, 919.

[83] *Muntakhab*, p 777.

Delhi.[84]

There is evidence to show that the practice of farming out the *Khalisa* and *Jagir* lands continued during the remaining years of Muhammad Shah's reign. Two documents contained in the *Dastur-ul-Amal-i-Bekas* show that the revenue farming of *Khalisa* and *Jagir* lands was a well established practice in the reign of Muhammad Shah. The *arzdasht* of Sobha Singh *Zamindar* reveals the presence of moneyed *Ijaradars* in his *talluqa*.[85]

In an incident the head of the local land revenue administration had charged Sobha Singh, that it as a sign of insubordination and hostility to government that he failed to pay the land revenue. In an *Arzdasht*, Sobha Singh refutes the charges and asserts that his forefathers always rendered necessary service to the former *Hakims*[86] and regularly paid land revenue and while describing the agrarian conditions prevailed in his *talluqa* he criticizes the role of the *Ijaradar* and makes a concrete proposal for a fair assessment of land revenue.[87]

The practice of *Ijara* thus gave rise to a class of bankers and who invested their money in the business of revenue farming and thus emerged as a class of intermediaries differs from the hereditary *Zamindars*.

The rise of this class was a constant danger to the hereditary *Zamindars*, and under this condition, the hereditary *Zamindars*, who were out bidden by the *Ijaradars*

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[84] *Later Mughals*, op.cit., Vol.II, p 136.

[85] Jawahar Mal Bekas, *Dastur-ul-Amal-i-Bekas*, MSS, MAL, Aligarh, f 58a.

[86] *Hakim* was a government official, especially referred to the *Faujdar*, who combined the executive and judicial powers in his office.

[87] *Dastur-ul-Amal-i-Bekas*, f 58b.



were compelled to sell their *Zamindari* rights to those who could purchases them.[88]

Another evil outcome of the *Ijara* system was the unemployment of those who were employed by the state for the detailed assessment and collection of land revenue. The intense exploitation of the peasantry coupled with unstable agrarian conditions brought to the cultivator and the villages were deserted. The oppressed peasantry took refuge in the nearby *Zamindaris* which were owned by powerful *Zamindars* that openly defied the authority of the state, neglected the payment of land revenue until a powerful noble led an expedition against them.[89]

Thus the *jagirdari* crisis, coupled with agrarian crisis due to *Ijara* system gave rise to the economic and administrative instability. These developments also weakened the military power of the Empire, so that it was not able to resist the revolts from inside and aggression from outside.[90]

The success of the Mughal army depended mainly on the proper working of the assignment system which provided the strong basis for maintaining the cavalry contingents and brings them into the battle field whenever required. But the successors of Aurangzeb were not able to maintain the system as it was working under his predecessors and affected each and every brands of the state, including the army.[91]

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[88] An examination of the sale deeds of *Zamindaris* preserved in the state record office at Allahabad indicates that the *Zamindaris* were sold on a large scale in the first half of 18th century, *Allahabad Documents*, R.326, CAS, Department of History, Aligarh.

[89] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 902. Khafi Khan mentions that the people of the country belonging to every class hated Saiyyid brothers and Ratan Chand who patronized only the Saiyyids of Barha and the *baqqals* (bankers).

[90] We see that there were constant danger to the empire from inside, i.e., the Marathas, the Jats, the Sikhs, the Rohellas and the invasion of Nadir Shah was an example of the outside aggression, which shows the weakness of military power during the period.

[91] Z.U. Malik, op.cit., p 377.

2.3. Factional Politics at the Court of Muhammad Shah:

Towards the last years of Aurangzeb's reign, the older problems of conflicts between the imperial authority and the some groups of the nobility began to reappear, though in a very different manner. In certain cases the nobles began to seek avenues to build their fortunes in obvious disregard of the principles defining their power and positions.[92]

Bahadur Shah thus inherited a difficult situation. Moreover a large section of the nobility, particularly that which had supported Prince Muhammad Azam, his opponent and the contender of the throne, was uncertain and apprehensive. Bahadur Shah decided to tackle the problem in the usual tradition by encouraging new elements in the nobility and by imposing certain constraints on the ambitions of the dominant section of the nobility as well as by extending some concessions to some of them. For the purpose he appears to have decided to grant *mansabs* with liberal hands, more so because another claimant Prince Muhammad Kam Baksh was still to be dealt with in the Deccan.[93]

Bahadur Shah showed restraint in promoting the interests of the members of the old and the established families and favoured high positions for the relatively new and obscure elements in the imperial service. He did not accept the claims of the two powerful groups of the nobility-led by Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan, Iranis on the one hand and by Chin Qilich Khan, a Turani on the other for the office of *Wazir* and other special privileges. He appointed Munim Khan as *Wazir*, who was an Indian born Turani

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[92] *Parties and Politics,* op.cit, p 4, *History of Aurangzeb*, op.cit, Vol V, pp 68,74.

[93] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol II, p 600.

and outside the charmed circle of the privileged groups and had not held a high position at the time of Aurangzeb's death. After the death of Munim Khan in 1711, Prince Azimu-ush-Shan was allowed to control the affairs of *Wizarat* with Sadullah Khan, a Kashmiri Indian, instead of Zulfiqar Khan and Nizam-ul-Mulk who were continuously reasserting their claims.[94]

It is significant to note here that Nizam-ul-Mulk and number of other Turanis resigned their *mansabs* and decided to live in retirement, protesting at the neglect of the old nobles and the rise of new nobles to high posts.[95]

This was the beginning of the widening gap between the Mughal Emperor and the different sections of the state officials.

Just after the deposition of Farrukh Siyar, Saiyid brothers had taken all the powers into their hands, set up a new monarch and started appointing their nominees on all the important posts. Saiyid Hussain Khan Barha was appointed the (*Ataliq*) of the Emperor Rafi-ud-Darajat.[96] Thus the Emperor lost all personal liberty and was guided even in the personal matters by the Saiyyad brothers.[97]

The same situation continued under Rafi-ud-Daulah, the next Emperor, who died very soon after his accession and now the turn come for Muhammad Shah to be the next Emperor of Saiyid's. But at that time, they did not want to make drastic changes in the previous policies.[98]

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[94] *Muntakhab,* Vol II pp 677-8, *Umara,* op.cit, Vol II, pp 98,831,504.

[95] *Dilkusha,* op.cit, f 167a.

[96] *Muntakhab,* Vol.II, pp 829, 831.

[97] Ibid, p 816, 818, 831, 842.

[98] *Later Mughals,* op.cit, Vol.I, p 416.

The provincial governors and other officers were confirmed in their previous posts.[99] Muhammad Amin Khan continued to be the II[nd] *Bakshi*, Roshan-ud-Daulah Zafar Khan was made the III[rd] *Bakshi* and Inayatullah Khan was allowed to continue as *Khan-i-Sanam* and the absentee governorship of Kashmir. The post of *Sadr* was given to Amir Khan, an Alamgiri noble. The Saiyid brothers retained their position as *Wazir* and the *Bakshi* and the viceroyalty of the Deccan, while two other posts of *Subedari* of Agra and Allahabad and the *faujdari* of Muradabad were given to Barhas.[100]

In spite of their conciliatory policy, their domination was resisted and revolted from two centers, first from Agra and second from Allahabad. At Agra it was organized by Mitr Sen.[101]

His main aim was to gain from the disturbing conditions, and to fulfill his desire, he proclaimed Neku Siyar,[102] the Emperor. There were rumors that Nizam-ul-Mulk, Jai Singh[103] and Chabela Ram Nagar[104] were coming to the aid of Neku Siyar. After the deposition of Farrukh Siyar, many nobles such as Taqarrub Khan,[105] Shaista

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[99] *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghta*, op.cit, f 422.

[100] Agra was given to Ghairat Khan, the cousin of the Saiyyids. Allahabad was given to Shah Ali Khan after Girdhar Bahadur was removed. Saif-ud-Din Ali Khan, the younger brother of Abdullah Khan and Husain Ali Khan was made the *faujdar* of Muradabad.

[101] An employee of Neku Siyar, he was reputed to have some knowledge of medicine, and to have made his fortune by money lending. It was he who proclaimed Neku Siyar, the emperor and become his Wazir, with the rank of 7000 and the title of Raja Birbal, *Muntakhab*, Vol.II, p.825.

[102] The descendent of the Timurid dynasty, who was a prisoner at Agra Fort.

[103] Raja Jai was a Rajput chief, a *mansabdar* of 7000/6000 and the governor of Malwa. *Umara,* op.cit., vol.II, pp.81-83.

[104] Chabela Ram Nagar was the mansabdar of 7000 *zat* and holding the governorship of Allahabad. He was an old servant of Farrukh Siyar. *Umara*, ibid., pp.328-30.

[105] His real name was Jafar Shirazi and the title Taqarrub Khan was conferred on him by Farrukh Siyar and the rank of 5000 *zat*. He held the post of Khan-i-Saman during Farrukh Siyar's reign. *Muntakhab*, op.cit, vol.II, p.728.

Khan[106] had taken shelter under Jai Singh and thus Amber had become an centre of opposition to the Saiyid brothers, and they thought that some other who were not happy with them will soon join hands with then group of Jai Singh.[107]

The Allahabad rebellion was by Chabela Ram Nagar, who believed that Saiyid brothers wanted to destroy him and his belief became firm when the Saiyids attempted to transfer him from the governorship of Allahabad. The Saiyids however prepared to grant him the governorship of Awadh but he had no faith in them and revolted in August 1719.[108] Soon afterwards Chabela Ram died and the rebellion was continued by his nephew Girdhar Bahadur.[109]

For the next nine months, the Saiyids were busy in negotiations and warfare with Girdhar Bahadur, who agreed to left Allahabad in May 1720, on condition that governorship of Awadh will be given to him with the additional gifts of rupees thirty lakhs as *Inam*.[110] It took three months of siege for the surrender of the Agra and it was fulfilled on, August 12, 1719.

The Saiyid brothers tried to consolidate their alliance with the Rajputs and immediately after the deposition of Farrukhsiyar; the *Jaziya* was abolished on the request of Raja Ajit Singh, the *Rathor* Rajput who had good relations with Saiyid

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[106] He was holding the post of Diwan of Khalisah wa Tan, and retained the absentee governorship of Kashmir. He was the mansabdar of 4000/3000 and father-in-law of Farrukh Siyar, mirza Muhammad Harisi, *Tarikh-i-Muhammadi*, R-99-102, p.39.

[107] Munshi Daya Ram, *Balmukundnama*, tr. Satish Chandra, letter 23, p 56, *Muntakhab*, Vol.II, p 832.

[108] *Shahnama*, op.cit, p 76, *Balmukundnama*, letter No.7, p 7.

[109] He was the mansabdar of 5000/5000 and war granted the governorship of Awadh by Saiyyids, *Muntakhab*, vol.II, p.843.

[110] *Muntakhab*, Vol.II, p.846, *Shahnama*, p 68.

brother.[111] Through him, the Saiyid brothers tried to strengthen the bonds of good will with Jai Singh.[112] But the Saiyid pact with the Rajputs was confine to Ajit Singh as Jai Singh refused to join them.

In the Deccan, they tried to strengthen their bond with the Marathas and secured the formal grant of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* for Shahu.[113]

It seems that a situation came when there arouse differences between the brothers over the personal as well as political matters. Sometime there was great tension and even talk of fighting between them and it was Ratan Chand who sorts out their differences and made them realize the Turani danger.[114]

On the other hand the rivals of the Saiyid Brothers were waiting for the turn of the events, when they get chance to destroy their power. With the coming of Qudsiya Begum, the mother of the Emperor, the grounds were prepared to mobilize the nobles who were opposed to the Saiyids. She set to work with Muhammad Amin Khan, who sided with the Saiyids against Farrukh Siyar but gained nothing, and was waiting for an opportunity to destroy their power.[115]

The Emperor and Muhammad Amin Khan opened a correspondence with Nizam-ul-Mulk and informed him about the scheme against the Saiyids and also about their intentions that they were planning for the complete ruin of the Turani group.[116]

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[111] *Ibid*, p 816.

[112] G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity*, New Delhi, 1977, p 236.

[113] J.G. Dutt, *History of the Marathas*, London, 1912, Vol.II, pp 368-69.

[114] *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghta*, op.cit, ff 441-42. The Turani nobles, Nizam-ul-Mulk and Amin Khan were against the Saiyyid domination.

[115] *Tarikh*-i-*Shahadat*-i-*Farrukh Siyar wa Julus*-i-*Muhammad Shah*, f 38.

[116] Abul Faiz Mani, *Shahnama*-i-*Deccan*, R.207, p 116.

The author of *Ahwal-ul-Khawaqin* holds that Nizam-ul-Mulk, besides his personal safety, wanted to restore Muhammad Shah to sovereign position and set up a new imperial order.[117]

The Saiyid brothers were charged that none except the Saiyids of Barha was allowed to hold supreme powers at the court. They tried to destroy the fortunes of all *Irani* and *Turani* families.[118]

When Nizam-ul-Mulk was dismissed from the governorship of Deccan and succeeded by Husain Ali Khan, the Nizam accepted the governorship of Malwa on condition that he will not be transferred to other province very soon.[119] But now he was asked to quit from Malwa, and was offered the governorship of the provinces included Agra, Allahabad, Multan and Burhanpur.[120]

But the Nizam left Delhi on 15 March 1719, taking his whole family and army with him.[121] He crossed the Narmada on 8 May 1720, on the other hand Husain Ali Khan, asked Dilawar Ali Khan to south and cross *Chambal*, Alam Ali Khan nephew and deputy of Husain Ali in Deccan, was ordered to move north to the bank of the Narmada with his forces.[122]

On 19 June 1720, the armies of Dilawar Ali Khan Nizam-ul-Mulk came face to face and a battle was fought in which Dilawar Ali Khan was killed.[123] Husain Ali after

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[117] *Ahwal*, op.cit, f 194a.

[118] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 860.

[119] *Muntakhab*, Vol.II, p 847.

[120] *Shahnama*, op.cit, f 36b.

[121] *Ahwal*, op.cit, f 152b.

[122] *Hadiqat-ul-Alam*, op.cit, p 96.

[123] *Tarikh*-i-*Shahadat*-i-*Farrukh Siyar wa Julus*-i-*Muhammad Shah*, ff 90, 100.

this accepted Nizam's governorship of Deccan. Nizam sent the copy of *Farman* to Alam Ali Khan but he was preparing for final fight and on 9 August, 1720, a battle was fought at Balapur, and Alim Ali was killed.[124] These successive military defeats in the Deccan gave a blow to the power and prestige of Saiyid brothers.

On the other hand Muhammad Amin Khan was preparing for the final removal of the Saiyyads. For the purpose he brought other nobles of influence like Sadat Khan[125] and Haidar Quli Khan,[126] with him. On October 8, 1720, Husain Ali Khan was killed.[127] Saiyid Abdullah Khan started preparations for the revenge, a battle was fought on November 1720,[128] and Abdullah Khan was imprisoned and poisoned on 11 October 1722.[129]

After the overthrow of Saiyid brothers, the *Wizarat* was given to Muhammad Amin Khan but he soon died in 1721.[130] There were further differences amongst the nobles on the issue of the appointment of the new *Wazir*. Haidar Quli Khan, Sadat Khan Khan-i-Dauran and Sarbuland Khan pushed their own claims for the office.[131] On the other hand one group wanted Qamruddin Khan to succeed to the office of his deceased father, while the other proposed Khan-i-Dauran for the post.[132] But the Emperor conferred it on Nizam-ul-Mulk who was recalled from Deccan to taken the

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[124] *Ahwal*, ff 165, 169.

[125] An Irani noble of 5000/5000 rank, holding the faujdari of Hindaun and Bajara, *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 903.

[126] Mansabdar of 6000/3000, held the post of Mir Atish, *Shahnama*, op.cit, f 48b.

[127] *Later Mughals*, Vol.II, p 56-60.

[128] *Muntakhab*, pp 915, 916, 919.

[129] *Tarikh*-i-*Fathiya*, op.cit, f 8.

[130] *Muntakhab*, Vol.II, p 939.

[131] Muhammad Ali Bin Muhammad Sadiq, *Mirat-us-Safa*, R.155-56, CAS, History, f 52a.

[132] *Shahnamah*, f 121b.

responsibility.[133]

Nizam-ul-Mulk's *Wizarat*, his proposed reforms in the administration, the opposition from the rivals and the Nizam's decision to go back to Deccan will be discussed in the Next chapter (chapter 3).

After Nizam left Delhi, his son Ghazi-ud-Din Khan was appointed as the deputy *wazir* on January 6, 1724.[134] But finally on 22 July 1724 it was given to the hands of Qamruddin Khan,[135] the son of Muhammad Amin Khan, his rank was enhanced to 8000/8000, but he was not given the *Subedari* of any *Suba* as the earlier *Wazirs* were given. His authority and influence were limited by the group of Koki Jiu, who was dominant from 1724-1732.[136]

The *Wazir* played no role in the appointments of the administrative posts and the favorites of Emperor secured the appointment of their own persons on various administrative posts.

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[133] *Ahwal*, op.cit, f 180b.

[134] *Umara*, op.cit., Vol.I, p.361-62.

[135] After the removal of Husain Ali, Muhammad Shah appointed him the second Bakhshi and Darogha-i-Ghusal Khana. He held the mansab of 5000 *zat*. He was a Turani Noble.

[136] The group of Koki consisted of Zafar Khan Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan, Abdul Ghafoor and other members who complete hold over the emperor, and he hardly ever took a decision on any issue without consulting them.

Table II- Appointments made during the ascendancy of Koki's group 1724-1732[137]

S.No.	Names	Post	Mansab	Group
1.	Ali Ahmad Khan	*Arz-i-Mukarrar*	5000/-	Indian (Koki's brother)
2.	Ali Asghar Khan	*Faujdar of Doab Punjab*	5000/-	Indian (Koki's brother)
3.	Ali Hamid Khan	*Daroga of Faiz Canal*	5000/-	Indian (Koki's brother)
4.	Allahwardi Khan	*Qarawal Begi*	4000/-	Mughal
5.	Amin-ud-Daulah	*Mir Tuzak I*	-	Indin
6.	Dawar Dad Khan	*Mir Tuzak II*	-	-
7.	Mir Hasan Khan	*Darogha-i-Khas Jilu*	6000/-	Foster brother of emperor
8.	Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan	*Nazir and Darogha-i-Sarf Khas*	6000/-	Indian
9.	Sher Afghan Khan	*Darogha of Risala-i-Sultani*	7000/-	Indian

[137] *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, op.cit., ff.46-48, 54-55.

10.	Muzaffar Ali Khan	*Mir Atash*	7000/-	Indian
11.	Najm-ud-Din Ali	*Governor of Ajmer*	-	Barha Saiyyid (Indian)
12.	Bu 'Ali Khan	*Darogha-i-Farrash Khana*	-	-
13.	Munawwar Khan	*Qur Begi*	5000/-	Indian
14.	Inayat Khan Rasikh	*Bakshi of Shagird Pesha*	4000/-	Indian
15.	Javid Khan	*Darogha of Privy Purse*	-	-
16.	Jawahar Khan	*Darasha of Jewel House*	-	Eunuch
17.	Bakhtawar Khan	*Darogha of Kitchen*	-	Eunuch
18.	Wajeeh Khan	*Darogha of Coffle Department*	-	Eunuch
19.	Qaim Khan	*Darogha of Post Office*	-	Eunuch
20.	Masum Ali Khan	*Darogha of Intelligence*	-	Eunuch

Apart from the above mentioned appointments, the group of Koki recommends Sarbuland Khan for governorship of Gujarat, Nasir Khan for governorship of Kabul and Muhammad Khan Bangash for that of Malwa. From the Table it is evident that the Indians occupied the important post during the period, Qamruddin Khan was the exception of getting highest post of *Wazir* with the mansab of 8000/8000 but without

any power.

The evil practices of the Koki's group grew day by day, they were busy in making their fortunes by the unfair means, the auditor's report showed a balance of 3 crore against Zafar Khan and the same against Abul Ghafur.[138] Koki also fell from the Emperor's confidence soon and by the end of 1734, the ascendancy of this clique had come to an end.[139]

With the fall of the Koki's clique Qamruddin tried to strengthen his group by joining hands with the other Mughal nobles. The *Wazir* also brought into the alliance, Muhammad Khan Bangash,[140] and also established cordial relations with Sadat Khan, an *Irani* noble. The *Wazir* also mobilized nobles Iranis and Turanis both against Muzaffar Khan and Samsam-ud-Daulah.[141]

Zafar Khan and Sher Afghan Khan employed a large number of Afghans and Hindustanis in their armies, formed their own group. Zafar Khan though related to Nizam-ul-Mulk but did not join lands with Qamruddin Khan against Khan-i-Dauran.[142]

Throughout his life Muhammad Shah had never been able to solve any problem or made a decision for himself. He had always been under the command of his favorites. In early his life he was guided and controlled by Saiyyad brothers, then under the influence of the group of Koki Jieu, who were fell from favor in 1732. After that the Emperor was dominated by Samsam-ud-Daulah (the *Mir Bakshi*) and his brother

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[138] *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, op.cit., ff.47b, 66b.

[139] *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, op.cit., pp.602-605, 622-638.

[140] An Afghan noble of 6000/6000 and holding the post of governor of Allahabad, *Umara*, op.cit., Vol.III, p 771-74.

[141] *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, ff 81-82.

[142] *Ibid.*, f 60a.

Muzaffar Khan.[143] After the death of Samsam-ud-Daulah and Muzaffar Khan in 1739, Emperor fell into the hands of Amir Khan,[144] and three other men brought to the Emperor's notice by Amir Khan; namely Muhammad Ishaq Khan,[145] Asad Yar,[146] and after four years Safdar Jung.[147] The Emperor thus totally withdrew himself from public business leaving it to his ministers.

Muhammad Warid Tehrani writes about the condition prevailing under Muhammad Shah and the Emperor's concern about the same. In his words, "whenever the officers of the Deccan or Gujarat or Malwa reported any Maratha incursion in the vicinity to the Emperor. His Majesty in order to soothe his heart afflicted by such bad news either visited the gardens – to look at the newly planted and leafless trees or rode out to hunt in the plains, while the *Wazir* went to lessen his grief by gazing the lotuses in some pools. He spent a month or more in tents, enjoying pleasure or hunting fish in the rivers. Thus both the Emperor and *Wazir* lived in complete forgetfulness of the business of administration. No chief, no man thinks of guarding the realm and protecting the people while these disturbances grow greater day by day.[148]

In such a situation it was obvious that everyone wanted to have his own share with force and it gave a rise to factional politics, where the whole court was divided into groups of same interests, according to race. The main aim was to divide the

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[143] *Seir*, op.cit, Vol.II, pp 457-58. Samsam-ud-Daulah was title of Khwaja Asim, Khan-i-dauran, he was Indian Shaikh, *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghta*, op.cit., f 373b.

[144] Amir Khan entitled Umadat-ul-Mulk, a noble holding the post of III[rd] Bakshi.

[145] Ishaq Khan, entitled Mutaman-ud-daulah, an Irani noble of 6000 *zat* held the post *of Diwan-i-Khalisah.*

[146] Asad Yar Khan was also an Irani noble who had acquired the post of *Darogha-i-Harkaras.*

[147] An Irani noble, Governor of Awadh.

[148] Muhammad Warid Tehrani, *Mirat-i-Waridat* or *Tarikh-i-Waridat*, MSS, MAL, AMU, Aligarh, ff 117-118.

administration among them.[149]

The Persian invasion of 1739 substantially drained the wealth of the Mughal Empire. Whatever was left in the imperial treasury was distributed among those *mansabdars* and *risaladars* (commander of small armies), who had not received their emoluments for years. It was promised to them that their debts to the traders would be cleared after the victory over Nadir Shah.[150]

The rivalry amongst the nobles made the situation worst, when they due to their own interests did not take part in the battle with their large armies. But after the aggressor left Delhi, each of them tried to secure a place for himself Nizam-ul-Mulk get the post of *Mir Bakshi*, due to Khan-i-Dauran's death. After Nadir Shah's departure in May 1739, people tried to live a normal life again, and the life which came to a standstill now once again came into motion.[151] But the markets were turned to ruins. After that prices in Delhi rose so high that even one or half *ser* of grain could not be had at a rupee.[152]

When the Emperor held *Darbar*, this time we can see that Irani ascendancy came into scene with Amir Khan as its head. Out of twelve appointments nine were *Iranis*, two Indians and one *Turani*.[153] At this time Amir Khan tried to get the office of *Wizarat* for himself from Qamruddin Khan. But Muhammad Shah was aware that it will create problem from the side of *Turani* nobles, and on the advice of Ishaq Khan

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[149] J. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Calcutta, 1932, p 3.

[150] *Tarikh-i- Shahadat-i- Farrukhsiyar*, op.cit, ff 171.

[151] *Shahnama-i-Deccan*, op.cit, p.420.

[152] Irvine, op.cit, Vol II, p 357.

[153] *Ibid*, p.421.

Muhammad Shah left the idea and told Amir Khan the danger in the Scheme.[154] Amir Khan was ordered to left for his province of Allahabad.[155]

With the removal of Amir Khan from the court and the death of Ishaq Khan in 1740, diminish the influence of Irani nobles and Qamruddin Khan tried to strengthen his relation with the emperor. Amir Khan did not left the hope and once again joined the broken relations and secured the appointment of persons of his own Irani group. Safdar Jang was appointed on the post of *Mir Atish* and given the *subedar* of Kashmir in 1744. Amir Khan secured the *Faujdari* of Karnal.[156]

Amir Khan after this started interfering in all the matters of state and the relations between him and Amir Khan deteriorated further and finally the Emperor got Amir Khan murdered in December 1746. After him the Irani faction get another leader Safdar Jang. The Emperor appointed Najmud-Daulah, the elder son of Ishaq Khan, *Diwan-i-Khalisa* on 12 July, 1747.[157] Thus the Irani group still dominated the public affairs.

The factional politics during the remaining part of Muhammad Shah's reign was marked by the intense mutual rivalry of Qamruddin Khan and Safdar Jung, i.e., the Turanis and Iranis.[158]

Thus, throughout his long reign the administration was thoroughly neglected by its supreme head, the nobles divided the *jagirs* and political power among themselves and fought freely as if no monarch existed over them. The Emperor's favourites were

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[154] *Sier*, op.cit., Vol.II, p.487.

[155] *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, op.cit, f 314b.

[156] *Sier*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 521-22.

[157] *Tarikh Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, op.cit., ff 314,316.

[158] Ibid, f 316.

little concerned with the problems of the Empire; their main aim was to amass wealth and to keep their position secure. According to Warid, whatever revenue came from the provinces, the Emperors favourites instead of depositing it in the imperial treasury, took it themselves. The amount so misappropriated can be measured from the fact that when Abdul Ghafoor was censored, over twenty lakh rupees were discovered from his house. Half of the sum of Rs twelve lakhs which was handed over to Zafar Khan each month for the emoluments of imperial army in Kabul was misappropriated by him. In 1732, it was discovered that over two crore rupees had till then been embezzled by him.[159] Muhammad Shah it seems had no courage to take necessary actions against the evil doers.

Thus during the reign of Muhammad Shah, it seems the relation between the Emperor and the nobility changed almost totally. Individual interests of the nobles had openly guided the course of politics and state affairs. The end of the ascendancy of the Saiyid brothers meant to be the decline in their power and the ascendancy of the '*Turani*' fraction, and not the affirmation of imperial authority. The nobles in control of the central offices still had all Empire outlooks; even if they were more concerned with the stability of the regions they had their *jagirs*.

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[159] *Tarikh-i-Waridat*, op.cit, p 383, *Tarikh-i-Shakirkhani*, op.cit, f 38b, *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukhsiyar*, op.cit, ff 45,47,48.

Chapter – 3

Nizam-ul-Mulk in the Deccan 1719 – 1748

3.1. Early Life and Career:

Khwaja Abid, son of Alam Shaikh, was the great man of Samarqand, and a descendent of Shaikh Shahabuddin Soharwardi (d.1234).[1] After the death of his father, he came to India in early 1650s; when he was on his way from Samarqand to Mecca to perform *Hajj* during the reign of Shahjahan. While in India he met the recently appointed subedar of the Deccan prince Aurangzeb, who promised him great rewards if, on completing his religious obligation he returned to Mughal India and joined the prince's service. Thus in the Mughal court he was received with distinction and was offered with a post, which he promised to join after the performance of *Hajj*.[2]

The reason for Aurangzeb's interest in Abid Khan is unclear; it may have been related to the Khan's lineage to the honoured Sufi Saint Shaikh Shahabuddin Soharwardi. More likely another reason is Aurangzeb's attempt to recruit individuals in anticipation of an impending war of succession between the Emperor Shahjahan's four sons.

Abid Khan returned to South Asia in late 1656 just in time to fight in the 1657-58 war of succession in which Aurangzeb was victorious. After Aurangzeb's enthronement, Abid Khan was rewarded for having fought with distinction during the

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[1] *Masir-ul-Umara*, op.cit, Vol III, p 409.

[2] Lala Mansaram, *Masir-i-Nizami*, MS, Central Record Office, Hyderabad. State Archives, Hyderabad, f 15.

war of succession. Thus began an enduring fifty years long association between the Emperor Aurangzeb and Abid Khan's family.[3] Over the next few decades, and until his death during the siege of Bijapur in 1686, Abid Khan was one of Aurangzeb's favourite noblemen. Aurangzeb appreciated Abid for his honesty and loyalty; he was especially liked because he shared many of Emperor's views regarding Islamic religious practice. Ultimately he was appointed as the imperial *Sadr-us-Sudur* (head of religious endowments).

Other members of his family also received due considerations and imperial favours and that was his son, Mir Shihabuddin, who became one of the principal nobles of Aurangzeb, and in time attained the rank of 7,000 with the title of Ghazi-ud-din Khan Bahadur Firoz Jang, and as a reward for his eminent service at the battle of Bijapur, he receive from the appreciative sovereign in addition to the former titles the appellation of *Farzand-i-Arjumand.* Ghazi-ud-din remained a committed Aurangzeb loyalist. Although there are many examples of Ghazi-ud-din's devotion to Aurangzeb[4], two examples are worth mentioning here. First in the early 1680s; he played a vital role in thwarting an almost successful rebellion by one of the Emperor's son's prince Akbar. Secondly in 1686-87 Ghazi-ud-din Khan accused another son of the Emperor, prince Muazzam of engaging in secret negotiations with the kingdom of Golkonda in order to thwart his father's attempt to conquer the Deccan Sultanate. The Emperor turned aside

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[3] *Ahwal*, op.cit, f 179.

[4] Following the Khan's success in bringing grain to a starving and beleaguered Mughal army commanded by Aurangzeb's son prince Azam, a deeply appreciative Emperor went so far as to pray ' As God Almighty has saved the honour of the house of Timur (*sharm-i-aulad-i-Taimuriya*) through the efforts of Firuz Jung so may he guard the the honour of his descendents until the Day of Resurrection *(ta daur-i-qayamat), Muntakhab,* op.cit, Vol II, p 319.

THE GENEOLOGICAL CHART OF NIZAM-UL-MULK*



* Munshi Abdul Qadir Bidri, *Tarikh-i-Asaf Jahi,* OMLRI, Hyderabad, f 10.

Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I, *Subedar* of the Deccan (Painting- Sir Salar Jung Museum, Hyderabad.)

prince Muazzam's protestations of innocence and placed him under house arrest for almost a decade.[5]

During the reign of Shah Alam, Bahadur Shah Ghazi-ud-din Khan was appointed the governor of Gujarat, where he died in 1710 A.D.[6]

Mir Qamruddin Khan, whose chronographic name was Nek Bakht (a Persian phrase meaning, a person having good fate) was born to Ghazi-ud-din khan and Safiya Khanum in 1671 at the imperial capital Delhi, the Mughal Empire at that time was at its height with the Emperor Aurangzeb at its helm. The dynasty's political and military authority in late 17th Century was largely unchallenged. At its heart lay a small and elite group of nobles whose unfailing loyalty to the Empire was richly rewarded in the form of political benefits. Nizam-ul-Mulk the grandson of Abid Khan was the scion of two such elite noble families. On his mother's side he was grandson of Sadullah Khan- the illustrious and long serving prime minister of the Emperor Shahjahan (1628-1658). Although Sadullah khan died in 1656, his family continued to enjoy great imperial favors.

Thus the women in the family continued to enjoy contract excellent marriages. Safiya Khanum was one of them. At the behest of the Emperor Aurangzeb himself Safiya khanum was married (in 1670) to Ghazi-ud-din Khan –the eldest son of Abid Khan, one of the Emperor's favorite nobleman. This marriage undoubtedly represented

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5 Other high ranking noblemen had similarly challenged Aurangzeb's sons. In 1693, for example, Zulfiqar Khan and Asad Khan temporarily imprisoned prince Kambaksh, the youngest son of Aurangzeb, following bitter disagreements over military strategy during a campaign in the Deccan. Although Aurangzeb subsequently ordered his son's release and even warned Zulfiqar Khan for overreaching, the reputation of Khan was not affected in any significant way. *Masir-i-Alamgiri*, op.cit, pp 354-59.

6 *Umara*, op.cit, Vol.II, pp 875-879.

a powerful match up connecting as it did an impeccably credentialed noble family (that of the Nizam's mother), with a fast rising family of recent immigrants from Central Asia.[7]

Nizam-ul-Mulk received consideration from the Emperor Aurangzeb early in his life. He was six year old when he received a *mansab* of 450 horses. After one year this was increased to 900. There was a further increase in the following years. He was given the title of Chin Qilich Khan. The meaning of the word is boy swordsman. Twice in his career Nizam-ul-Mulk seems to have fallen out with his father but was reconciled with him under the instructions of the Emperor.[8]

In the 45th (1702), R.Y of the Emperor's reign he was appointed as the *Faujdar* of Bijapur-Karnatak in place of Namwar Khan. In the 47th R.Y of Aurangzeb's reign he was appointed the governor of the province of Bijapur. During the same year he was entrusted with the *Faujdari* of Talkonkan and Azamnagar and was made the *thanedar* of Sampgaon. Nizam-ul-Mulk received an addition of 1,000 horse in his *mansab* with a gift of 1 crore *Dam*.[9]

Nizam-ul-Mulk accompanied the Emperor in the siege of *Wakin Kheda*, the last siege conducted by the Emperor, and he did services to the satisfaction of *Aurangzeb*. In recognition of his ability and service Chin Qilich Khan was raised to the rank of 5000 *zat* and 5000 *sawar* and was awarded one crore and fifty lakhs of *Dams*, a sword

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[7] *Tarikh-i-Asafjahi*, op.cit, pp 3-5.

[8] *Masir-i-Nizami*, op.cit, f 19.

[9] Ibid, f 20, Yusuf Husain, op.cit, p 36.

and an elephant.[10]

As long as Aurangzeb was alive men like Nizam-ul-Mulk and his father never faltered in their loyalty to the ageing but relentless Emperor. This is true even when large number of Mughal nobility had clearly lost all confidence in achieving Emperor's goal of conquering and pacifying Deccan. In the face of widespread demoralization and defeatism, Nizam-ul-Mulk remained a standout general, contemporary sources describe him as showing casual disregard for his own personal safety when on imperial duty.[11]

Nizam-ul-Mulk clearly felt that he had learned much of what he knows about people, politics, leadership and religion through his association with Aurangzeb.[12] The two men despite a 53 year age gap enjoyed a strong relationship that went all the way back to Nizam's infancy when Aurangzeb personally chose the Nizam's name, 'Mir Qamaruddin'. Other example of intimate relation thrive: when the Nizam was a very young boy, the Emperor requested that Ghazi-ud-din Khan should leave him under Aurangzeb's personal charge for one day a week so that the Emperor might train him.[13]

Aurangzeb not only promoted the Nizam and his father to the highest ranks in the within the Mughal nobility, he extended his generosity to other members of their extended family as well. Muhammad Amin Khan who was Ghazi-ud-din Khan's first cousin and Nizam's uncle is an example in this case. Within a year of his arrival in

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[10] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol II, p 538.

[11] During the 1705 siege of Wakinkheda, for example, the horse he was riding was blown apart by a cannon shot, instead of caring for his own life the Nizam called for a fresh horse and continued inspection of the Mughal frontlines.

[12] *Masir-i-Nizami*, op.cit, f 73b.

[13] *Hadiqat-ul-Alam*, op.cit, Vol II, p 49.

India from Central Asia in 1687, Muhammad Amin Khan was promoted to much coveted position of *Sadr-us-Sudur*, the position which once held by the Nizam's grandfather. Later just prior to Aurangzeb's death, Muhammad Amin khan was further honoured with the imperial title of 'Chin Muhammad Khan' and another increase in his imperial rank.[14]

Such examples of imperial favours towards the Nizam's extended circle, including uncles, Cousins, nephews and the family retainers, flourish. Having received seemingly boundless imperial patronage and generosity, there is no question that the Nizam would not be true to his salt.

In early November 1707, Chin Qilich Khan combined his governorship with a number of *faujdaris* in the province of Awadh and the *Faujdari* of Jaunpur which lay on the border in Allahabad province in the neighbourhood.[15] Later in January 1708, when he resigned protesting among other things, for a mansab of 7000/7000, he was persuaded to withdraw his resignation by none other than Munim khan, the *Wazir* and the Nizam returned to Awadh with a *mansab* of 7000/7000 together with all his earlier *faujdaris*, barring Jaunpur which was given to his uncle Qilich Muhammad Khan. Thus with the accession of Muazzam with the title of Shah Alam Bahadur Shah, Nizam-ul-Mulk was called to the court. His previous titles and *mansabs* were confirmed, and he was appointed to the governorship of the province of Awadh and *Faujdari* of Lucknow.[16]

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[14] . *Umara*, op.cit, Vol I, pp 346-350.

[15] *Umara*, Vol II, p 839, *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghta*, op.cit, f 307b.

[16] *Masir-i-Nizami*, op.cit, ff 26-27.

These additional offices were not meant to strengthen the position of the governor, and enable him to encounter the problems of the local administration forcefully. *Subedari* with more than one *Faujdari* was simply an additional privilege for Nizam, more as a mark of special consideration for his eminence and stature than any index of change in the institution of governorship. Nizam's claims to the high rank of 7000/7000, was also accepted because he was a leader of the important group at the court. Besides his father Ghazi-ud-din Khan was the governor of Gujarat while a number of his associates were posted in the Deccan where the emperor had to meet the challenge of another claimant of the throne Prince Muhammad Kam Baksh.

Thus when Nizam came to Oudh in 1708, he was made to recognize the fact that his special position as governor by no means implied additional power in matters related to *Subedari*. The Emperor did not approve of his recommendation that one of his friend appointed to the Faujdari of Bahraich. Instead the Emperor had appointed to the post an associate of Zulfiqar khan, his arch rival at the court.[17]

On another occasion the Nizam was deprived of the *faujdaris* of Khairabad and Lucknow to the *Diwan* of the province, who was again an associate of Zulfiqar Khan and thus independent of and check on Nizam-ul-Mulk.[18]

In the case of Zulfiqar Khan, it was in altogether different situation that the emperor granted the unprecedented power to him as the governor of Deccan. Bahadur Shah had had firsthand experience of its problems. He had opposed the annexation of

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[17] *Umara*, op.cit, Vol I, pp 277-78,311, Vol II, p 93.

[18] *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, op.cit, f 115a.

Golkonda.[19] After his accession he had agreed to give Golkonda and Bijapur to Prince Kam Baksh on the condition that coins should be struck and *Khutba* read in the name of the Emperor.[20]In Bahadur Shah's assessment, the Deccan had a special position and was to be only loosely integrated into the empire.

The role of Nizam-ul-Mulk during the period of Bahadur Shah, Jahandar Shah and Farrukh Siyar has been discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter I) in detail. The first governorship of Nizam 1713-1715, his removal from the post and succession of Hussain Ali Khan in the Deccan after him, the Nizam's fight with Dilawar Ali Khan and Alam Ali Khan in the battles of Hasanpur and Balapur respectively. Now we move to what has happened during the reign of Muhammad Shah the next Emperor in line.

3.2. The Second Viceroyalty of the Nizam (1720-22 A.D.):

Before the accession of Rafi-ud-Darajat, Nizam-ul-Mulk was offered the *Subedari* of Patna which he refused to accept. But the presence of Nizam-ul-Mulk in the capital was a source of constant danger for Saiyid brothers.[21] They were not able to command the full loyalty of demoralized and dispirited imperial nobility. Opponents found a leader in the Turani Amir Nizam-ul-Mulk who was given the governorship of Malwa.[22]

The Emperor Muhammad Shah and his mother had sent a plea to Nizam-ul-Mulk to free him from his Saiyid captors. When the Saiyids tried to transfer the Nizam

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[19] *History of Aurangzeb*, op.cit, Vol IV, pp 362-65.

[20] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol II, p 608.

[21] They were known in the history as the king makers because with the help of their supporters they enthrone one Emperor after another with their own choice.

[22] Yusuf Husain, op.cit, p 81.

from Malwa, the Nizam marched towards Delhi. In his appeal for noble's support the Nizam deplored the ruin of the Timurid house and the monarchy; he protested that Saiyids were intent on ruining all the old Irani and Turani families of the Empire.[23]

In August 1720, the Nizam won a battle in the Deccan against a combined Maratha/Saiyid army. A successful plot secured the assassination of Husain Ali Khan while he was marching towards the Deccan, with the Emperor in his camp. Muhammad Shah then joined the hands in a campaign against Abdullah Khan. The latter was defeated and captured outside Delhi in November, 1720. After two months in captivity Abdullah Khan was executed.[24]

Muhammad Shah was now free from the menace of the Saiyid brothers. He started appointing the persons of his own choice on various posts. As the Nizam was in the Deccan, the *Wizarat* was given by the Emperor to Muhammad Amin Khan instead of Nizam, to whom the Emperor promised the *Wizarat* in lieu of his help against the Saiyids.[25] Nizam's success against the Saiyids can be ascribed to the fact that he had brought with him from Malwa a number of followers, Mohammadans and Hindus who were attached to his person and fortunes. To these nobles he granted *Jagirs* and employs them as his generals. In this way he was able to raise, when necessary the enormous army amounting on some occasions to as many as 300,000 men.[26]

After this victory the Nizam organized the administration and pacified the

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[23] J.F. Richards, *The Mughal Empire*, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p 273.

[24] *Masir-i-Nizami*, op.cit, f 71.

[25] Ibid, f 72.

[26] J.D.B. Gribble, *A History of the Deccan*, London, 1924, Vol.II, p 5.

country. He himself set out in the direction of Bijapur, Karnatic and Mysore to deal with the unruly Afghan landholders, who had acquired power by extortion and highway robbery. On hearing of his march the *Faujdar* and *Zamindars* of Adhoni (Imtiyazgarh), Sadullah Khan, the Nazim of Arcot, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, *Faujdar* of Shahpur and Bankipur, Abdul Nabi Khan *Faujdar* of Cudaba, Ibrahim Khan Panni, *Faujdar* of Karnol and others offered submission. He restored the peace and order by chastising rebels in the neighborhood of Talikota and returned to Aurangabad.[27]

Mubariz Khan, the governor of Hyderabad, had with great foresight expressed his support to the Nizam at the right time.[28] Agreeing with Mubariz Khan on a common cause of eliminating Saiyid brothers from power, the Nizam promised him a high rank and new title when Saiyid rule in Delhi was brought down.[29]

While Mubariz Khan was still in residence at Aurangabad news arrived of the death of both the Saiyid brothers. On learning of the appointment of his uncle Muhammad Amin Khan as *Wazir* by the Emperor Muhammad Shah, the Nizam wholly freed from the worries of intervention from Delhi turned his attention to tightening the Deccan administration.[30]

Nizam confirmed Mubariz Khan's position as governor of Hyderabad and sent him back to his province.[31] The cordial relation between the two did not last for long.

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[27] Mir Alam, *Hadiqat-ul-Alam* (Litho), Hyderabad 1892, Vol II, pp 48-49.

[28] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 897.

[29] *Umara*, op.cit., Vol III, p 734.

[30] Yusuf Husain, op.cit., p 115.

[31] Ibid, p 116.

The interests of Nizam were sharply diverged from those of Mubariz Khan. Though in view of the prevailing situation Mubariz Khan did not express his dissatisfaction, yet he was inwardly displeased.[32] The reason why Mubariz Khan did not express his dissatisfaction was that, after the Adhoni expedition Nizam was removed entirely from the Deccan political scene. Muhammad Shah, the Emperor summoned him to Delhi as imperial *Wazir* after the death of Muhammad Amin Khan.[33]

Thus during the period of his second viceroyalty Nizam-ul-Mulk, was busy in organizing the tribute gathering expedition against the various *Faujdar* of Bijapur and Hyderabad Karnatak (mostly *Afghan*), who had completely ignored any imperial obligations for several years.[34] Nizam's relation with Mubariz Khan during this period was openly not strained but internally their relations were not cordial.

3.3. Nizam's *Wizarat* and his Proposed Reforms:

On the 5th of the month of Jumada I, year four of accession, corresponding to 1134 (10th February, 1722), orders were issued for making arrangements for the holding of the *Diwan-i-am*. All the grandees and high *Mansabdars* were ordered to be present there. The Emperor thus conferred on Nizam-ul-Mulk, the office of *Wizarat*. Nizam receive usual robe, a dagger, an ornamental case (*Qalamdan-i-Wizarat*), and a diamond ring.[35]

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[32] *Umara*, Vol.III, pp 735-36.

[33] *Muntakhab*, Vol.II, p 939.

[34] *Umara*, op.cit,Vol.III, p 738.

[35] Shivdas, *Shahnamah-i-Munawwar Kalam*, tr. Syed Hasan Askari, Patna, 1980, p.150, Munim Khan, *Sawaneh Deccan*, MSS, OMLRI, f. 94b. All the authorities except Khafi Khan agree on this date, he gave 29 January, 1722 for the appointment of Nizam-ul-Mulk as *Wazir*, *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 930.

When the *Farman* of his appointment was received by him, he accepted the offer and busied himself with arrangements for the administration of the six *Subas* of the Deccan. In his absence he appointed Izzud-daulah Iwaz Khan as his deputy and entrusted him with his personal seal of authority.[36]

Iwaz Khan one of Nizam's followers, a mansabdar of 4000/3000 was left with large force as his deputy in the Deccan, and the Nizam set out towards Hindustan. Nizam left 20,000 horses and an equal number of foot soldiers and deputed competent *Faujdars* in that region.[37]

Nizam-ul-Mulk in his new position as *Wazir* was surrounded by difficulties and found himself confronted with a solid block of opponents who took delight in putting obstacle in his way. Muhammad Shah was in the hands of a clever woman known as koki or the 'foster sister', Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan, a eunuch of the palace, and others of the same standing. The hostilities of most powerful man in the state Samsamud-Daulah Khan Dauran, (the *Mir Bakshi*) against the Nizam were barely concealed. Thus the new *Wazir* found himself thwarted at every step.[38]

Whatever the minister did or proposed was misinterpreted until doubt and suspicion were aroused in the mind of Muhammad Shah. Upon taking charge of his office Nizam-ul-Mulk found the state of the treasury alarming and the *Jagirdari* system in disorder. People suffered from the effects of rise in prices and unemployment,

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36 *Masir-i-Nizami*, op.cit, f.71, Iwaz Khan originally named Muhammad Kamal and entitled Izud-Daulah was Nizam's uncle by marriage, having married the sister of *Nizam's* father (i.e. his aunt), he and his son Jamaluddin, rendered good service in the battle of Khandwa and Balapur. He died on June 30th 1730, *Shahnama*, op.cit, p 144.

37 *Shahnama*, op.cit, p 145.

38 *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol II, p 940.

particularly the *Khanzad* nobles were reduced to impoverishment.[39]

Nizam-ul-Mulk's efforts were chiefly directed to the abolition of the practice of farming out the revenues and the stopping of presents and peshkash to the Emperor for appointments and other favors. He wanted to reduce the extent of *jagirs* and to assign those which were difficult to manage to the more powerful. He also suggested that competent persons should be appointed to offices of trust and responsibility. He held that the re-imposition of *Jaziya* would lessen the financial burden.[40]

Reckless alienation of *Khalisa* lands had brought about a considerable fall in the revenues of the state, making the regular payment of salaries difficult. The Emperor faced with the imminent bankruptcy.[41] Not far from the capital the *Mewatis* had taken to plunder and thrown the whole region into disorder, but they were not checked and punished.[42] The natural calamities in the form of earthquakes, floods and epidemics affected large areas of the land and further aggravated the distress of the people.[43]

In the execution of his plans for reform, Nizam-ul-Mulk found himself confronted by a hostile court. Those who were gaining out of the mismanagement were not ready to accept the reforms. And many rivals came in his way, Haidar Quli Khan, the governor of Gujarat, after shattering his hopes of becoming *Wazir*, turned against

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[39] *Ahwal, op.cit,* f 181a.

[40] Yusuf Muhammad Khan, *Tarikh-i-Fathiya,* MSS, *Daftar-i-Diwan*, Hyderabad, f 16a.

[41] *Ahwal,* op.cit, f 182a.

[42] M. Ali Khan Muzaffari, *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, MSS, MAL, Aligarh, f 257.

[43] Ibid, f 207.

the Nizam to calm his frustration.[44]

Suspicion and Intrigue were again rife at the court, Nizam-ul-Mulk, left the attending of court in disgust.[45] However Qudsiya Begum patched up these differences of Nizam with Muhammad Shah. Khan-i-Dauran, the *Mir Bakshi* was sent to bring the Nizam back who accepted on the condition that Haidar Quli Khan should be sent away to his own province of Gujarat which he had been neglecting over since he superseded Ajit Singh as its governor.[46]

Haidar Quli Khan left Delhi but in utmost reluctance and started taking aggressive measures which provoked the Emperor who issued an order to the governor to desist from his activities. But Haidar Quli paid no attention. He was deprived of his *Jagirs* in Delhi and removed from the *Subedari* of Gujarat to which Nizam was appointed with authority to proceed to chastise the rebel. Nizam left his son, Ghaziuddin as his deputy at the imperial court.[47]

During the period of his *Wizarat*, Nizam inquired into the salaries of Mubariz Khan, his sons, and companions and the existing fiscal relationship between Hyderabad and the centre, discovering large arrears, the Nizam made a sharp demand upon Mubariz Khan's representative at court (one of his sons) for payment of the revenues of the crown lands in Hyderabad. An altercation followed and the Nizam, unable to force payment openly showed his displeasure. The enraged *Wazir* made two subsequent

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[44] M. Baksh Ashub, *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, R.69-70, CAS, History, Aligarh, f 46.

[45] *Ahwal*, f 183a.

[46] V.G. Dighe, *Peshwa Baji Rao I and Maratha Expansion*, Bombay, 1944, p 26.

[47] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 946.

attempts to transfer Mubariz Khan to other governorship: first to Kabul and later to Gujarat.[48]

For improving the existing condition and removing the evils Nizam proposed the reforms, to which the emperor under pressure of the opponents of Nizam gave his formal assent only, no work has done so far its implementation. The virtual rejection of his scheme of reforms placed Nizam-ul-Mulk in an embarrassing and difficult position.[49]

Nizam-ul-Mulk decided to abandon the *Wizarat* and on the pretext of change of climate, he took leave and proceeded on a hunting excursion to his jagir at Muradabad. When he reached Agra, he got news that the Marathas had invaded Malwa and Gujarat which were under his eldest son Ghaziuddin's charge. Nizam-ul-Mulk wrote to the Emperor seeking permission to take up the expedition against the *Marathas*. A *Farman* was issued granting the permission to Nizam-ul-Mulk. The *Marathas* departed from Malwa when they heard that Nizam-ul-Mulk had crossed Narmada.[50]

From there the Nizam went and camped at Sirah near Sironj. Here he received intelligence from the Deccan about the evil designs of Mubariz Khan. Nizam-ul-Mulk hastily returned to the Deccan and reached Aurangabad in June 1724.[51]

"Nizam-ul-Mulk had always looked upon the Deccan as the land of his dreams. He had spent most of his youth there and since the dispossession of the Saiyids, he

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[48] *Umara*, op.cit,Vol.III, p 736.

[49] *Muntakhab*, Vol.II, p 947.

[50] Yusuf Husain, op.cit, p.153.

[51] Later Mughals, op.cit, Vol.II, p.136, *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, pp.949-959.

considered it his own by right of the sword".[52] Thus he was never willing to relinquish the Deccan for the precarious *Wizarat*, when he withdrew from the *Wizarat* and marched towards the south, he had only the Deccan in his mind as his goal.[53]

3.4. Battle of Shakarkheda and the third Viceroyalty of Nizam-ul-Mulk, 1724-1748:

Ultimately it was Nizam's marginality and weakness, not his strength as much of historiography on Hyderabad[54] suggests that forced him to stand for the possibility of a life beyond imperial court in1724.

While Nizam-ul-Mulk was away from Delhi, his enemies at the court were not idle. On 3rd February, 1724, a *Farman* was handed to Abdul Mabud Khan, son of Mubariz Khan, appointing the latter as deputy to infant Prince Shahryar Shah in the Deccan, and after the death of the infant Mubariz Khan was confirmed as *Subedar*.[55]

Mubariz Khan, whose father in law Inayat-ullah Khan, was the *Khansaman* of the Emperor and held a position of considerable influence at the court incited him to

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52 *Parties and Politics*, op.cit, p 176.

53 Z.U. Malik, *The Reign of Muhammad Shah 1719-1748* (2nd ed.), Bombay, 2006, p 85.

54 See, Irvine, *Later Mughals, Parties and Politics*, Yusuf Hussain, *Ahwal, Tarikh-i-Fathiya, Masir-i- Nizami.*

55 *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 950, Two years earlier, Mubariz Khan (Khwaja Muhammad) *Nazim* of the Suba of Hyderabad, at the close of the war with Alam Ali Khan, came to Nizam-ul-Mulk and made great profession of zeal and devotion. Nizam took an interest in him and obtained for him from the Emperor an addition of 2000 in his former rank, the title of Imadul Mulk Mubariz Khan Bahadur Hizbur Jang. Shahnawaz Khan gave his rank as 7000/7000, *Umara*, op.cit, Vol.III, p 730.

offer resistance to the Nizam.[56]The situation further deteriorated when Nizam-ul-Mulk's son Ghaziuddin, whom he had left at the court as his *Naib* in the office of *Wazir*, has been removed and that Itimad-ud-Daula, Qamruddin Khan (son of Muhammad Amin Khan) had been appointed *Wazir*.[57]

Mubariz Khan was thus set up as a rival to Nizam-ul-Mulk to thwart latter's attempt to recover Deccan. Mubariz Khan started raising an army to realize his ambition. The Emperor had also made a grant of five lakh of rupees for the expenses of the expedition against Nizam. Orders were sent to Iwaz Khan (deputy of Nizam in the Deccan), Bahadur Khan, Abdul Nabi Khan, Raja Shahu and other chiefs to help Mubariz Khan in every possible way.[58]

Nizam-ul-Mulk in his characteristic way, wrote to the newly appointed governor to refrain from fighting against him, but the pressure of Mubariz Khan's followers and his own self interest made him reject the Nizam's suggestion of keeping the peace. He continued to make his preparation for the trial of strength.[59] The Nizam enlisted considerable support from his men. His deputy Iwaz Khan persuaded Raja Shahu, who had sent a contingent of the Maratha troops under Peshwa Balaji for

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[56] Irvine, op.cit., Vol.II, p 138-50. Inayatullah Khan was the native of Bukhara and his real name was Khwaja Muhammad. He came to India with his mother when he was a boy. Being capable and intelligent he obtained government employment through Mirza Yar Khan, a man of considerable influence at Alamgir's Court.

[57] *Muntakhab*, Vol II p 950.

[58] *Ahwal*, op.cit, f 186a.

[59] Mausavi Khan, Mir Hashim, *Munshat-i-Mausavi Khan*, MS, State Lib. Hyderabad, R.204, CAS, Department of History, Aligarh, f 44-47.

Nizam's help.[60]

As Nizam-ul-Mulk had succeeded in reaching Aurangabad unopposed, it appears that Muhammad Shah considered the game lost, and changed his plans. The Emperor asserts that the Deccan provinces had been placed in charge of Mubariz Khan because Nizam had complained that the country was a desolate one producing no revenues. If the extent of Nizam-ul-Mulk's desire for the Deccan had been known, a successor would not have been appointed. Nizam-ul-Mulk was restored, while Mubariz Khan was granted Azimabad and Patna, and Nizam was directed not to hinder Mubariz's way. But before these orders could reach or take effect the hostile governors had put their quarrel to the arbitrament of the sword.[61]

On 23rd *Muharram* 1137 H (11th October, 1724) a severe battle was fought near the town of Shakarkheda, in Berar, about 40 miles from Aurangabad, in which Mubariz Khan was killed.[62] The total losses on Mubariz Khan's side are said to have amounted to 3500 men of the other hand the losses on Nizam-ul-Mulk's side were comparatively few. Mubariz Khan was buried in the plain outside the town of *Shakarkheda*.[63]

On 20th June, 1725 Muhammad Shah accepted the bitter reality and pardoned Nizam-ul-Mulk conferring upon him the governorship of the Deccan and the title of "Asaf Jah". His *Jagirs* restored to him, but he was relieved of the change of the other

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60 *Masir-i-Nizami*, op.cit, ff 72-73, In this Manuscript, a letter on behest of the Nizam by Iwaz Khan to Raja Shahu is given.

61 *Ahwal*, op.cit, ff 191ab.

62 Ibid, f 191a.

63 Ibid, f 196b.

two provinces of Malwa and Gujarat.[64]

After this Nizam bestowed on his nobles office and *Jagirs* in the Deccan and gave promotions in rank to many of them. But he avoided the use of sovereign symbols such as the scarlet of or imperial umbrella, the reading of *Khutba* in his own name and the issue of coins (*Sikka*) with his name inscribed on them.[65]

3.5. Nizam's campaign in the Subah of Bijapur and Karnatic:

After his victory in the battle of Shakarkheda, the Nizam consolidated his position from Aurangabad to Hyderabad. He made Hyderabad as his new capital, in view of its strategic importance. Then he busied himself in the administration of the country and made new appointments of reliable and capable persons to all important posts of the government. In the *Subah* of Bijapur, the *Faujdari* of Raichur and Bijapur *Mahals* were placed under Talib Muhi-ud-din Khan and Mirza Ali respectively. The latter had his jagirs in this part of the country and knew the districts (of Bijapur Subah) thoroughly well. The *Mahal* of Adoni (Imtiazgarh) was taken out of the hands of Rindullah Khan and placed under Sana-ullah Khan, son in law of Mubariz Khan. As the fortress of Adoni enjoyed considerable strategic importance Sultan Ali Khan was appointed its *Qiledar*. Generally the *Qiledars* of important fortresses were allowed to have direct dealings with the *Subedar* instead through the *Faujdar*.[66]

After making the administrative arrangements, the Nizam proceeded into the *Suba* of Bijapur and Karnatic to subjugate the turbulent *Afghans* and *Zamindars* of

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[64] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 962.

[65] *Later Mughals*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 154.

[66] *Tarikh-i-Fathiya*, op.cit, ff 174-76.

Bijapur, Chitradurg, Ramdurg, Chinapattan, Srirangapattan etc. They were constantly deviated from the Mughals and the Nizam's authority in their region. The Marathas often rendered support to the Afghans.

During his second viceroyalty, the Nizam intimated the Emperor by writing a letter (1720) that there were difficulties in the *Suba* of Bijapur. He accused the Afghans and *Zamindars* of *Suba* for their deceitful character. He requested the Emperor for financial assistance for the setting of the affairs in the *Suba* of Bijapur.[67] After the surrender of Golkonda, he proceeded towards, Cudapa, Karnol, and Bankapur (1726). He received the allegiance of the *Afghan* chiefs.[68]

Then the influential chiefs of Karnatic, Sadatullah Khan Bahadur (Arcot) Tahir Muhammad Khan Bahadur, Abid Khan and others submitted,[69] and joined him with their armies. The Nizam stayed at Adhoni for three weeks and conciliated the Afghans to join his for collection of tribute in the South. But they refused and joined the Marathas. From Adhoni, Nizam moved to Sira,[70] where Sadatullah Khan joined him.[71]

In April-May 1726, Nizam proceeded towards Srirangapattan on the news of his arrival, the *Rajas* of Mysore, Bednur, Chitradurga and Ramdurga submitted and agreed to pay tribute. Afterwards submitted and agreed to pay tribute. Afterwards as a matter of precaution Nizam reached Chinnapattan (1727). In the same year after settling the

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67 *Ahwal*, op.cit, f 94a.

68 *ibid*, f 94 b.

69 *Umara*, op.cit., Vol.II, p 513.

70 The provincial headquarters of Bijapur Carnatic.

71 Sadatullah Khan joined Nizam with his 2000 cavalry and 1500 infantry in March 1726.

affairs of the Bijapur Karnatic, Nizam reached Gulbarga.[72]

In 1729, the Nizam approached the fort of Wakin Kheda. Its ruler Pam Nayak surrendered the fort. In the following year the Nizam captured the fort of Alur near Gulbarga. He also attempted to make the garrisons of the forts strong.[73] The necessity of checking the power of the Afghan chiefs and *Zamindars* of Bijapur Karnatic forced the Nizam to appear in this region in the year 1733, 1734, 1735 and 1736. During the Nizam's stay at court (1737-41), again the Karnatic affairs had deteriorated beyond measure.[74]

When Nizam-ul-Mulk was leaving for Delhi in 1737, he placed an extensive authority into the hands of his son Nasir Jung and made him deputy in the Deccan. But soon after Nadir Shah's departure, Nizam received intelligence that Nasir had taken up arms against him. Nizam obtained the permission from the Emperor to leave for his dominions to extinguish the rebellion, and he left the capital in August 1740.[75] After preparations the two armies met on 23rd July 1741 near Daulatabad. He was defeated but later pardoned and reinstated in his former office and titles.[76]

After suppression of the rebellion of Nasir Jung in 1741, the Nizam campaigned in the Karnatic at the head of 80,000 cavalry and 20, 0000, foot soldiers.[77] On hearing

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[72] Yusuf Husain, op.cit, p 176.

[73] Ibid, p 180.

[74] Robert Orme, *Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan, Madras,* 1861, Vol.I, p 51.

[75] Umara, op.cit, Vol.III, p 836.

[76] Yusuf Husain, p 205.

[77] Orme, Vol.I, p 50.

the Nizam's march Himmat Khan, the refractory Afghan chief sent petitions in advance expressing regret and asking for pardon for his killing of Himmat Yar Khan, the *Subedar* of Bijapur. The pardon was granted to him by the Nizam on condition that he would behave properly in future.[78]

Then Nizam stayed at Arcot for some time and from there move to Trichnopoly, where on the death of Raja of Trichnopoly, Chanda Sahib seized the fortress from the widowed Rani and had installed himself as governor of newly annexed territory. But it was invaded and occupied by the Marathas. Nizam-ul-Mulk then turned to subdue Murari Ghorpade, in Trichinopoly. He laid siege to the fort for six months, but finding it impregnable he made peace through negotiations and obtained it on 29th August 1743. He entrusted the fort to Khwaja Abdullah Khan and returned to Arcot.[79] On the 4th of *Jumada* 11, 1161 A.H. (21st May, 1748 A.D.), he departed from this life near Burhanpur.[80]

Table III-List of the *Jagir Mahals* of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah Bahadur I (22 *Mahals*) 1120H/ 1708 A.D to 1141H/ 1748 A.D[81]

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[78] *Hadiqat-ul-Alam,* op.cit., Vol.II, p.174.

[79] *Umara*, op.cit, Vol.III, p.901, *Munshat,* op.cit, ff.36-37.

[80] Ibid, p.902, the author said "Three great pillars of the government of Hind departed from this world.

Alas! Three matchless pearls fell from the palm of the world,

I computed the date of the death of three as

The Shah of the world, the *Wazir* (Qamruddin Khan) and distinguished Asaf are no more.

[81] *Kaifiyat, Daftar Diwani Mal wa Mulki* Sarkar Ali, Hyderabad, pp.151-52.

S.No.	*Pargana*	*Suba*	*Mahal*	Amount Rs.
1.	Faridabad	Darul Khilafa Shahjahanabad	1	100,000
2.	Balol	,,	1	400,000
3.	Mauza Khandah Amla, Pargana Khar Khodh	,,	1	80,000
4.	*Pargana* Siyah Nisfi	,,	1	1,50,000
5.	Rampur and Shahabad	,,	2	3,00,000
6.	*Pargana* Dhar Ghaziabad	,,	1	7,00,000
7.	*Faujdari* Chakla Bareili and Rasa	,,	1	1,21,000
8.	Shahjahanpur and Kankord	,,	2	4,00,000
9.	*Pargana* Patharwarah and Kananah	,,	2	1,35,000
10.	*Dehat Pargana* Shakarpur	,,	2	50,000
11.	*Dehat Haveli* Akbarabad (Allamgha)	Akbarabad	1	90,000
12.	Nalgaon and Bho gaon *Sarkar* Kannauj	Akbarabad	2	3,00,000

13.	*Pargana* Shikohabad	„	1	4,25,000
14.	*Pargana* Khwaja Asaf	„	1	1,50,000
15.	*Pargana* Wankor	„	1	1,00,000
16.	*Pargana* Wanhai	„	1	50,000
17.	*Pargana* Khokhwal	Darus-Sultanat	1	1,00,000
18.	*Pargana* Khai Balda	*Suba* Multan	1	1,00,000

Besides the above mentioned *Jagirs* Nizam-ul-Mulk had other possessions as well. In the Sarkar Rajmundry, out of 39 Mahals Nizam had 5 Mahals as his *Jagir* yielding Rs. 1, 151, 284/15/-.[82] In the Karnatak, *Suba* Hyderabad, he possessed *Jagir* worth of Rs. 15, 91, 358/3/-. In the *kaifiyat*, there is information that in the *pargana* Khwaja Asaf, Firoz Jung had 4 *mauzas* as *altamgha* and 18 *mauzas* as *jagir*. The 20 *mauzas* from *haveli* and *pargana* Palam, *Suba* Darul-Khilafa, were given to the Nizam by the *amil* of the said place for Rs 20,000.[83] *Dehat* of *haveli* Akbarabad were also in the *altamgha* of Nizam, yielding 1,80,000 dams.[84]And the revenue of 55000 rupees from the *Baghat* of *talluqa* Darul khilafa was also under Nizam.[85]

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[82] Document No. 16/6, APSA, Hyderabad.

[83] *Dwazdah mauza az haveli wa pargana palam, suba darul khilafa ewaz dwazdah hazar rupya k tard Nawab Firoz jung girvi budah amil az Sarkar miraft.*

[84] *Dehat haveli Akbarabad, altamgha yak lak, hashtad hazar dam.*

[85] *Baghat taluqa Darul khilafa panjah wa panj hazar.*

Nizam-ul-Mulk was having most extensive *Jagirs* both in terms of area and amount. His total jagirs amounted to 18, 20, 00, 000 *dams*, out of which 16 crore *dams* went to his personal pay and 2 crore *dams* went towards the services he had to perform as *Subedar* of the Deccan. Nizam was assigned *jagirs* in several *parganas*, located mainly in the *Suba* Shahjahanabad (capital Delhi) and Akbarabad (Agra).

3.6. His Relation with the Court at Delhi:

After his victory in the battle of Shakar Kheda in 1724, Nizam wrote a letter to the Emperor Muhammad Shah and the letter ends with a brief report of the fate of Mubariz Khan, he writes that he (Mubariz Khan) had insisted on putting the dispute to the arbitrament of battle, in spite of his exhortation to refrain. Further he writes that Mubariz perished along with thirty three of his chief men, ranking from 1000 to 7000 in *mansab*, and a great number of common soldiers.[86]

After getting his desired post in the Deccan, Nizam tried to maintain the cordial relation with the emperor and tried to show on every possible occasion his loyalty and allegiance, in return the Emperor on many occasions sent to Asaf Jah special gifts of fruits and robes of honor which he responded gratefully to these favors.[87]

Once an Emperor sent a *Farman* to the Nizam, with three *ghazals* composed by him. Asaf Jah in his reply praised every verse in the same literary style in which they were composed.[88] He also sent *Id* greetings to the Emperor and wrote letters of

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[86] William Irvine, 'Letter of Nizam-ul-Mulk to Muhammad Shah after his victory over Mubariz-ul-Mulk', Asiatic Miscellany 1885, pp 482-493.

[87] *Munshat*, op.cit, ff.17, 18, 21, 22, 28.

[88] Ibid, ff 175-76.

congratulation on the anniversary of his enthronement.[89]

In one letter, Nizam wrote to the Emperor "God is my witness and the people are also aware that I have always carried out royal commands with the same spirit of devotion which my performance of religious acts displays".[90]

He considered obedience to the king as a necessary pre-requisite condition for seeking the blessings of God.[91] He hoped that Emperor recognize his endeavors and those would win for him grace and that would be rewarding and beneficial to him in both the worlds, here and hereafter.[92]

Nizam-ul-Mulk never openly claimed independence of the Deccan from the central government. His loyalty to the Emperor was unshaken. Coins in the Deccan were continued to be struck in the name of the Mughal Emperor. Muhammad Shah's name was recited throughout the Deccan in the *Khutba* of the Friday's and on occasion of *Id*.[93] All documents issued under the authority of Nizam-ul-Mulk have the R.Y of Muhammad Shah, added and suffixed in the date.[94]

The legends in the different seals read: "*Nizam-ul-Mulk Fath Jung Sipahsalar/murid ba falak Iqtedar Shah Muhammad Shah*",[95] "*Nizam-ul-Mulk Fath*

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89 Ibid, ff 41, 43, 62, 63.

90 Ibid, f 142b.

91 *Munshat*, op.cit ff 29, 31, 32.

92 Ibid, f.135b.

93 Z.U. Malik, op.cit., p.224.

94 Doc No.VIII/21/1201 dtd. 10th Julus, VIII/13/1253, VIII/31, VIII/6, Inayat Jung Collection, National Archives, Delhi.

95 Doc. No.707, dtd. 1133 Hijri, Andhra Pradesh State Archives, Hyderabad.

Jung Bahadur Fidwi Muhammad Shah".[96] There is another seal of the same year reads "*Asaf Jah Nizam-ul-Mulk Fath Jung Sipahsalar/Fidwi ba wo Sulaiman Iqtedar/ Shah Muhammad Shah*" another seal of the same date reads "*Asaf Jah Nizam-ul-Mulk/Fidwi/ Shah Muhammad Shah*".[97]

Nizam-ul-Mulk maintained loyalty to the Mughal Emperor by never disobeying the royal orders. Lala Mansaram records that whenever any *Farman* arrived, Nizam-ul-Mulk use to go up to the particular place called *Farman badi* and received it with full honors. The *Diwan* use to hand over the *Farman* to Nizam-ul-Mulk, who in turn after receiving it, would raise it over his head. This behavior of Nizam performed in the public shows the profound respect and regard Nizam-ul-Mulk had for the Mughal Emperor and his orders.[98]

Khafi Khan remarks "Nizam-ul-Mulk had never moved a hair's breadth in opposition to the Mughal Emperor, but in all his undertakings, he had shed a new glory on the house of Taimur".[99]

During the 20th R.Y. (1737-38), Muhammad Shah invited Nizam-ul-Mulk with pressing letters to come to the court to take up the highest post. However Nizam-ul-Mulk was unwilling to accept the invitation.[100] Nizam-ul-Mulk, at seems considered the safety of law and order in the Deccan *Suba* more important. When reassured of the

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96 Doc. No.1146, dtd. 1140 Hijri, APSA, Hyderabad.

97 Doc. Nos. 306 and 216, APSA, Hyderabad.

98 Lala Mansaram, *Risala-i-Darbar-i-Asafia, Daftar-i-Diwani*, Central Record Office, Hyderabad, 1946, p 66.

99 *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 961.

100 Irvine, op.cit, Vol.II, p 299.

safety of the Deccan, Nizam-ul-Mulk accepted the invitation and was received by the *Wazir* Qamruddin Khan and all his troops in 17th April, 1737. On coming before the Emperor Nizam-ul-Mulk made his offerings and was honored in return with a robe from the Emperor's own ward robe and a Jacket called a *Charqab*, worn only by members of the *Chaghtai* house, descendents of *Timur*.[101]

Soon after the coming of Nizam-ul-Mulk, Delhi faced the invasion of Nadir Shah in 1738-39; again Nizam-ul-Mulk played a major role of mediator during Nadir Shah's invasion and was responsible for the settlement of peace. In view of the great services to the cause of the Empire, Muhammad Shah conferred on him the office of *Amir-ul-Umara Bakshi-ul-Mumalik.*[102] It is reported by Mansaram, secretary of Nizam-ul-Mulk in his history '*Masir*-i-*Nizami*' that Nadir Shah before his departure asked and offered Nizam the responsibility of the government of the Indian Empire. But Nizam refused and replied "To be an Emperor, such qualities of greatness are as required, I, your humble servant, do not possess". Nizam mentions that his ancestors and he himself from the ancient times had been in the service of the kings of Delhi, and such an act of impropriety will make him notorious of untrue to salt.[103]

Even in his last testament, which he made before his death, he advised his successors to keep intact the traditional relations of loyalty with the Mughal Government.[104]

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[101] Ibid., p 300.

[102] *Tarikh-i-Fathiya*, op.cit, f 109.

[103] *Risala-i-Darbar-i-Asafia*, op.cit, p 65, Masir, op.cit, pp 78-85.

[104] Munim Khan, *Sawaneh-i-Deccan*, OMLRI, Hyderabad, MS, 604, ff.226-30, *Hadiqat-ul-Alam*, Vol.II, ff 179-80, Tajalli Shah, *Tuzuk-i-Asafia*, Hyderabad 1892 (Litho), pp 37-43,

Under all circumstances remember that the governance (*riyasat*) of the Deccan is depended on our constant service and fidelity to the Emperor. It is necessary that you should under no circumstances be remiss in showing the proper respect (*adab*) to the Emperor.....you should under no circumstances be cursed (*mat'un*) for violating the bonds of respect.[105]

Thus he did not give up allegiance to the Mughal Emperor. Had he slightest inclinations of asserting independence or disowning loyalty to the Emperor, he would never pay such respect to the orders of the Emperor and Emperor in turn did not allow him to enjoy such a position and privilege. Nizam-ul-Mulk was part and parcel of Mughal nobility and did not break away at any time. If these actions of Nizam-ul-Mulk are viewed in a broader perspective by considering the actions of earlier *Subedars* of Deccan and the highest position of *Wazir* and *Wakil-i-Mutlaq* that Nizam-ul-Mulk had occupied, then it would appear that these actions were nothing but part of routine administrative practice.[106]

Shahnawaz Khan in his work '*Masir-ul-Umara*' remarks "The *Nawab* was one of the imperial nobles at the court of the Emperors of Delhi from the reign of *Khuld-i-Makan* (Aurangzeb) to the death of *Firdus Aramgah* (Muhammad Shah). For nearly thirty years the six *Subas* of Deccan were governed under him. He was a remarkable

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Mansaram *Masir-i-Nizami*, op.cit, pp 98-104. *Risala-i-Darbar-i-Asafia.* Apart from the original *Sanad* of the Testament in the *Daftar-i-Diwani*, which is probably of later date, its slightly different version are found in the five above mentioned contemporary sources. The *Sawaneh-i-Deccan* gives 16 testaments while there were 17 in other of Mansaram's source. Mansaram is said to be present by the side of his death bed.

[105] *Tuzuk-i-Asafiyah*, op.cit, p 42.

[106] *History of Modern Deccan* 1720-1948, ed. A.R. Kulkarni and M.A. Nayeem, Hyderabad 2000, Vol.I, p 33.

personality endowed with 'Angelic qualities' and in his government the *fakirs*, the learned and deserving people received their share according to their deserts.[107]

In spite of his best efforts, it seems that Nizam-ul-Mulk was not able to crush completely the growing Maratha power in the Mughal dominions of the Deccan and the Nizam was all the time busied in formulating the policy against the Marathas according to the need of the times. His struggle and relations with the Marathas needed a detailed description, which will be discussed separately in the VI Chapter.

7- Nizam-ul-Mulk's attitude towards Muslims and Non-Muslims:

In this section an attempt has been made to examine the attitude of Nizam -ul –Mulk Asaf Jah, the first Nizam of Hyderabad towards Muslims and non Muslims. As we know that from Akbar onwards, the mughals started the practice of appointing the various ethnic and religious groups in the nobility which resulted in the construction of the heterogeneous nobility, among these the highest number was that of the non Muslims and the most noteworthy were, Man Singh, Todarmal, Bhagwandas, Jai Singh, Jaswant Singh, Raghunath, Jai Singh Sawai etc[108]. This act was not guided by political motives alone; it was Akbar's belief in the Absolute Peace (*Sulh-i-kul*), which he thought will prevent idle strife between the votaries of different religions and factions.[109]

The Nizam followed the Mughal tradition of treating Muslims and non Muslims alike and appointed them on various posts. Lala Mansaram who had an

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[107] *Umara*, op.cit, Vol.III, p 905.

[108] Man Singh, Todermal and Bhagwandas served under Akbar. Jai Singh, Jaswant Singh and Raghunath were the high rank nobles during Aurangzeb's reign and Sawai Jai Singh played an important role during the reign of Muhammad Shah, 1719-1748. They helped in the expansion and consolidation of the Empire.

[109] Abul Fazl, *Ain-i-Akbari*, Vol I, ed, H.Blockman, Calcutta 1866-67, p 158.

opportunity to be in direct contact with Nizam-ul-Mulk as a *peshkar* (personal secretary), recorded in his *Masir-i-Nizami*, the inviolable rules of conduct which were to be invariably followed by the different functionaries of the dominion whether Muslims or non Muslims. Mansaram's grandfather Balkrishna served under Khwaja Abid Khan, the grandfather of Nizam-ul-Mulk. Mansaram's father Bhavanidas served under Ghaziuddin Khan, the father of nizam. It will thus be seen that the family of Mansaram was associated with the Nizam's family for three generations. So closely associated was Mansaram with Nizam-ul-Mulk that he was present at the bedside of the Nizam, when he breathed his last.[110]

The Contemporary writers like Khafi Khan claimed that Hyderabad under the Nizam was an Islamic bastion in the Deccan.[111] But the basis it seems for this statement were the Nizam's political correspondences in which he talked with the Emperor of his forces as *ghaziyan* or *mujahidan*. For example, while corresponding about the Marathas with the Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah, the Nizam often described his forces as 'holy, (*ghaziyan or mujahidin*)[112], or an 'army of Islam' *(lashkar-i-Islam or Fauj-i-Islam)*[113] who were engaged in a '*jihad*'[114]aimed at upholding the prestige of Islam (*ghairat-i-islam*)[115], againsed the '*kafirs*'.[116] The use of such overblown language

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[110] Mansaram, *Masir-i-Nizami*, tr, P.M Setu, *Eighteen Century Deccan*, Bombay 1963, p-46.

[111] *Mumtakhab*, op.cit, Vol II, p 972.

[112] Munshi Ram Singh, *Gulshan-i- Ajaib*, ff 83b, 94a, 97b, 104b, 119b, 130a qf, Farooqi,Munis.D, 'An Empire's End: The Nizam, Hyderabad and Eighteenth Century India', Modern Asian Studies, 43, I (2009).

[113] Ibid, ff 80b, 97a, 98ab, 124a, 125b.

[114] Ibid, ff 112a, 116b, 117b, 122b, 130a.

[115] Ibid, ff 92b, 93b, 95b.

against the Marathas is not surprising because the Marathas were the mughals' sworn enemies and had been instrumental in the Empire's collapse. At the same time the Nizam's language followed standard conventions and forms that dated back to Aurangzeb's reign and were used by Muslim and Non-muslim employees of the Empire alike. [117]

When corresponding with the others, the Nizam's language however changed completely. The Nizam's correspondence with Raja Sawai Jai Singh II, a non Muslim provides an example of this, here the Marathas were only referred to as 'misguided people', 'Marathas', 'the enemy' or 'partisans of Shahu'. [118] Comparing these two sets of languages one can draw a conclusion that the Nizam was pragmatic officer who understood the importance of contingency- tailoring different languages for different audiences and situations. The same judgment seems applicable to Nizam's relationship with Muslims and non-Muslims.

Nizam undoubtedly placed great importance in cultivating Islamic religious groups, valued for their social contacts, their political connections, their literacy, their judicial skills. The task of honouring and cultivating Muslim religious figures was taken seriously. This can be attested by Nizam's own words and actions. On his deathbed Nizam guided his successors to remember that:

.....the respect and esteem in which I hold the community of supplicants or lobbyists' (*firqay-i-duago*) has been constant. Without them no army will be of any use.

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[116] Ibid, ff 17b, 18a, 84a, 116a, 125b.

[117] See, *Nuska-i-Dilkusha*, tr, V.G Khobrekar, Bombay 1972.

[118] 'Two Historical Letters of the Great Asaf Jah I', I.C 1941, 15, pp 341-342.

I respect them above all other affairs of the state. I receive strength and courage from the mendicants (*ghurba)* and the *faqirs*. I consider them as the gateway to God. They are the follower of the Prophet (PBUH). I consider it my foremost duty to treat them with respect. You should also continue with this practice.[119]

The Nizam always emphasizes his close personal relations with a large number of distinguished Sufis across the number of different *Tariqahs* (Sufi Orders). Shaikh Nizam-ud-din Aurangabadi (d. 1731), is said to have initiated the Nizam into the Chishti order. He also extended patronage to the tomb of Shah Abdul Qadir in Aurangabad.[120] Nizam also chose to be buried in the shrine complex of Shaikh Burhan-ud-din Gharib in Khuldabad.[121]

The Nizam attached great importance to honouring the non-sufi Islamic religious scholars and clerics (*Ulema*) as well.[122] The Nizam's generosity spread so rapidly and widely those ulema arrived from Arabia (*Hejaz*), Central Asia (*Mawra-un-Nahar*), Iran (*Ajam*), Iraq and north-eastern Iran (*Khurasan*) to benefit from the promise of honour and financial security.[123] Many religious scholars from northern India arrived in Hyderabad for fresh beginning, after losing their stipends and imperial patronage. This is indicated by the arrival of many imminent scholars from Bilgram

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[119] Tajalli Ali Shah, *Tuzuk-i-Asafiyah*, Hyderabad 1892, p 40

[120] *Masir-i-Nizami*, op.cit, ff 59 ab.

[121] Nile Green, *Geography, Empire and Sainthood in the Eighteen Century Muslim Deccan*, p 215.

[122] According to the *Risala-i-Darbar-i-Asafia*, the Nizam advanced cash grants depending on the person's need like for daughter's marriage, for undertaking the Hajj or gaining an education.

[123] Ghulam Ali Azad Bilgrami, *Khazana-i-Amira*, Lucknow 1871, p 38.

including Ghulam Ali Azad Bilgrami, Wasiti Bilgrami Hanifi Chishti and Azad Bin Sayyid Muhammad Nuh Husaini and from Lucknow Maulavi Haider Lakhnawi Farangi Mahali.[124]

Despite the extended generosity to the Muslim religious figures the Nizam had certain political limits as well which can be seen in the unwillingness to grant *inam* grants to religious figures (*aimmas)* in areas where such grants might provoke *Zamindari* hostility. The attempt essentially to keep away the Muslim religious class from urban areas was a departure from the earlier Mughal policy that encouraged settlement in areas which deemed rebellious.[125] The Nizam also refused to allow *madad-i-ma'sh* grants to become automatically inheritable.[126] Thus if limits on the inheritability of the *madad-i-ma'sh* grants marked an important curb on the Islamic religious establishment, continuous efforts to reform the system of daily allowances *Wazifa* apparently to root out corruption and mismanagement, effectively undermined any possibility of establishing Islamic privilege.[127] The Nizam loosened the previous strict Mughal regulation governing the inheritability of offices within the land revenue administration. Thus Nizam had no real interest in cultivating the establishment of Islamic religious classes, but wished to encourage the emergence of a locally based, ethnically diverse and mostly non Muslim revenue collecting intermediary class.

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[124] The region of Awadh is well presented in this migration.

[125] Muzaffar Alam, *Crisis of the Empire in Mughal North India; Awadh and the Punjab 1707-1748*, pp 116-117, 121-122.

[126] *Mughal Administration of Deccan*, op.cit, p 197.

[127] *Masir-i-Nizami*, op.cit, ff 60ab.

We see that the administrative policies of the Nizams, especially the appointment to the state service, were free from any communal bias. Nizam used to say, after me it would be fitting if every family according to their merit regardless whether they belong to muslim community or the hindu, (*che az firqay-i-ahl-i-islam wa che az firqay-i-hunood*)[128].

The contemporary sources mention that Hindu and Muslim festivals were equally celebrated at the Hyderabad court, the best examples of Mughal times especially that of Akbar came to memory[129]. The Nizams were the true successor of the grand tradition and culture of the Mughals; they were the builders of what is popularly called the "*Hyderabadi Culture*", which is a true synthesis of Hindu and Muslim cultures[130].

The Nizam was proved a master recruiter. When he marched back to the Deccan after a gap of 2 years which he has spent in Delhi between; 1738-1740, he returned with thousands of administrators, religious scholars, intellectuals, military men and master craftsmen. He seems to have directly recruited many of them. A large number of often highly skilled and educated Punjabi Khatris, north Indian kayasthas, Shaikhzadas, Awadhis and ethnic Iranians and Central Asians were attracted towards Hyderabad. Other who joined this influx included trading, cultivating and warrior groups as the Banjaras, Bundelas, Afghans, Kurmis, Kumbis and Kacchis. Many of the north Indian money lenders and small scale bankers (*Sahukars*) took advantage of the

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[128] *Tuzuk-i- Asafiyah*, op.cit, p 43.

[129] Law John, *The Chronology of Modern Hyderabad, 1720-1890*, Hyderabad 1954, pp 80-81.

[130] *Administration of Justice under the Nizams 1724-1948*, op.cit, p- xii.

recently related familial networks and condition of greater security offered by Hyderabad in the 1730s 1740s.[131]

It was the product of mutual interaction of the two communities in the spheres of social life, art, literature, and religion. Thus began the process of assimilation and traits of the two cultures having distinctive characteristics and a historically independent existence merged and became inextricable during the process of history[132].

The Hindus and Muslims were regarded by the Nizams as their two eyes. Though first Persian and then Urdu became the official languages, regional languages were not neglected[133]. In the districts the notifications were issued in the regional language.[134]

In the sphere of social relations the Hindus and Muslims exerted deep influence on each other's mode of living and pattern of behavior. The Muslims learnt and accepted many social practices of the Hindus, while the Hindu social attitudes and norms were influenced by the Muslim egalitarian philosophy. Whatever differences in manners and customs were found among them were based on class and regional distinctions and not on religious basis. A Muslim in Deccan resembled his Hindu neighbors more closely than his co-religionist in other areas.[135]

As the heirs of the Mughal Emperor in the Deccan, the Nizams inherited a system of appointing worthy persons in the administration without the consideration of

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[131] *Mughal Administration of the Deccan*, op.cit, p 230.

[132] Shafa'at Ahmad Khan, Foreword to Atulananda Chakravarti's *Hindus and Musalmans of India*, p-xvi.

[133] M.A Muttalib, p-xv.

[134] *Marathi Translation of the Document*, Central Research Record Office, Asafia Section.

[135] The Contemporary literature consisting of *Diwans*, *Masnavis* and *Poems* in Urdu and Persian Language are full of numerous illustrations to support this statement.

their religion, thus the ruling elite emerged from different communities and it did not have religion as a base.[136] There are numerous examples to ascertain this fact. Raj Goal Singh was given the *Faujdari* of *Suba* Muhammadabad and was appointed as the Naib Subedar with the mansab of 3000/2000. Udup Singh held the post of *Amin* and *Faujdari* of *pargana* Sangamnir, while the *Naib Amin* and *Faujdar* was Shyam Rao of the same *pargana.*[137] Ajaib Singh has had the office of *Shiqdari* and *Faujdari* of the port of Machlipatam and *Sarkar* Nizampatam.[138]Ram Singh was appointed on the combined post of *Mutasaddi* and *Faujdari.*

There is a long list of the hindu *Amils*, appointed by the Nizam during the period 1724-1742 A.D. A. Venkat Ram was appointed as the *Amil* of *Sarkar* Nirmalata, *Suba* Muhammadabad, Mallard was in Kangril, Raghuram in Hasanabad and Mahadeo Rao was in Nanded[139]Anand Venkat Rao was the *Amil* of *Sarkar* Ramgir, *Suba* Hyderabad, Babu Rao was that of Santwali, Bhan Singh was in Ibrahim Patam while Sahib Ram in Khammam, *Suba* Hyderabad.[140] Thus in the spheres of administration the principle of equality for eligibility of Hindus and Muslims for government employment was in practice.

In the 9th clause of his testament the Nizam, pointedly praises Puranchand, his hindu Diwan, for being good man who deserves security of his tenure following his (Nizam's) demise.[141] The calls for the imposition of *Jaziya* has been rejected by the

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[136] M.A Mutallib, op.cit, p 68
[137] Document No VIII/42/53.
[138] Document, No 83, APSA,Hyderabad.
[139] Document No T.109, APSA,Hyderabad.
[140] Document No T.111, APSA,Hyderabad.

[141] *Tuzuk-i-Asafiyah*, op.cit, pp 41-42.

Nizam, the Nizam's actions largely point out to the non sectarian attitude towards the non Muslims.[142]

Nizam-ul-Mulk, tried to maintain good relation with the Hindu chiefs as well. He wrote letters of consultation to Raja Sawai Jai Singh and tried to join hands with him against the Maratha.[143] Raja Chhatar Singh (son of Raja Gaj Singh, *Zamindar* of *Narwar*, who was killed in the battle fought between Dilawar Ali Khan and Nizam-ul-Mulk in 1720), joined him. As the deceased *Raja* had taken an active part in organizing the Rajputs to help the cause of the Saiyyad brothers, his son Chhatar Singh could barely conceal his fear of ill treatment. He presented himself personally before the *Nawab*, made obeisance and joined him with a body of troops. Nizam-ul-Mulk with his usual generosity treated him with consideration.[144]

Under the mughals, in the majority of treason cases the punishment was death unless ruler chose to exercise his prerogative of mercy. No distinction was made between Muslims and non-Muslims or between highly placed persons and ordinary subjects in inflicting sentence.[145] But the Nizam never inflicted death sentence even in case of treason, Moru and Ramdas whom, he regarded as the rebels of his dominion were confined in the fort of Ahmednagar. However, he strongly impressed upon his sons that in their continued confinement lay their well being.[146]

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[142] *Administration of Justice under the Nizam*, op.cit, p 66.

[143] Jadunath Sarkar, "Two Historical Letters of the Great Asaf Jah I", Islamic Culture, vol-15, 1941, pp 341-42.

[144] Yusuf Hussain , *The First Nizam, Life and Times of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I*, Mangalore, 1936, p 119.

[145] Bashir Ahmad, *Administration of Justice in Medieval India*, Historical Research Institute, Aligarh, 1941, p 227.

[146] Lala Mansaram, *Masir-i-Nizami*, Andhra Pradesh State Library, MSS, 1749. P 71.

In the administration of justice, *Islamic* law was applicable to the Muslims, both in civil and criminal cases, but to non-Muslims only in criminal cases. Thus the criminal law treated the Hindus and the Muslims alike.[147] The Nizams did not put an end to the system of *Panchayats* which largely regulated the life, liberty, and property of the non-muslim community. All civil cases to which Hindus were party were to be handled by the *Panchayat* only.[148] No effort was made by the Nizam to disturb the corporate life of the Hindu community or encroach upon ancient institutions. The government officers were enjoined to give due respect to local customs.[149]The *Jaziya* was discarded by Nizam-ul-Mulk and his policy was followed by his successors as well.[150]

Lachmi Narain Shafiq, the son of Lala Mansaram comments on the growing importance of the *Brahmans* in government services, "The *kayastha* sect outnumbered all other hindu castes in the government services under the *sultans* and the *mughals.* With the decline of Shahu dynasty and the rise of Balaji Rao, the Nizam's dominion has witnessed the penetration of the Brahmins in the government services. The Kayastha and Khatri sects which dominated all the government services are now outnumbered by the Brahmans. They have accepted services even in the office of the *Shariat-i-Balda.* In spite of religious differences, they are actually conducting all the affairs of the *Qazat* (justice), having mastered the *Shara* rules.[151]

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[147] Henry George Briggs, *The Nizam*, Vol II, London, 1861. P 149.

[148] *Ibid*, p 241.

[149] *Dastur-ul-Amal*, Central State Library, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, MSS, 1836, P 3.

[150] *Masir-i-Nizami*, p 112.

[151] Lachmi Narain Shafiq, *Tazkira-i-Gul-i-Rana*, Umar Yafai, Personal Library, Mughalpura, Hyderabad. pp 87-88.

The testament of the Nizam produced by the contemporary historians[152], emphasize primarily on humanity, secularism and the good of the mankind. He says "Up to this time I have looked after the people and appreciated their merits as far as possible. After me it would be your responsibility that every family should be taken care of and should be employed in the service of the government according to their merits, whether they belong to Muslim or Hindu community." "The world and the sky are from eternity so also the human creation. So you should not think that the world belongs only to you and to deprive people of their rights. You should always be considerate."[153]

The instances of common cultural traditions, religious tolerance and co-operation , alluded here, will serve to counter the argument of those who seek to interpret Indian history of the 18th century in terms of conflicts and communal antagonism based on religious issues. "It would be perilous to assume that conflicts between religious communities were the central theme around which the drama of Medieval Indian History revolved.

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[152] Apart from the original *Sanad* of the Testament in the *Daftar-i-Diwani*, its slightly different versions are found in five contemporary authorities. *Risala-i-Darbar-i-Asafi* by Munshi Mansaram, *Masir-i-Nizami* by Mansaram, *Sawaneh-i-Deccan* by Munim Khan Aurangabadi, *Tuzuk-i-Asafiyah* by Tajalli Shah and *Hadiqat-ul-Alam* by Mir Abu Turab.

[153] *Masir-i-Nizami*, cf, Yusuf Hussain, *Life and Times of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I,* Bombay 1963, pp 115-16.

THE SIX SUBAS OF THE DECCAN 1719



Chapter – 4

The Administrative Organization of the Deccan Suba

4.1. Administrative Division of the Suba:

For convenience of administration and effective control, the Mughals divided the *Suba* into administrative division like; *Sarkar* (district), *pargana* (smaller division), and the *Deh* (villages). As the representative of the Mughal Emperor, the Nizam followed the same pattern in the Deccan. Another division *Mahals* was for the fiscal purpose.

When Aurangzeb was appointed as the viceroy of the Deccan for the first time in 1636, the Deccan consisted of the following four *Subas*.[1]

1. Daulatabad
2. Telangana
3. Khandesh
4. Berar

The name of Daulatabad was changed to Aurangabad and that of Telangana to Zafarabad or Bidar in the later period as can be inferred from a *Parwancha* to the period of Shah Jahan[2] and from a *Siyah-i-Waqia* of the period of Aurangzeb.[3]

The name of the two other *Subas* remained unchanged. Further with conquest of Bijapur and Golkonda added the fifth and the sixth *Suba*. Bijapur was renamed *Darul*

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1 *Lahori*, op.cit., Vol.I, part II, p 205.

2 *Document* No.743, dt. 27th, *Safar* 1056H/ 4th April, 1646 of APSA, Hyderabad.

3 *Document* No. IV/ 163, dt. 27th *Ramzan* 1071H/ 16th May, 1661, APSA, Hyderabad.

Zafar[4] and Golkonda was renamed *Darul Jihad* Hyderabad.[5] Thus the territory up to Rameshwaram came under Mughal rule.[6]

The number of *Subas* in the Mughal Deccan stood at six with slight adjustments under Nizam-ul-Mulk's viceroyalty. The six *Subas* were as follows:

1. Khjista Bunyad Aurangabad
2. Muhammadabad Bidar
3. Khandesh
4. Berar
5. Darul Zafar Bijapur
6. Farkhunda Bunyad Hyderabad

Each of these six *Suba* was sub-divided into a number of *Sarkars.* Each *Sarkar* was further sub-divided into *Parganas* also called *Mahals* from the fiscal point of view. Each *Pargana* or *Mahal* consisted of several smaller territorial divisions called *Deh* or *Qasba* or *Mauza.* This *Deh* was the smallest administrative unit.

The source *Sawaneh-i-Deccan* written by Munim Khan in 1782 gives the detailed information of the administrative division, on which Nizam-ul-Mulk's administration was based.[7] The following list gives the details about the number of *Sarkars* and *Pargana* (*Mahals*) of the six *Subas* of the Deccan:

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4 *Masir-i-Alamgiri*, op.cit, p.172.

5 Ibid, p 183.

6 Jadunath Sarkar, *The India of Aurangzeb*, p XX

7 Munim Khan, *Sawaneh-i-Deccan*, MSS No.604, OMLRI, Hyderabad, ff. 1-28.

Table IV; Details of the *Sarkars* and *Mahals* of Six *Subas*[8]:

S.No.	*Suba*	*Sarkars*	*Mahals*
1.	Khujista Bunyad Aurangabad	12	147
2.	Muhammadabad Bidar	06	76
3.	Khandesh	06	136
4.	Berar (Balaghat Painghat)	12	252
5.	Darul-Zafar Bijapur	17	252
6.	Farkhunda Bunyad Hyderabad	42	405
Total	**6 Subas**	**92 Sarkars**	**1268 Mahals**

4.1a. Khujista Bunyad Aurangabad:

The city was originally founded by Malik Ambar under whom it was known as Khirkee.[9] It was renamed Aurangabad by Aurangzeb, when he was the viceroy of Deccan sometime, between; 1636-1642.[10] Daulatabad the celebrated fortress had for some time been the capital of the *Suba* of the Deccan after its Mughal occupation,[11]

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[8] Lachmi Narayan Shafiq, *Khulasat-ul-Hind*, Transcript.58, of Ms No-768/492 Asafia Library in,CAS, History, Aligarh, p.35.

[9] *Dilkusha*, ff.7b-8a, *Khulasat-ul-Hind*, p.125.

[10] *Dilkusha*, f.9a.

[11] *Lahori*, op.cit, Vol.I, part II, p.205.

later Aurangzeb made Aurangabad as its capital during his viceroyalty.[12] It remained the *Sarkar* headquarters, for Shafiq designated it as *Haveli.*[13]

Aurangzeb's choice of the Aurangabad as the centre for his wider conquests of the Independent Muslim kingdoms of the Deccan was perhaps fitting, for the Persian geographer (migrant), Sadiq Isfahani (1635) had earlier interpreted its name of Khirki as signifying the 'gateway' opening into Deccan.[14]

The population of the city continued to grow throughout the first half of the 18th century. The manufacture of the embroidered silks originally purchased by the elites of the Empire remains the city's oldest industry to this day.[15]

The province of Aurangabad had a length of 150 *kos* and a breadth of 100 *kos.* The total area of measured land in 1720 was 2, 55, 70, 950 *bighas* and the total provincial revenue in 1720 was 2, 95, 00,002 Rs.[16]

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12 *Khulasat-ul-Hind*, p 125.

13 Ibid, p 130.

14 Sadiq Isfahani, *The Geographical works of Sadik Isfahani*, ed. and tr. Sir William Ousely, London, 1832, p 47.

15 Nile Green, *Indian Sufism since the 17th century Saints, books and empires in the Muslim Deccan*, Oxford, 2006, p.3.

16 *India of Aurangzeb*, op.cit, pp.xxxiv, xxxv.

Table - V[17]

S.No.	Sarkars	Mahals	Mauza	Haveli
1.	Daulatabad	27	1039	Khujista Bunyad, Daulatabad
2.	Ahmadnagar	10	797	Ahmadnagar
3.	Pattan	03	157	Pattan
4.	Parenda	19	597	Parenda
5.	Bir	01	-	-
6.	Jalnapur	10	426	Jalnapur
7.	Sangamnir	11	1338	Sangamnir
8.	Sholapur	03	70	-
9.	Fatehabad/ Dharur	11	324	Fatehabad
10.	Junnair	23	1216	Junnair
11.	Talkonkam	16	-	Islamnagar
12.	Jawer	13	-	-
Total	**12**	**147**	**5964**	

[17] All the 12 *sarkars* of Aurangabad are now a part of Maharashtra.

The number of *mauzas* under Bir were not given in the source. Under Talkonkan the number of *Mahals* with their name was given but the number of *mauzas* was not given. In case of Jawer only the number of *Mahals* was given but not the names of the *Mahals*, the number of *mauzas* was also absent.

4.1b. Muhammadabad Bidar:

Suba Bidar was not an independent *Suba* from the beginning. It was a part of *Suba* Berar but later the *Sarkar* of Telingana extended and become a new *Suba* with certain annexations from the Nizamshahi kingdom as well as parts of *Sarkar* Pathri, Shahjahan created a separate *Suba* of Telingana, later Bidar.[18]

Bidar, the capital of *Suba* and former seat of Bahmani ruler was annexed from Bijapur in 1657 by Aurangzeb, Kalyan was also taken and Telingana was left with single *Sarkar* of Nanded, and with amalgamation of Nanded, Kalyan, Bidar, Akulkot, Malkhed, Yadgir the new *Suba* was created.[19] It was then given the name of Zafarabad,[20] and changed subsequently to Muhammadabad.[21] The *Sarkar* of Yadgir was renamed as Firuzgarh under Aurangzeb.[22]

East of the province lay Hyderabad, west Aurangabad, South West Gulbarga and North Burhanpur. The total area of measured land in 1720 was 78, 72,194 *bighas* and the provincial revenue were, 1, 55, 13,750.[23]

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18 *Lahori*, op.cit, Vol.I, part II, p 62, Vol.II, p 711.

19 *Amal-i-Saleh*, Vol.III, pp 249-52.

20 Ibid, p 261.

21 *Khulasat-ul-Hind*, op.cit, p 144.

22 Ibid, p 145.

23 *India of Aurangzeb*, op.cit, p xcv.

Table - VI[24]

The *Suba* Bidar was consisted of the Following *Sarkars* and Mahals:

.No.	Sarkars	Mahals	Mauza	Haveli
1.	Bidar	08	559	Muhammadabad
2.	Ankalkot	07	1055	Ankalkot
3.	Kalyan	02	147	Kalian
4.	Nanded	43	3169	Nanded
5.	Yadgir/ Ferozgarh	01	-	-
6.	Malkhed/ Muzaffar Nagar	14	174	Malkhed
Total	**06**	**75**	**5104**	

Thus the *Suba* Bidar had six *Sarkars,* seventy five *Mahals* and five thousand, one hundred four *mauzas,* the *mauzas* under Yadgir are not mentioned. The *Sarkar* of Bidar, Kalyan, Yadgir and Malkhed of *Suba* Bidar are now in Mysore.

4.1c. Suba Khandesh:

Burhanpur the capital of this province is a large city, situated on the bank of the

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[24] *Sawaneh-i-Deccan*, op.cit, ff 7-11.

river Tapti.[25] The length of the province from Boregaon, near Handia to Laling near the province of Ahmadabad was 75 *Kos*, its breath from Jamod near Berar to Pali (adjoining Malwa) 50 *Kos*, East of it lays Berar, West and North Malwa, South Jalna.[26] The area of measured land in 1720 was 88, 00,001 *bighas*. The total provincial revenue was 1, 15, 00,750.[27]

Table - VII[28]

Details of the Sarkars and Mahals of the Suba Khandesh:

S.No.	Sarkars	Mahals	Mauza	Haveli
1.	Burhanpur/ Asir	33	2724	Asir, Galna
2.	Bijagarh	33	-	Bijagarh
3.	Baglana	30	-	Khargaon
4.	Handia	27	-	Handia
5.	Galna	07	-	Galna
6.	Nandurbar	06	-	Nandurbar
Total	**06**	**136**	**2724**	

[25] Abul, Fazl, *Ain-i-Akbari*, Vol.II, p 223, incorrectly says 3 kos distant from the Tapti.

[26] *India of Aurangzeb*, op.cit, p 54.

[27] Ibid., p xxx.

[28] *Sawaneh-i-Deccan*, op.cit, ff 13-16.

The *Suba* was thus consisted of six *Sarkars,* one hundred thirty six *Mahals* and two thousand seven hundred twenty four *mauzas*. No information on the villages was furnished except for the *Sarkar* of Asir. Bijagarh and Handia *Sarkars* of Khandesh *Suba* are now in Madhya Pradesh.

4.1d. Suba Berar:

The *Suba* of Berar was divided into two regions – *Balaghat* and *Paiynghat*. Its length from Pitalwari to Wairagarh 200 *Kos*, breadth from Bidar to Handia 180 *Kos*. The area of measured land was 2,00, 28, 100 *bighas* and the total provincial revenue was 2,25,60,000.[29]

The author of *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, Rustam Ali writes that the land holders of this province were *Bhils, Kolis*, and *Gonds*.[30]

Table - VIII[31]

Details of the Sarkars and Mahals lying in the Balaghat and Painghat Region of Suba Berar;

S.No.	Sarkars	Mahals	Mauza	Haveli
	Balaghat Region			
1.	Pathri	11	545	Pathri
2.	Basam	09	747	Basam

[29] *India* of *Aurangzeb*, op.cit, pp xxvii, xxviii.

[30] Rustam Ali, *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, R.28, CAS, History, A.M.U, p 46.

[31] *Sawaneh-i-Deccan*, op.cit, ff 19-21.

3.	Baitalwadi	09	174	Baitalwadi
4.	Mahur	20	1054	Mahur
5.	Mahkar	12	821	Mahkar
	Paiynghat			
6.	Islamgarh	40	-	-
7.	Kawail/ Gawail	46	2483	Ellichpur
8.	Kollam	28	2182	Kollam
9.	Narnala	37	1564	-
10.	Ponar/ Lomor	04	197	Ponar
11.	Khedla/ Karle	24	821	Khedla
12.	Sirpur	47	-	-
Total	**12**	**287**	**10588**	

From the above table, it can be inferred that the information of *Mauzas* for Islamgarh and Sirpur *Sarkars* was not given. The name of the headquarter/ *haveli* for these *Sarkars* was also absent along with Narnala. Khedla and Sirpur are now in M.P. and Andhra Pradesh respectively.

4.1e. Darul Zafar Bijapur:

The *Suba* of Bijapur was created upon the annexation of the Adilshahi Kingdom of Bijapur in 1686; the boundaries were same as they existed at the time of annexation.[32]

Bijapur *Suba* was the second largest *Suba* of the Deccan after Hyderabad. It was divided into two parts namely Bijapur and Bijapur Karnatak, respectively administered from headquarters of Bijapur *Haveli* and Sira.[33] There was a further division of Bijapur Karnatak and that is uplands (*Balaghat*) and plains (*Paiynghat*). Bijapuri *Balaghat* included the Sira and Bangalore districts of Mysore and their dependent *Zamindars*. Bijapur *Paiynghat* extended south from Sadras to Tanjore.[34]

North of the *Suba* lay Aurangabad, in the south Adoni and the Krishna river, in the east Gulbarga, and in the west Tull ghat (in Konkan). The total income of the *Suba* was 2,48,75,000.[35] The *Baghats* and *Bazaars* under Bijapur have been considered as a *pargana*.

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[32] *Dilkusha*, op.cit, ff 68a-69b.

[33] *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol. II, p 337.

[34] J. Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzeb*, Calcutta, 1954, p 272.

[35] *India of Aurangzeb*, op.cit, pp xxxviii, xxxix.

Table - IX[36]

Details of the Sarkars and Mahals of the Suba Bijapur and Bijapur Karnatak (*Balaghat* and *Paiynghat*);

S.No.	Sarkars	Mahals	Mauza	Haveli
1.	Bijapur	30	1534	Bijapur
2.	Asadnagar	12	301	Asadnagar
3.	Azamnagar	15	568	Azamnagar
4.	Imtiazgarh/Adhoni	06	828	Imtiazgarh
5.	Raibagh	12	350	Raibagh
6.	Murtazabad	06	225	Murtazabad
7.	Karnataka	55	-	Karnataka
8.	Bankapur	16	1006	Bankapur
9.	Nurkal	16	731	-
10.	Ghazipur	25	374	Ghazipur
11.	Feroznagar/Raichor	09	470	Feroznagar
12.	Mudgal	13	606	Mudgal

[36] *Sawaneh-i-Deccan*, op.cit, ff 22-25.

13.	Nusratabad/Sakkar	05	743	Nusratabad
14.	Nabi Shah Dumk	07	539	Shah Dumk
15.	Muhammadnagar	07	254	Muhammadnagar
16.	Naldurg	08	785	Naldurg
17.	Mustafabad/Dabhol	08	-	Mustafabad
18.	Ahsanabad/Gulbarga	-	-	Mustafabad
Total	**18**	**252**	**9314**	

4.1f. Suba Farkhunda Bunyad Hyderabad:

Golkonda from which Hyderabad traces its origin was ruled by Qutb Shahi dynasty from Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah who is regarded the founder of Hyderabad to Abul Hasan Qutb Shah.[37] The total revenue in 1720 was 2, 73, 20,875 Rs.[38]

Hyderabad was popularly known or called Bhagnagar.[39] The *Suba* of Farkhundabad Hyderabad had 42 *Sarkars* and 405 *Mahals* and was the largest amongst the six Deccan *Suba*. It was Nizam-ul-Mulk who transferred the capital of *Suba* from Aurangabad to Hyderabad.

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[37] H.K., Sherwani, *Muhammad Qutb Shah*, Bombay, 1956, p 12.

[38] *India of Aurangzeb*, op.cit, p xciii.

[39] *Khulasat-ul-Hind*, op.cit, p 174.

Table - X[40]

Details of the *Sarkars* and *Mahals* of the *Suba* Farkhunda Bunyad Hyderabad:

S.No.	*Sarkars*	*Mahals*	*Mauza*	*Haveli*
1.	Muhammadnagar	12	-	Muhammadnagar Golkonda
2.	Kolas	05	-	Kolas
3.	Khammamet	11	-	Khammamet
4.	Koilkonda	13	-	Koilkonda
5.	Kanlore	08	-	Kanlore
6.	Devarkonda	13	-	Devarkonda
7.	Nalgonda	06	-	Nalgonda
8.	Pangal	02	-	Pangal
9.	Bhongir	11	-	Bhongir
10.	Medak	12	-	Medak
11.	Malangur	03	-	Malangur
12.	Mustafanagar	24	-	Mustafanagar
13.	Murtazanagar	05	-	Murtazanagar
14.	Ellore	12	-	Ellore
15.	Rajmundry	24	-	Rajmundry
16.	Elgandal	21	-	Elgandal
17.	Warangal	16	-	Warangal
18.	Machlipatnagar	-	-	

[40] *Sawaneh-i-Deccan*, op.cit, ff 23-28.

19.	Nizam Pattan	-	-	
20.	Sikakul	02	-	Sikakul
21.	Kan-i-Almas	01	Diamond mines	-
Total	**21**	**209**	**-**	

B. Details of the Hyderabad Region *Balaghat* and *Paiynghat*:

S.No.	Sarkars	Mahals	Mauza	Haveli
	Balaghat			
1.	Sidhout	08	-	Sidhout
2.	Konji Kota	15	-	Garyoli
3.	Koti	13	-	Koti
4.	Koramkonda	12	-	Koramkonda
5.	Khammam	18	-	Khammam
	Paiynghat			
6.	Udgir	06	-	Udgir
7.	Sorwapalli	12	-	Sorwapalli

8.	Kanchi	15	-	Kanchi
9.	Chingalpet	03	-	Chingalpet
10.	Chandragiri	10	-	Chandragiri
11.	Narsapur	10	-	Narsapur
12.	Dandavasi	03	-	Dandavasi
Total	**12**	**125**		

C. Details of the Country of *Muftuha*:

S.No.	*Sarkars*	*Mahals*	*Mauza*	*Haveli*
1.	Nusratgarh	08	-	Nusratgarh
2.	Tiryapal	11	-	Tiryapal
3.	Palamkotah	12	-	Palamkotah
4.	Dardawer	09	-	Dardawer
5.	Walgondapur	06	-	Walgondapur
6.	Wailur	08	-	Wailur
7.	Jagdew	17	-	Jagdew
8.	Tanjawar	Under Zamindars	-	-

9.	Trichnapally	„	-	-
Total	**09**	**71**	**-**	**-**
A+B+C	**21+12+9= 42**	**209+125+71= 405**	**-**	**-**

The above table shows that the *Suba* Hyderabad was divided into two broad-categories of Farkhunda Bunyad Hyderabad and Karnatak Hyderabad, the latter was further divided into *Balaghat* and *Paiynghat* region. There is a separate category of *Muftuha* under which comes seven *Sarkars* and seventy one *Mahals*. The other two *Sarkars* of Trichnapally and Tanjawar were under the *Zamindars* who paid *Paishkash*.

4.2. Administrative Organization:

The provincial administration of the Mughals to a great extent was a small replica of the administration of the central government. But the administration of all the provinces of the Mughal India was not exactly the same. The different political problems and local conditions were responsible for some variations in the administrative set up from one province to the other.

As far as the Deccan *Suba* is concerned, it had a special feature besides its diverse political problems geographical and local conditions. It was also distinguished for its vastness. During the period of study the entire Deccan *Suba* which was quite large in extent had six sub-ordinate provinces, thus it need a large number of officers to look into the administrative responsibilities.

The head of the province was the governor, styled as *Sipahsalar* in the days of Akbar and *Subadar* or Nazim under his successors, but better known as Nazim under

Aurangzeb and the later Mughals.[41]

The English Records call this officer both *Subah* and *Nabob*. He was the vice-regent of the sovereign in the province and was responsible for executive action, defense criminal justice and general supervision of the province. The Mughal provincial administration may therefore be divided into two parts, the executive and revenue.[42]

The principal officers in the Deccan were organized in three tier system viz.

(i) Headquarters of the Deccan (Hyderabad after Aurangabad).

(ii) Headquarters of *Subas* (Bijapur, Aurangabad, Bidar, Berar, Khandesh and Hyderabad). The personal here were the exact replica of the Deccan headquarters and

(iii) The lowest administrative level was the *Pargana/Mahals* under the *Shiqdari*.[43]

Administration has its importance in the study of a country's history. The integrity of the state and its preservation, with the maintenance of law and order and looking after the material prosperity of the people are the objectives of any good system of administration. It is an ever developing process based on the existing institutions and also innovated by the new expedients. Additions and alteration are made according to requirement and needs of the time.

The history of administration of the Deccan is an interesting and thought

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41 *Masir-i-Alamgiri*, op.cit, p 15-172.

42 Abdul Karim, *Murshid Quli Khan and his Times*, Dacca, 1963, p 61.

43 Basant Kumar Bawa, *The Nizams between Mughals and British*, New Delhi, 1986, p 8.

provoking one. It has witnessed several good and bad governments and administrative machinery of the region was altered, modified and overhauled according to the need of the time.[44]

The documents published by Zahiruddin Malik, show that in the Deccan, a twofold policy was followed. The interior, or Telangana was left to be dominated by powerful local chiefs and Magnates often descendants of the class who had controlled the locality under the Qutb Shahi rulers of Golkunda.

It was in the late 1720's 1730's that Nizam-ul-Mulk concentrated his efforts in those areas Ibrahimpattan, Devarkonda, and the Coastal districts of Srikakulam, Masulipattan and Nizampattan.[45]

4.2a.The Provincial Officials with their Power and Functions:

(i) Subedar:

The *Subedar* was the provincial head of the administration. He was also known as *Nazim*, *Sahib*-i-*Suba*, *Faujdar*-i-*Suba* etc. The Emperor directly appointed him. Generally, the appointment in this post was made from amongst officers holding the highest ranks or mansab, or the princes were preferred. He was to hold office only for two or three years and transferred to some other positions.[46]

The essential duties of the *Subedar* were to maintain law and order and to help the smooth and successful collection of revenue and to execute the royal decrees and

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[44] P.V. Kate, *Marathwada under the Nizams 1724-1948*, Delhi, 1987, p 23.

[45] Zahiruddin Malik, 'Documents Relating to Pargana Administration in the Deccan under Asaf Jah I, in Medieval India: A Miscellany', vol.III, Delhi 1975, pp 152-83.

[46] M. Athar Ali, *The Apparatus of Empire, Awards of Ranks, Offices and Titles to the Mughal Nobility* 1574-1658, Delhi, 1985, p xxiii.

regulations sent to him. He has to see that the strong army might not oppress the weak. He collected the tribute from the vassals. He was dispenser of civil justice as well. He could recommend worthy officials for promotion, and reported every fortnight the occurrences of his *Suba.*[47]

Occasionally an absentee *Subedar* sent an agent to represent him in the Deccan while he retained his other position at the centre or any other post.[48]

The Mughals at the height of the Empire supervised and controlled the activities of the *Subedar* and his minister through a system of intelligence extending throughout the Empire to watch the loyalty and devotion of its officials. Yet owing to weak communication, the exercise of control by the central authority on the provincial government was at best a difficult task.[49]

List of the *Subedars* served in the Deccan from 1707-1748 A.D.[50]

S.No.	Subedars	Years
1.	Ghaziuddin Khan Firoz Jang (father of Nizam-ul-Mulk)	1707
2.	Prince Muazzam, Shah Alam I	1708
3.	Zulfiqar Khan Deputy Daud Khan Panni	1709-1713

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47 Jadunath Sarkar, *Mughal Administration*, New Delhi, 1972, pp 38-39, P. Saran, *The Provincial Government of the Mughals*, New Delhi, 1988, pp 157-58.

48 *Nizam between Mughals and British*, op.cit, p.8.

49 S.H. Bilgrami and Willmott, *Historical and Descriptive Sketch of Nizam's Dominions*, Bombay, 1883, Vol.II, p 402.

50 H.K. Shervani, *History of Medieval Deccan*, Vol.I, Andhra Pradesh, 1973, p 624.

4.	Nizam-ul-Mulk	1713-1715
5.	Husain Ali Khan, Deputy Alim Ali Khan	1715-1720
6.	Nizam-ul-Mulk, (Reappointed) Deputy Iwaz Khan	1720-1722
7.	Mubariz Khan	1724
8.	Nizam-ul-Mulk (Reappointed)	1724-1748

Thus in 1724 after the battle of Shakar Kheda, Nizam became the *Subedar* for the third time in spite of the Emperor's unwillingness which he showed by asking Mubariz Khan to fight against the Nizam. But with the force Nizam got it and now he tried to restore the administration and started working for that, he retained that position till his death in 1748. During his second and third viceroyalty Nizam made various appointments on various posts and brought some changes in the administration.

With his victory over Alim Ali Khan in 1720, Nizam became the viceroy of Deccan for the second time and proceeded to Aurangabad, the capital of the *Suba* at that time to organize the administration. For the cause he appointed certain peoples on various posts, who were as follows:[51]

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[51] *Tarikh*-i-*Fathiya*, op.cit, ff 90-120.

Table XI

S.No.	Name	*Mansab*	Title	Post/Gifts
1.	Iwaz Khan	5000/5000	Izd-ud-Daulah Bahadur Qiswara Jung	*Subedar* of Berar
2.	Abdur Rahim (Iwaz Khan's uncle)	5000/5000	Nasir-ud-Daulah	Gifts of elephant Jewels etc.
3.	Ghaziud-Din Khan (brother of Wazir Muhammad Amin Khan)	5000/5000	Zahir-ud-Daulah	*Hakim* of Ujjain
4.	Marhamat Khan	5000/5000	Ghaznafar Jung	*Subedar* of Burhanpur
5.	Mutawassil Khan	3000/2000	Bahadur	Elephant, Jewels a horse and *alam* and *Naqqara*
6.	Aziz Beg Khan	3000/2000	-	
7.	Sadud-Din Khan	3000/2000	-	
8.	Jamal Khan (son of Iwaz Khan)	3000/2000	-	
9.	Muhtashim Khan	3000/1000	-	Bakshi of *Subas* of Deccan
10.	Ali Akbar	3000/1000	-	Cash award of 1 lakh Rupees, Hakim of the Fort and City of Asir
11.	Rao Rambha	-	Raja Ajit Rao	-

Mubariz Khan was transferred from Aurangabad to Hyderabad as *Subedar*. Iwaz Khan was appointed *naib-Nazim* of Aurangabad. In 1722 when Nizam-ul-Mulk left Deccan to take the responsibilities of *Wizarat*, he appointed Iwaz Khan as his *naib* or deputy in the Deccan with all powers to act on behalf of him. He appointed Diyanat Khan as *Diwan* of the Deccan and in place of Muhteshim Khan, he appointed Sadullah Khan as *Mir Bakshi* of the Deccan.[52]

The same course of appointments and promotions was followed by Nizam-ul-Mulk after his victory over Mubariz Khan in the battle of Shakarkheda in 1724. People who received mansab from the viceroy were as follows:

Table- XII

S.No.	Name	Mansab
1.	Nasirud-Daulah Abdur Rahim Khan	7000/7000
2.	Baji Rao I	7000/7000
3.	Rao Rambha Nimbalkar	7000/7000
4.	Man Singh Hakiya[53]	7000/7000
5.	Saiyyad Jamal Khan[54]	5000/5000

[52] Yusuf Hussain, op.cit, pp 138, 214.

[53] From 1 to 4, *Tarikh-i-Fathiya*, op.cit, ff 94-95, 31-32.

[54] *Umara*, op.cit, Vol.I, p 310.

6.	Muhammad Ghiyas Khan[55]	5000/5000
7.	Mutahawwar Khan[56]	5000/5000
8.	Iwaz Khan[57]	5000/5000
9.	Qadir Dad Khan[58]	5000/5000
10.	Khwaja Ahmad	5000/5000
11.	Khwaja Mahmud[59]	5000/5000
12.	Turkaz Khan[60]	5000/5000
13.	Harzullah Khan[61]	3000/3000
14.	Talib Muhiyuddin Khan[62]	3000/3000
15.	Hafiz-ud-Din Khan[63]	3000/3000

After that Nizam-ul-Mulk turned his attention to appoint persons on various

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55 *Tarikh-i-Fathiya*, f 103.

56 *Umara*, Vol.III, pp 776-793.

57 *Ibid*, Vol.II, pp 832-36.

58 *Ibid*, Vol.III, pp 140-41.

59 *Umara*, op.cit, Vol III, pp 729-46.

60 *Ibid*, Vol.I, pp 503-4.

61 *Tarikh-i-Fathiya*, op.cit, f 99a.

62 *Umara*, Vol.II, pp 520-524.

63 *Tarikh-i-Fathiya*, ff 100.

posts. They were as fallows[64]:

Table- XIII

S.No.	Name	Post
1.	Iradat Khan	Diwan of the Deccan
2.	Ihadullah Khan	Faujdar of Sarkar Murtazanagar
3.	Aqil Khan KaKambu	Diwan of Burhanpur
4.	Yusuf Muhammad Khan	Khansaman and darogha of arsenal
5.	Hisamullah Khan	Qaladar of Udgir
6.	Mir Kalan Khan	Qaladar of Bidar
7.	Jan Sipan Khan	Diwan of Hyderabad
8.	Saif-ud-Daulah	Kotwal of Hyderabad
9.	Hafiz-ud-Din Khan	Faujdar of Chicacola
10.	Ihtida Khan	Nazim of Masulipattan
11.	Khwaja Rahmatullah Khan	Diwan of Establishment (Kandapali)
12.	Faiz-ullah Khan	Faujdar of Elore
13.	Agha Muin	Faujdar of Mustafanagar

[64] Ibid, ff 31-40.

14.	Himmat Yar Khan	Qaladar of Golkonda
15.	Randaullah Khan	Faujdar of Karnul
16.	Khairullah Khan	Nazim of Hyderabad
17.	Abdul Nabi Khan	Faujdar of Karpa
18.	Sanaullah Khan	Faujdar of Imtiaznagar/ Adoni
19.	Sultan Ali Khan	Qaladar of Adoni
20.	Sadullah Khan	Nazim of Arcot
21.	Talib Muhyuddin Khan	Faujdar of Raichur
22.	Mirza Ali	Faujdar of Bijapur
23.	Khwaja Abdullah Khan	Faujdar of Rajmundry
24.	Muhtashim Khan	Bakshi of the mansabdars
25.	Nasir-ud-Daulah	Nazim of Aurangabad
26.	Nurullah Khan	Diwan of Burhanpur
27.	Anwarullah Khan	Personal Diwan of Nizam-ul-Mulk
28.	Khwaja Abdullah	Khan Saman
29.	Raja Gopal	Qaladhar of Qandhar in Bidar
30.	Saif Khan	Second Bakshi

When Iwaz Khan, his uncle and Nazim of Berar died in 1731, Nizam-ul-Mulk appointed in his place the son of Mubariz Khan, Jamal Khan.[65]

On June 4, 1743, Nasirud-Daulah Nazim of Aurangabad died, his son Mujahid Khan was appointed in his post as he was minor at that time, Ali Akbar Khan was made his guardian but due to frictions between them Nizam-ul-Mulk dismissed Mujahid Khan and appointed Ali Akbar Khan as the governor of Aurangabad.[66]

While Nizam-ul-Mulk was busy in all these arrangements, Anwaruddin Khan arrived from Delhi. He had just then been dismissed from his appointment of *Faujdar* of Kora and Jahanabad in the Allahabad *Suba*. Nizam-ul-Mulk glad to secure his services, appointed him to be deputy governor of Hyderabad. His efforts to subdue opposition were very successful at Sikakol and other places and he brought up the revenue collection to the proper standard.[67]

Above all the principal provincial departments at the headquarters of the six *Subas* at Daulatabad was the office of Nazim, called *Diwan-Khana-i-Aali* and *Diwan-i-Khas* or the *Darbar*.[68] The officers of these offices were *Mushrif-i-Diwan Khana* and *Munshi, darogha, arzbegi,* these four were very close to the *subedar*.[69]

(ii) Diwan:

He was second important official in the *Suba*. On the recommendation of

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65 *Tarikh-i-Fathiya*, op.cit, f 95.

66 *Ahwal*, op.cit, f 201.

67 *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 962, *Umara*, op.cit, Vol.II, p 527.

68 *Risala*-i-*Darbar-i-Asafia*, op.cit, 1,25, 72 (Zabita).

69 Ibid, 59 (Zabita).

imperial *Diwan*, the Emperor appointed him. He was responsible for all revenue matters and controlled a hierarchy of officials down to the *patwari*, and the Diwan exercised a measure of control over the *Subedar*, who was the head of a similar range of services from the *Faujdar* down to the village *chaukidar*. The *Diwan,* however lower in rank than that of the *Subedar*.[70]

(iii) Bakshi:

The *Bakshi* or paymaster was saddled with various functions and duties. They included the recruitment of the army and maintenance of several registers such as the list of high officials i.e., *mansabdar*, the list of officers paid in cash. Whenever a battle was planned, it was his duty to place the complete muster, roll before the Emperor for his approval and orders. The *Bakshi* had also to assign posts to several commanders' command.[71]

Mirat-i-Ahmadi has furnished some valuable information about the duties of the Bakshi of the *Suba*.[72]

(iv) Kotwal:

He was essentially an Urban Officer, being the chief of the city police. At midnight he patrolled the city. He also had the duty of arresting thieves and criminals, to punish then or on the order of the *Qazi*, execute the sentence. He should necessarily keep knowledge of every house and inhabitant of the city. He deployed watchmen and sweepers to get information from every street.[73]

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[70] *Mughal Administration*, op.cit, p 45.

[71] William Irvine, *The Army of the Mughals*, Delhi 1962, p 38.

[72] *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, op.cit, p 175.

[73] *Mughal Administration*, op.cit, p 45.

(v) Khansaman:

The *khansaman* managed the imperial establishment. He was responsible for looking after the *karkhanas* and Royal store houses and the day to day need of the imperial household.[74]

(vi) Darogha-i-Dak Chauki:

There are four types of news reporters called the *Waqi-Navis*, *Sawaneh-Nigar*, *Khufia Navis* and the *Harkarah* worked in the *Suba* under the direct control of *Darogha*-i-*Dak Chauki*. They regularly kept informed the Emperor about the occurrences in the *Suba* and the activities of the staff deployed.[75]

Nizam-ul-Mulk brought to an end the system of diarchy with the appointment of Diyanat Khan as *Diwan* of the Deccan in 1721, before he left for Delhi to take the office of *Wizarat*. After he came back he dismissed Diyanat Khan and appointed Iradat Khan as *Diwan* of the Deccan.[76]

Same was the case with appointment of *Bakshi* Nizam-ul-Mulk appointed Muhteshim Khan as *Bakshi* of Deccan. Consequently a new administrative system evolved in which the provincial officers were not subordinate to the central officers. The *subedar* could appoint and dismissed them at his will, thus they became sub-ordinate to the *subedar*.

Another important feature of the *Suba* administration was that, to the principal offices were attached the part of *peshkar* or secretary. As Lala Mansaram, the author of the two

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[74] *Apparatus of Empire*, op.cit, p xxi.

[75] *Mughal Administration*, pp.47-49, cf. Alavi Rafi Ahmad, *Studies in the History of Medieval Deccan*, Delhi 1977, p 87.

[76] *Tarikh-i-Fathiya*, f 102a.

important works *Masir*-i-*Nizami* and *Risala*-i-*Darbar*-i-*Asafia* was the *peshkar* of the *Bakshi* of the Deccan. The *peshkar* was also attached to the office of *Sadrath* which was held by Ganesh Pandit.[77]

4.2b. Local Administration:

At the second level of administrative organization at each of the six *Subas*, the officers were the exact replica of the headquarters. However, at the lower level of administration, at *Sarkar* and *pargana* level, the administrative set up differed. The executive head of a *Sarkar* was called the *faujdar*. Next to him was *Amil* also called *Amalguzar*, he was revenue officer. Then there were *kotwal*, *bakshi* and *Qazi*.[78]

At the *Sarkar* level, the head of the administration was a *faujdar*. He worked under the direct control of *subedar*. The safety of roads and highways was his prime concern. His duty includes, the prohibition of exaction of illegal *abwabs* (taxes), to forbid the privatization of making of arms and ammunitions, prevent the construction of new forts and repairs of the old forts by the powerful *Zamindars*, to suppress local rebels and criminals, to maintain law and order and to supervise the *thanas* of the *pargana*.[79]

It is evident from the study of *Risala*-i-*Darbar*-i-*Asafia* that the office of *taluqdars* also existed and accounts of the *tahsil* from the *Sarkars* and *pargana* were submitted to Nizam-ul-Mulk.[80] *Amils* were in charge of the *taluqa*.[81]

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77 *Risala*-i-*Darbar*-*i*-Asafia, op.cit, 24, 27 (zabita).

78 P. Saran, *The Provincial Governments of the Mughals*, Bombay, 1942, p 211.

79 *The Provincial Governments of the Mughals*, op.cit, p 229.

80 *Risala-i-Darbar*-i-*Asafia*, f 41.

81 Ibid., p 45.

Besides the *faujdar* and *Amalguzar*, there were *Qazis* and *Kotwals* who were in charge of justice and religious affairs.

It is important to note here that the definition of *Faujdari* with regard to its territorial jurisdiction in the Deccan assumed new dimensions probably unprecedented elsewhere in the Mughal Empire.

Nizam-ul-Mulk was appointed with the *Faujdari* of Karnataka, which comprised an area of almost a *Suba*, along with the *Subedari* of Deccan. Thus a Faujdari might comprise a *pargana* a number of *pargana* and in many cases a *Sarkar*. A *pargana* generally constituted an administrative unit whether it comprised a *Faujdari* or formed a part of the *Faujdari*.

Thus the *subedar* it seems designated as *Sadr-Subedar* as he had six *subedar* under him. Likewise the *Diwan* of the Deccan had six other *diwans* under him. Each of these had a *Naib subedar* and *Naib Diwan* under them.[82]

Table-XIV Details of the *Faujdars* served under Nizam-ul-Mulk between; 1724-36[83]

S.No.	*Faujdar*	Territory of *Faujdari*
1.	Hafizud-din Khan	Sarkar chicacole
2.	Md. Said Khan	Sarkar chicacole
3.	Talib Muhiyud-din Khan	Sarkar Raichur

[82] Doc., No. VIII/2103, VIII/39/162, VIII/34/162, I.J.C.N.A., New Delhi.

[83] *Tarikh*-i-*Fathiya*, ff.30-40, for the appointments from 1 to 12.

4.	Mirza Ali	Sarkar Bijapur
5.	Ibadullah Khan	Sarkar Murtazanagar
6.	Faizullah Khan	Sarkar Ellore
7.	Agha Munim Khan	Sarkar Mustafanagar
8.	Abdur Nabi Khan	Sarkar Cuddappa
9.	Rundaula Khan	Sarkar Karnal (Kamarnagar)
10.	Sanaullah Khan	Sarkar Imtiazgarh (Adhoni)
11.	Abid Khan	Sarkar Haskote Hydeabad Karnatak
12.	Tahir Muhammad Khan	Sarkar Haskote Bijapur (Karnatak)
13.	Anwaruddin Khan[84]	Nusratgarh, Suba Bijapur
14.	Wakalal Khan[85]	Territory around the river Maujhira suba Muhammadabad
15.	Abu Turab Khan[86]	Mahals of Khalisa Sharifa of Pargana Qamarnagar, Bijapur
16.	Rai Gorad Mal[87]	Basawapattan and Balapur

[84] Doc. No. VIII/35/647, I.J.C. Delhi.

[85] Doc. No, VIII/52/364. I.J.C, Delhi.

[86] Doc. No., VIII/35/690. I.J.C, Delhi.

[87] Doc.No, VIII/52/813, 769, 770. I.J.C, Delhi.

17.	Mubariz Khan Bahadur[88]	Jagir Mahals
18.	Ghulam Husain Khan[89]	Sarkar Elgandal, Hyderabad
19.	Ajaib Singh[90]	Sarkar Nizampatam, Port Machlipatan
20.	Lutfullah[91]	Pargana Chincholi, Bidar
21.	Qasim[92]	Sarkar Warangal and Malargur, Hyderabad
22.	Anwarud-din Khan[93]	8 Sarkars, Ellore, Raymundry, Mustafanagar Murtazanagar, Machlipatan, Nizanpatan, Warangal and Khammamet

In certain cases when a *jagirdar* was appointed as *Faujdar* of his own *jagir*, his territorial jurisdiction as *faujdar* was limited to the area of his *jagir* alone. One such instance is of Raja Inder Singh who was appointed *Faujdar* for his own jagir of *pargana* Mehari Deonagar. It was granted to him as *tankhwah jagir* in 1720-21.[94]

In the case of posts in the lowest categories, like *Darogha*, *Futahdar*, *Karori*, *Tahwildar*, *Chaudhri* etc. some variations are found in the area of operation of different officials holding the same category of post.

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88 Doc. NO.3, APSA, Hyderabad.

89 Doc.No, 1620. APSA. Hyderabad.

90 Doc, No.83. APSA. Hyderabad.

91 Doc, No.23. APSA. Hyderabad.

92 Doc, No.47. APSA. Hyderabad.

93 Doc. No.16, APSA. Hyderabad.

94 Doc. No.VIII/27/8 I.J.C, Delhi.

For instance, Mir Ghulam Muhiyuddin was *darogha* of *mandwi sabzi* and *Kotah* of tobacco of the city of Aurangabad,[95] while Hazarimal Daya Ram was *darogha* of *baramda* for the entire city.[96] Md. Ibrahim was *darogha* of the entire *mahals* of *Sair*. Another *darogha* had 12 *mahals* of *Sair* under him.[97]

The *Shiqdar* was the chief officer of the *pargana* in whom the duties of both the *faujdar* and *kotwal* were combined. The revenue administration was carried on by the *Amil*. He was the chief officer for the assessment and fixation of land revenue. In the case of an *Amil* as in the case of a *Faujdar*, the territorial jurisdiction or the area of operation was not restricted either to a single *Sarkar* or *Pargana*. In the Deccan the area of operation assigned to each *Amil* varied considerably to suit local needs.[98]

When the area assigned to an *Amil* was a few *dehats* or *Mauzas*, less than *pargana*, the *Amil* was designated as *Amil*-i-*Dehat*.[99] In the *mahals* of the *Khalisa Sharifa* there were revenue personnel too like the *Tahsildar*, *Amin*, *Waqia Navis* etc. They were appointed by the *taluqdars*.[100]

Besides all the above discussed departments, there were other minor departments with their personnel, namely, department of Buildings under a *Darogha*, both at the headquarters and the individual *Suba* level and other was department of *Baghats* under a *Darogha*.[101]

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[95] Doc. No. VIII/29/1 dtd. 5 July. I.J.C, Delhi.

[96] Doc No. VIII/29/1. I.J.C, Delhi.

[97] Doc No. VIII/24/10 dt. 6 Julus, I.J.C, Delhi.

[98] Md. Ibrahim was *amil* of 27 *mahals* of the two *sarkars* – Warangal and Khammamet.

[99] Doc No. T.109/1156 and T. 111/OM, APSA, Hyderabad.

[100] *Risala*-i-*Darbar*-i-*Asafia*, 35 (Zabita).

[101] Doc No. VIII/17/6, I.J.C, Delhi.

There were several other small category posts in all the executive offices, that is *Amil*, *Amin* and *Darogha*. The office of *Amin* was common in all the provincial departments. The chief *Amin* was called *Amin*-i-*Kul*. There were different categories of *Amin* and these are *Amin Mahal*-i-*Sair*, *Amin*-i-*Paibaqi*, *Amin* for *Mal*, *Amin* for the *Khazana*-i-*Amira*.[102] There was *Amini* of *Bulgur Khana*. There were *Amins* for *Baghats*, *Bazars*, *Chabutra*-i-*Kotwali*, *Imarat* etc.[103] There was an office of *Naib Amin* as well.[104]

Similar was the case with the post of *Darogha*, there were *Daroghas* for *Mahal-i-Sair*, *Bulgur Khana*, *Kotah Parcha*, *Mandvi Sabzi*, *baramda*, *Topkhana-i-Deccan*, *Ganj-i-Kan* and *Kardwi*, *Baghat-i-Diccan*, *Kachehri-i-Diwani*, *Dagh-wa-tashiha* of *Ahsham*, *Kirana*, *Imaarat*, *Javhari Bazar*, *Ahshams*, *Chitra Pan Khana*.[105]

There was subordinate to *Darogha* called *Darogha-i-Nisf*. There were *Nirkh Navis* for fixing rates of grains every week. They informed the *chaudharis* of the fixed prices. There were *puradars* who patrolled the *pura* at night and reported to the *chabutra-i-Kotwali* of the municipality.[106]

4.2c. Judiciary under the Nizam:

The noble sentiments which Nizam-ul-Mulk expressed in his testament regarding the independence of Judiciary and the responsibility towards it are very significant. He condemned that he was not fit for the job in view of its assignment to

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[102] Doc.No. VIII/28/10, VIII/28/7/301, VIII/21/1204, VIII/42/1668, VIII/42/1653, I.J.C, Delhi.

[103] Doc.No. VIII/9/96, VIII/22/8, VIII/42/42, VIII/53/853, VIII/83/854.

[104] Doc.No. VIII/42/53, I.J.C, Delhi.

[105] Doc.No. VIII/24/10, VIII/1/492, VIII/9/96-100, VIII/29/1, VIII/21/1210, VIII/19/608, VIII/17/6, VIII/53/853, I.J.C, Delhi.

[106] Doc. No. VIII/35/62, *Risala-i-Darbar Asafiyah*, op.cit, pp.48, 43.

Qazi who was actually duty, since he knew his work best.[107]

Though he endeavored to keep the judiciary independent of the executive, he kept himself informed about its working. He would not hesitate to take prompt action to keep it free from corrupt practices. On the report of Qazi Karimuddin that Muhammad Sanan, the *Qazi* of a *pargana*, was taking bribe, he issued an order to the *subedar* of Aurangabad to produce Muhammad Sanan.[108]

The Nizam was no respecter of ranks where transgression of justice was concerned. Hakim Muhammad Ali Khan, who was the Nizam's personal physician, was taken to task when the former caused intervention in the dispensation of justice.[109]

Briggs writes that "the original provisions for the administration of justice are as fair and rational under the Nizams as they are under most other governments.[110]

The *Darul-Qaza-e-Balda-e-Hyderabad* occupied more or less the position of the highest court of appeal. The cases of complicated nature were referred by the *Sarkar* and *pargana* courts to the *Qazi-e-Balda.*[111]

The *Qazi-e-Balda* was appointed by the Nizam. At the time of appointment the *Qazi* was conferred with a robe of honor by the Nizam.[112]

Any statement or petition was authenticated by the *Qazi* with his seal. Every year the statement of revenue and expenditure which was transmitted to the office of

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[107] *Masir-i-Nizami*, p 67.

[108] *Masir-i-Nizami*, pp 103,104.

[109] Ibid, pp 107-8.

[110] Henry George Briggs, *The Nizam*, 2 Vols., London, 1861, Vol.II, p 204.

[111] *Risala*-i-*Darbar-i-Asafia*, f 101-2. (Zabita).

[112] *Tarikh*-i-*Asafjahi*, p 248.

Diwan from every village was to be authenticated by the *Qazi* with his seal.[113]

No age of retirement, it seems, was prescribed for the *Qazi's*. A *Qazi* could continue in service as long as his death permitted to do so or till he resigned.[114]

There were separate office buildings for the *Qazis* under the Nizam, they were known as either *Darul Qaza* or the *Adalath* or *Mahkama*.[115] The dais on which the *Qazi* took his seat was known as *Masnad-e-Ahkam-e-Shariat*.

The attached officers of court were *Darogha-e-Adalat*, *Mufti*, *Mohtasib*, *Waqai Nigar* and *Khufia Nawis*. *Darogha-e-Adalat* was to receive applications to be filled in the court. *Darogha-e-Adalat* was appointed by Royal *Sanad-e-Darogha-e-Adalat*-e-*Badshahi* which was issued by *Wazir*. *Mufti* gives legal advice or opinion but not to deliver any judgement. Kotwal did his inquiries and referred them to *Qazi-e-Balda*, he was to imprison or release criminals only if the *Qazi* so ordered.[116]

In addition to the *Darul Qaza*, the state had an ecclesiastical court in every city and big town. At Hyderabad it was known as *Sadarath-ul-Auliyah-e-Deccan,* presided over by *Sadr-us-Sudur*. In the *Sadarath-ul-Auliya* cases related to religious stipends of such dignitaries as *Qazis, Mashaikhs* and *Khatibs* were decided. These courts delivered oral verdict only, and no appeals against their decision were permitted.[117]

Usually the offices of *Sadr-us-Sadur* and *Muhtasib* were combined in one person. A *Qazi* of a city on Sarkar could aspire for the post of the *Sadr-us-Sudur* of the

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[113] *Risala-i-Darbar-i-Asafia*, f 99.

[114] Basheer Ahmad, *Administration of Justice in Medieval India*, Aligarh, 1941, p 149.

[115] *Risala*-i-*Darbar*-i-*Asafia*, f 102.

[116] Briggs, Vol.II, pp 239-40.

[117] Bilgrami and Wilmott, op.cit., Vol.II, p 162.

city of Hyderabad. A *Muhtasib* performed the duties of religious censor.[118]

In all criminal cases the Muslim law prevailed. In civil cases the Muslim law was applied to Muslims only. Disputes between Hindus were transmitted to a *panchayat* comprising members drawn from the Hindu community only.

In criminal cases if any Hindu plaintiff lost his confidence in any *Qazi*, he could refuse to file his case before him and could submit a petition to the Nizam to permit him to fill the suit before *panchayat.*[119]

This shows that Nizam might allow the *Panchayat* to handle the criminal cases also.[120] The civil cases filed by the Hindus in the local *Panchayat* were decided by arbitration.[121]

At the *Sarkar* level, there were *Qazis* to whom the Amil ought to refer cases relating to civil cases. The *Qazi* of the *Sarkar* or *pargana* like the *Qazi*-e-*Balda* led the Friday and *Eid* prayers. He could be promote and to *Qazi-e-Suba* or even to chief *Muhtasib* or *Sadr-us-Sudur.*[122]

Nizam never inflicted death sentence even in the case of treason, Moru and Ramdas whom, he regarded as the rebels of his dominion were confined in the fort of Ahmadnagar. However, he strongly impressed upon his sons that in their continued confinement lay their well being.[123]

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[118] Basheer Ahmad, op.cit, p 250.

[119] Doc No. 4979, Central Record Office, Hyderabad. This is a petition which was submitted to Nizam requesting him to permit the transference of a case from *Qazi* to *Panchayat.*

[120] Briggs, Vol.I, p 240.

[121] Basheer Ahmad, p 196.

[122] Briggs, op.cit., Vol.I, p 240, *Masir*-i-*Nizami*, op.cit., p 121.

[123] *Masir-i-Nizami*, p 71.

4.2d.The Forts and their Administration:

In the Deccan, Mughals inherited large number of forts, though all were not important from the point of the military strategic, but there were some important and strong forts which were regularly garrisoned and their maintenance was given to the officers of the fort. The bigger forts were called *Qilas* and its officer *Qiladar*, while the smaller one's were termed *garhi*.

The *Chahar-Gulshan* of Chatar Man Kayasth gave a list of the forts of the Deccan. There were over 400 forts in the six *Subas* of the Deccan.[124] The details are as follows:

The Forts of the Province of Aurangabad[125] there were 144 forts in the province.

Kaliani	Bakhavi
Puri	Qila Manik
Qila Masi	Qila Balgarh
Qila Mahraujan	Mankargarh
sarmar Rai	Bhamri
Dhankhora	Dargolikhora
Baralaf	Bahrangarh
Barili	Durggarh
Sardari	rampuri

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[124] Chatarman Kayastha, *Chahar Gulshan*, MSS, Abdus-Salam Collection, MAL, Aligarh, ff.116b-118a.

[125] *Chahar Gulshan*, ff.116b, 117a.

Ratangarh	Sardadurg
Sakatra	Songarh
Surplarak	Koliana
Kurgarh	Kalana Khura
Kanakdurg	Ghosala
Matgarh	Manikgarh
Madhgarh	Bala
Mandalgarh	Mulkgarh
Basantgarh	Haidargarh
Manpalgarh	Morgarh
Isagarh	Goganj
Bhaskar	Deodand
Uniri	Unokdanda
Mulkgarhi	Chandbari
Dhak	Koplas
Honkana	Udurg
Biramgarh	Bhuri
Saudagir	Padamdurg
Partabgarh	Purna
Chandangarh	Rajgarh

Rajdurg	Karur
Khanderi	Kotwalgarh
Kalmangarh	Kanu
Bari	Makasandgarh
Dabdalgarh	Wanuba
Bansli	Sakota
Ahangarh	Bandagarh
Kijrgarh	Suadas
Harsal	Khujistabunyad
Beganpur	Daulatabad
Ajlau	Ahmadnagar
Islamabad or Jalna	Azimgarh
Buna	Amur
Audgir	Usa
Undh	Islamabad or Rari
Anjrani	Alang
Ankibanki	Ahuhat
Bahadurgarh	Bula
Buhar	Sardari
Banigarh	Malih

Salih	Parenda
Nandgaon	Bhimgarh
Bamarbank	Warangaldari
Judhan	Jaula
Chandpur	Parand
Chanun	Dharat
Dabhra	Rajmand
Rajkot	Rasanj
Rula	Sinkhar
Sadhudurg	Sagangarh
Songarh	Sholapur
Qandhar	Fatihabad or Dhari
Gulbarga	Khadasa
Kahangarh	Kalubi
Khayar Biyar	Nakhara
Kurang	Guldhar
Kanra	Kurang
Kalulgarh	Kargarh
Lauhgarh	Kunila
Badh	Markand

Mahuli	Manikganj
Mahur	Sarbas
Naldurg	Harchandgarh

The Forts of the Province of Khandesh:[126]

Burhanpur	Asirgarh
Rudi Manik	Hargarh
Parenata	Mauragarh
Fatihabad	Bhatnir
Mul Bhatnir	Mujha
Sultangarh	Sanula
Songarh	

The Fort of the Province of Berar[127]**:**

Gawil	Kamla
Basnal (Narnala)	Navagarh
Baila	Babhalgarh

The List of the Forts of the Province of Bidar[128]

Muhammadabad (Bidar)	Ramgir
Firuzgarh/ Ibrahimgarh	Kalian

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[126] *Chahar Gulshan*, f.117a.

[127] *Chahar Gulshan*, f 117a.

[128] Ibid, f 117a.

Muzaffarnagar or Balkhan

The Forts of the Province of Bijapur[129]

Bijapur	Islamgarh
Alang	Achalpur
Rewri	Amalank
Anirajdurg	Andarud
Astgarhi	Ramgdurg
Taru	Panchdurg
Himdurg	Mahimgarh
Sudargarh	Badnur
Sakdurg	Naumadargarh
Baibuzani	Makharai
Makharali	Banli
Salliki	Sadhgarh
Nupargarh	Sapandandurg
Susar	Sahdurg
Kalki	Kisangarh
Lakhmir	Lumsigarh
Nadargarh	Bhalgarh

[129] Ibid, f 117a-b.

Mohammatgarh	Mandhigarh
Nandugarh	Balapur
Harang	Dangpur
Bhukhamgarh	Mudgal
Susal	Barad
Mandpal	Saubatdurg
Bundi Kotha	Gokalpur
Chillam	Luna
Bundi	Kotpur
Khua	Rasulgarh
Kandalgarh	Kulangarh
Jubgarh	Bhumgarh
Rahimgarh	Ruingarh
Shahmandar	Wazirgarh
Vilaitgarh	Huma
Bankabala	Harbansgarh
Chandangarh	Mahalgarh
Gulbandgarh	Gandharbgarh
Morgarh	Naulpur
Mardangarh	Suram Sakh

Kumbaralal	Khadi
Ladha Sadha	Asgharnagar
Azimnagar or Malkapur	Imtiazgarh
Kaburah	Murani
Banalgarh	Basvamin
Baldagarh	Bikanur
Bhusgarh	Padshahpur
Bansi	Mathura
Nurgal	Mangalkot
Khabra	Dhubri
Rajbansgarh	Athsligarh
Anmalgarh	Sankula
Sadhur	Sadanandgarh
Sribastgarh	Harkongarh
Kamlgarh	Murtazabad
Mangalband	Mudgal
Baldatpi	Maham
Haidargarh	Sabazangarh
Mandalgarh	Mahamangarh
Nasirabad	Nandpal

Daragarh	Bijuli
Huligarh	Halihal
Hulihunur	Honmali.

List of the Forts of Province Hyderabad.[130] There were 54 forts in the *Suba* Hyderabad

Bhagnagar	Danurgarh
Muhammadabad	Rasapur
Khulas or Kaulas	Murtazanagar
Kalohbadar	Makha
Kumalgarh	Mustafanagar
Haidarnagar	Basantnanam
Kubauli	Tubal Kandam
Mandakpur	Hasabnasab
Kanjikup	Angalpet
Masrur	Naumalgarh
Golkonda	Sadahdanam
Habur	Arganur
Walmak	Makahpur
Bhugarh	Karudh

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[130] *Chahar Gulshan*, ff.117b-118b.

Bansdhar	Harmali
Urksla	Varun
Mankal/ Mangal	Khulirah
Kahabkali/ Karab	Absi
Vbur	Kumin
Panchla	Lundhal
Korur	Kalapur
Kuli	Bamin
Abdullagarh	Bidligarh
Sundambar	Maujadurg
Kharamwardan	Khajla
Nimi	Khim
Dharamram	Kuni.

In order to keeps the administration of forts running smoothly Nizam-ul-Mulk appointed *Qiladars* and *Thanadars* for the purpose that were responsible for the maintenance of each fort and its infantry garrison (*Ahsham*). These *Qiladars* were from among the *mansabdars*, sometimes they were the *mansabdar* of higher rank and sometimes they held very small rank. And the range of their *mansab* was from 4000 to 200 but there was no difference in the power and duties of the different *mansab* holders.

List of some of the *Qiladars* of the Forts of Deccan with their Possessions:

S.No.	Name of Qiladar	Fort	Source
1.	Anwaruddin Khan	Nusratgarh	Doc. No.VIII/35/647 I.J. Collection
2.	Himmat Khan Bahadur	Raichur/ Feroznagar	Doc. No.VIII/39/162 I.J. Collection
3.	Faiz Ali Khan	Deodurg	Doc. No.VIII/35/629 I.J. Collection
4.	Abdul Rasul Khan	Karnataka	Doc. No.VIII/27/146 I.J. Collection
5.	Basir Khan	Ellore/ Antur	Doc. No.103, APSA Hyderabad
6.	Allah Khan	Parenda	Doc. No.VIII/42/4, I.J. Collection
7.	Sadat Khan	Ahmednagar	Doc. No.VIII/10/444 I.J. Collection
8.	Dargah Quli Khan	Haskote	Doc. No.VIII/22/3, I.J. Collection

9.	Imam Wardi Big	Devarkonde	Doc. No.VIII/19/606 I.J. Collection
10.	Ali Quli	Balapur	Doc. No.VIII/22/4, I.J. Collection
11.	Faiz Baksh	Maurbi Mark	Doc. No.VIII/35/510 I.J. Collection
12.	Md. Ali	Ellichpur	Doc. No.VIII/10/747 I.J. Collection
13.	Khwaja Burhanuddin	Warangal	Doc. No.71 APSA Hyderabad
14.	Md. Qasim	Warangal	Doc. No.71 APSA Hyderabad
15.	Md. Fazl	-	Doc. No.VIII/21/10 I.J. Collection
16.	Md. Qutubuddin	-	Doc. No.VIII/47/95 I.J. Collection

There are large number of documents in the Inayat Jung collection from where we can infer the names of the *Qiladars* with the fort they were appointed. Sometime there is a mention of only a persons name without giving the details of the fort he was in charge. But sometimes the rank of the *Qiladar* was also given.

The *Qiladari* though a military post, with a certain number of infantry garrison under its control was sometimes also assigned the executive and civil office of *Faujdar*. They also given the military responsibility of *thanedar*, to look after the smaller fortification called *thana*.[131]

Under Nizam-ul-Mulk, it seems that in some cases the office of *Qiladari* became hereditary. When Khwaja Burhanuddin *Qiladar* of the Warrangal fort died, his son Md. Qasim requested appointment to the same post. The request was granted and the *parwana* with the seal of Nawab Ahmad Khan Bahadur Nasir Jung was issued on 11 *Rajab*, 1151 H/1738-39.[132]

The *Qiladars* retained the infantry garrison in the fort consisted of *Piyadagan* or foot soldiers, they were called *Ahsham*. The Mughal infantry included musketeers, swordsman, macebearers, *sihbandi*, *dakhili*, messenger, *shagirdpesha* or slaves and artisans, blacksmiths, miners, axemen etc. The officer in command of the infantry was called *Darogha*.[133]

In the Deccan the *Ahsham* of the forts had the following categories, *piyada*, *bargir*, *bhat*, *ababanti*, *Kamatki*, *barsanti*, *sawar*, *golandaz*, *banduqchi* and *Abad*.[134] However some of the terms are not identifiable given in the documents.

It is important to note here that all the categories of the *Ahsham* were not posted simultaneously in the fort. Some forts had only *piyada*, some had one or two categories, and sometimes more than two according to the situation and importance of the fort.

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131 Doc No.VIII/35/647, I.J.C, Delhi.

132 Doc No.71, APSA, Hyderabad. The reason behind the seal of Nasir Jung on the document was that during that period Nizam-ul-Mulk was in Delhi on the call of the emperor.

133 *Mughal Administration*, op.cit, p 204.

134 Doc No.1069, 703, APSA, Hyderabad.

The strength of the *Ahsham* was also not same for all the forts, it varied from fort to fort. The highest being 900 and lowest was 50 found in the Documents.

Another important factor in the fort administration under Nizam-ul-Mulk was that, he had marked a set of lands called *Jagir-i-Ahsham* to meet the expenditure of the salary of *Ahsham*. These *Jagir* were either within the territorial jurisdiction of the forts or in its neighborhood. These arrangements thus maintain regular flow of revenue for the *Ahsham*.

For the *Qiladars* as well, there were separate Jagirs for the maintenance of *Ahsham*. These *Jagirs* for maintenance of *Ahsham* assigned to the *qiladars* were distinguished as Mashrut.[135]

Some of such assigned Jagirs for the maintenance of *Ahsham* in the Karnataka region were, Ganji Koti Kohan fort, *Pargana* chaula for chamla, Khammam for Khamman fort. Kalwa, Kawari, Tomri for Tomri fort, Udgir *pargana* for fort Udgir and 50 others.[136]

There were some *Ahsham* who were paid in cash and the average pay of them varied from 10 Huns to 20 *huns* per head, annually. In one case there was a *sawar* was mentioned and his pay has been given separately as 500 *Huns* annually.

Next to *sawar* was the *piyada* whose highest average salary was 20 *huns*. There was a great gap between the salaries of the *piyada* and the *sawar*. The *piyadas* were paid different in different forts, either *huns* 20 or 10, there was variation in pay of other

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[135] Doc. No. 1070 dtd. 1157F/ 1747 APSA, Hyderabad.

[136] Doc. No. 1,109, dtd. 1156F/ 1746, APSA, Hyderabad.

categories as well.[137]

Thus we can see that there were no strict rules for the payments to *Ahsham*, it that the *Ahsham* who were posted in the important forts were paid slightly high and those in the minor forts were paid less. But there was no difference in their jobs and duties; they were strictly to be followed by all the post holders.

This was the whole structure of the administration prevalent under Nizam-ul-Mulk. The Nizam adopted the system of appointing worthy persons in the administration without the consideration of their religion, thus the ruling elite emerged from different communities and did not have religion as base.

The Hindus and Muslims were regarded by him as two eyes. In the matter of language though Persian became the official language but regional languages were not neglected. In the districts the notification were issued in the regional language.

An important thing to note here is that, the combination of several posts under a person was very common during the period. A person can hold two there or more than three posts simultaneously. The reason behind, it seems that there were certain posts in which the physical presence of a person was not compulsory, and they can manage their work through their deputies on various post while they work at the highest post according to their choice.

Thus we can see that the combination of several offices under a single person is that the exercise of executive and revenue functions by one person resulted in a single system. Further in military offices, there was no clear cut separation of the functions of the executive, revenue and military offices. The three offices functioned as a whole unit

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[137] Ibid.

of one system.

There are numerous documents in favor of these conditions, where a single person was entrusted with more than two or three posts simultaneously. In 1135F/ 1725-76 Abu Turab Khan held the office of *Naib*-i-*diwan*, *Amin* and *Faujdari* of the *Mahals* of the *Khalisa Sharifa* of *pargana* Qamarnagar, *Suba* Bijapur.[138]

After the death of Sadulla Khan, Anwaruddin Khan was appointed to *Qiladari*, *Faujdari* and *thanedari* of Nusratgarh *Suba* Bijapur.[139]

In 1143 H/1732-33, Muhammad Husani Khan held the post of *Ziladari* of eight *Sarkars* of Ellore, and at the same time he was given the posts of *Amanat*, *Faujdari* and *Shiqdari* of Ellore and Raymundry and three *Mahals* of Narsapur, etc.[140]

In 1145H/ 1733-34 Ajaib Singh held the office of the *Amanat*, *Shiqdari* and *Faujdari* of the *Sarkar* of the port of Machlipatam and *Sarkar* Nizampatam.[141]

In 1149H/ 1739-40, Md. Qasim was appointed to the *Amanat*, *Faujdari* and *Shiqdari* of *Sarkar* Warangal and Malangur Suba Hyderabad.[142]

It seems that the three posts of *Amanat*, *Faujdari* and *Shiqdari* were combined together and were assigned to a single person. Sometimes a person holding there posts were also assigned the additional duty of *Tahsildari* of *chauth*.

There is an example of Md. Sharif Khan who was assigned with the post of an *Amil* of pargana chirakonda, *Sarkar* Devarkonda, *Suba* Hyderabad, was also assigned

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[138] Doc No. VIII/35/690, I.J. Collection, N.A. Delhi.

[139] Doc No. VIII/35/647, I.J. Collection.

[140] Doc No.1666, APSA, Hyderabad.

[141] Doc No. 83, APSA, Hyderabad.

[142] Doc No.47, APSA, Hyderabad.

the additional duty of the Amanat, Faujdari, *Shiqdari* and *Tahsildari* of *chauth* of the Jagir Mahals of the same *Suba*.[143]

Mansaram, who was in the direct contact of Nizam-ul-Mulk as he served as secretary of Nizam. He is the author of two important works, *Risala*-i-*Darbar*-i-*Asafia* and *Masir*-i-*Nizami*. The *Risala*-i-*Darbar*-i-*Asafia*, discusses the *Darbar* and its culture prevailing during the time of Nizam-ul-Mulk. There are 73 (*zawabits*) regulations of Nizam-ul-Mulk's time and some of the important are as follows:[144]

1. Dances by the dancing girls could be permitted in the houses of noblemen or big businessmen or the officers, only on the occasion of festivals or marriages. Permission for this could be obtained from the officer of innovations,[145] information for the permissions were communicated to Nizam-ul-Mulk by the officers of posts and information as *Darogha*-i-*Harkara*.

2. The messengers with the permission of their officer (Naik) directly approached Nizam-ul-Mulk for communicating news.

3. There were several writers and fair copyists (Munshis) for the drafting in different styles of writing (*nastaliq*, *nasq*, *shikasta* etc.). Important drafts regarding wars etc., to be submitted to Nizam-ul-Mulk were made by Mousvi Khan Jurat. Drafts of the orders were made by Ram Singh. The personal attender and carrier of the royal pen case (*Qalamdan Bardan*-i-*Khas*) always kept with himself both the big and small seals of Nizam-ul-Mulk.

4. Except five or six special persons, no one was allowed to enter the private

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[143] Doc No.7, APSA, Hyderabad.

[144] Mansaram, *Risala*-i-*Darbar*-i-*Asafia*, op.cit., ff.105-177.

[145] *Darogha-i-Bidat*.

chambers and these persons too attended by rotation. The public audience usually lasted not more than ninety six minutes (Four ghadi 1 ghadi = 24 minutes) and the minimum time was forty eight minutes. At the end of the session the officer (chopdars) announced that the time of the *Durbar* was nearing an end, and that they should conclude their consultations.

5. Nizam-ul-Mulk signed the papers for the grant of charity, etc. Lala Mansaram held the post of the submission of papers to Nizam-ul-Mulk. Afterwards papers of other departments in the following order were submitted for signature – *Diwan*-i-*Deccan*, *Bakshi*-ul-*Mumalik* and *Mir Atish* etc. After signing the papers of *Daftar*-i-*Shahi*, he turned his attention to the papers of *Diwan*-i-*Khana* and *Khan Saman* etc., and than to his own *karkhanas* (workshops).

6. Nizam-ul-Mulk says that first the work of the Mughal Emperor and then his own work must be executed. The papers of the *Qazi* under the *Sadrath* department were written in a very fine writing in *Nastaleeq* by Mir Zain-ud-din Hussain Khan, *Sadr*. They were submitted in the order in which Zainud-din had arranged.

7. The rule was that, once any business man paid the amount of tax (*Mahsul*) on goods at any one place and obtained a receipt then he had not pay tax at other places or points. Even if he could not sell his goods for the whole year and if he moved to another place, in that case one half of the tax was collected. Nizam-ul-Mulk says that the whole of the territory was of the Mughal emperor. Hence when tax had been paid at any one place, it had been paid for all places. It would be disobedience to God if tax was collected each and every place. The other disadvantage was that by heavy taxation the businessman would be

discouraged and it also enhances the price of the goods which would result in loss to the people.

8. Silver was kept in the personal treasury while gold was kept in the treasury of the district, and the remaining was kept in the treasury of the district, and the remaining was kept in the treasury of the villages, and was then sent to the headquarters of villages, (*pargana*) from whence it reached the district headquarters (*Sarkar*), where it was deposited. The treasuries at different places were maintained separately. The revenue collections sent accounts monthly and annually to the office of Nizam-ul-Mulk.

9. Nizam-ul-Mulk maintained that the forts were for safeguarding the treasuries around them during the war to protect the animals of the villages. If a rich noble made his place in the fort, it implied that he has left the world and is sitting in the fort in seclusion. The revenue receipt of the country was usually received as *Hundi.* The *kotwal* had instructions to keep a watch over strangers. The latter were allowed to stay in the city after taking surety. Otherwise, they were asked to stay outside the city. In case of any theft they were investigated.

10. The officer in charge of the town or city (*Puradar*) patrolled the town or city every night and reported every evening about every house at the police station. The sweepers (*Khaproban*), also reported daily. A copy of these reports was obtained by the news reporter (*Akhbarnavis*), who along with other reports, made a selection and forwarded it to Nizam-ul-Mulk in a comes with his own seal.

11. Religious persons called on Nizam-ul-Mulk and if there were to be any literary or political meeting, it was usually held between the two evening prayers.

12. The dismissed revenue collector could not region service until he had settled the accounts. For this purpose he had to remain at the office of *Diwan* and get in touch with the officials. If charges against his were not proved, then he had to obtain a clearance artifact (*Farakkati*), with the seal of the *Diwan*. After this he could rejoin service. But he was their posted to another place for not more than three years.

13. The superintendent of the elephants had no authority to lend the elephants to anyone, even for a marriage. The uncontrollable elephants were kept away from the public.

14. Every week the rate of grains was fixed by the market officer (*Nirkh Navis*), who then instructed the headman of the trade (*chaudhris*). The rates were submitted for the information of Nizam-ul-Mulk. The *Harkara* of the *Akhbar* wrote it in the news report. If there was any differences in rate or weight he communicated then same to the market officer and the headman was compelled to ride on the donkey and the shop where a difference had occurred was looted.

15. Hindus and Muslims could celebrate their festivals like Holi, Diwali, Id or Muharram, for not more than three days. However, they could prolong the celebration within their houses only. Bars and brothels were outside the limits of the city.

16. During the annual anniversary of the holy persons, *Qawwali* and *milad* were conducted and were allowed without permission.

17. For a full gathering in the mosques, the *Sadr* would instruct the *Qazi* and inspectors (*Muhtasib*) in advance for regular calling to prayers. People from rich houses gave donations which was credited to the public treasury (*Baitul Mal*),

and distributed among the poor.

18. Nizam-ul-Mulk rode his carriage without much pomp.

19. The *Deshpandia* was strictly instructed to submit the annual revenue receipts (*Muazana*) of every land. The fixation of land revenue (*Tashkhis*-i-*Jamabandi*) was made every year along with the receipts and balances. A copy of the same, with the scale of *Qazi* and the news reporter was sent to the revenue office.

20. The Emperor's royal orders (*Adab*-i-*Sultani*) were never disobeyed. When any *Farman* arrived it was received with full honors, by going up to the place of *Farman Badi.*

21. The soldiers were treated decently. Once two soldiers approached the *Nawab* directly and obtained two months salary as advance for the marriage of their daughters.

From the above information, certain points came into light, Nizam-ul-Mulk while formulating all these rules had the image of benevolent rulers of the previous times.

For example when the princes of the grains were fixed in order to check the oppression of the common man, the times of Alauddin Khalji came into memory. The prohibition of giving elephants to anyone by the officers was followed and the violation of the rule was considered as an act liable to punishment here we can recall Akbar's displeasure against Bairam Khan on the point. The department of charity can be compared with that of Firoz Shah Tughlaq's time.

It seems that Nizam-ul-Mulk tried to borrow all the good customs and ruler of the previous emperors in order to avoid the problems. It is the foundation of the Asaf

Jahi dynasty on which the successors of Nizam-ul-Mulk built the building of their independence. But it is important to note here that Nizam-ul-Mulk considered the Emperor's work prime and suggests his sons to follow the same and he never tried to assert his independent claims, at the same time by adopting all these rules and regulations he tried to keep the administration working in a proper manner as he was aware of the condition prevailed at the centre, the corruptions, the financial problems and the dangers of foreign invasions.

The reason of such allegiance of the *Subadar* was also because of the fact that it was not possible for the governor to be completely free from the centre. The imperial tradition was not totally forgotten, because the Emperor was the source of all claims to authority, even though he himself was effectively deprived of power. The nobles including those in control of virtually independent provinces defended him, provided he did not imperil their interests in their respective regions. As late as 1739, Burhan-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk arrived at the centre from Awadh and Deccan respectively to defend the Emperor against Nadir Shah.

Chapter – 5

Revenue Administration: Its Sources Collection and Distribution

When Aurangzeb was appointed as the viceroy of the Deccan for the second time (1652), Murshid Quli Khan was send to the Deccan along with the prince as *Diwan* of *Balaghat.* After the period of 3 years i.e. on 28 January, 1656, Murshid Quli Khan became the *Diwan* of the entire Deccan when *paiynghat* was added to his charge.[1]

The tenure of Murshid Quli Khan as the *Diwan* of the Mughal Deccan is considered very important as far as the land revenue reforms are concerned. Aurangzeb was specially changed with the task of improving land revenue system in the Deccan.[2] Aurangzeb in turn, entrusted the work of land revenue reform to Murshid Quli Khan, who was for sometime assisted by Multafat Khan, *Diwan* of Berar *Paiynghat.*[3]

There was no revenue system at all in the Deccan before the reforms of Murshid Quli Khan came into operation. The people of the Deccan did not know the methods of crop sharing and the measurement of land. There were no surveys of the land and revenue per *bighas* was neither assessed nor shared between the cultivators and the state.

The unit of the assessment was the plough in the Deccan and the revenue was

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[1] *History of Aurangzeb*, op.cit, Vol.I, p 169.

[2] *Ruqat-i-Alamgiri*, op.cit, p 97.

[3] *History of Aurangzeb*, Vol.I, p 169-70.

assessed by the number of ploughs the peasant cultivated, as much land as they could with a plough and pair of oxen. They could grow whatever crop they wish and paid a very little amount to the state. The rate of varied in different places and it was fixed arbitrarily.[4]

The absence of land revenue system led to the exploitation of the peasants by the collectors. The constant Mughal aggression and succession of rainless years had added to their difficulties and miseries. The cultivators, therefore, left their homes and fields which resulted in the conversion of cultivated tracks into forests.[5] Aurangzeb expressed his concern on this grave situation and promised to improve matters.[6]

The following few paragraphs sum up the information given in *Shahjahan nama* written by Sadiq Khan, regarding the measures adopted by Murshid Quli Khan in the Deccan. "Murshid Quli Khan who by his ancestry, is an official well-versed in accountancy, intelligent, honest and possessed of good qualities adopted the regulations of Todar Mal, *Diwan* of Akbar and Asaf, *Diwan* of Jahangir. He appointed intelligent honest and God fearing *Amins* (revenue assessors) and *Amils* (collectors). In the beginning he got most of the land measured and after that the classification of land was taken up. The land that had not come under cultivation was given to men who had the ability to manage it for cultivation and supervise the peasants. The men chosen for this job were given robes of honour and the title of *Muqaddam* (Headman). In this way he persuaded them into the field of cultivation. He gave sums of money as *taqavi* (loan) for purchasing oxen, buffaloes and other requirements of cultivation. He ordered to recover the loan in installments at the honest time".

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[4] Muhammad Sadiq Khan, *Shah Jahannama*, Vol.I, p 262.

[5] Abdul Fateh Qabil Khan, *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, MSS 20, Department of History, f 34b.

[6] *Ibid*, ff 24b, 29ab, 32a.

"He introduced a 3 tier system of land revenue. The first system was *sarbasta tashkhis* (customary assessment) which was prevalent in the older days. The second system was *batai* (sharing) that is collection after the division of the crop of which he himself was the innovator".

He established three kinds of sharing:

1. The produce that depends on rain was to be divided equally between the peasants and the state.

2. The produce gained from the wells whether it was the produce of the *kharif* or *rabi*, one third of it was to got to the state and two thirds to the peasants. And besides grain, whatever of the high grade crops was produced such as grapes, sugarcane, plantain, pomegranate, rice, poppy, mango, plum, pineapple, peach, turmeric, cumin seed, sweet basil (*Raihan*), of this produce one third or one fourth would go to the state exchequer while the rest was meant for the peasants.

3. The trop produced by canals, the share of the government was fixed by way of schedule of Rates *(Dastur-ul-Amal)*, different from the rate on the crops irrigated by wells. The third system laid down by Murshid Quli was of *Jarib*. Under this system after obtaining the *rai* (crop rate) on every crop, such as food grains, vegetable, high grade crops taking into account the prices, he determined the value of the out-turn of cultivation, so that after measuring the land, they may collect the revenue rated according to the crop. This fixed revenue rate *(Wajh-i-Muqarrari)* was also among the innovations of Murshid Quli Khan.

"Murshid Quli Khan was so meticulous in having correct measurement that at

times he used to personally handle the *jarib* (the measuring rod or chain). These measures taken by Murshid Quli Khan so sincerely and with determination started showing quick results with marked improvement in revenue and living condition of the people".[7]

Within a short period after the introduction of land revenue system of Murshid Quli Khan, the condition of agriculture really improved and the land revenue increased considerably in the Deccan. This is corroborated by the account of Bhimsen of 1658. He writes 'this region is very thickly populated and not a single piece of land was to be found there which was without cultivation.[8]

According to J.N. Sarkar the revenue system of Murshid Quli Khan was prevalent in the *Subas* of the Deccan and was known for centuries afterwards as the *Dhara* of Murshid Quli Khan.[9]

5.1. Sources of Revenue:

The chief sources of revenue were:

1. *Mal, Mal-o-Jihat* and *Sair-i-Jihat.*
2. Rural taxes and exactions other than land revenue *Wujuhat* (*jihat* and *sair jihat), Rahdari,* etc.
3. Peshkash from various personnel like Zamindars, officials, semi-officials, private persons etc.
4. *Baghat* (irrigated lands, especially gardens).

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[7] *Shahjahannama,* op.cit., Vol.I, pp 262-264.

[8] *Dilkusha,* op.cit, tr, p 20.

[9] *History of Aurangzeb,* op.cit, Vol.IV, p 107.

5. Customs from the ports.

6. Salt monopoly at Machlipatam [*Mahal-i-Shura-wa-namak*]

7. Diamond mines

8. Mints[10]

The important revenue officers in the *subahs* were *Diwan, Amalguzars, Amins, Amils, Tahsildars, Waqai Nawis, Karori* etc. In addition, the hereditary revenue officers of *Sardeshmukh, Sardeshpandia, Deshmukh, Deshpandia, Patwari, Qanungo, Muqaddam Deshkulkarni* etc. were continued in order to maintain continuity in the maintenance of local records.[11]

The chief officer of revenue at Sarkar was *Amil* or *Amalguzar*. He was assisted by a number of junior officers such as *Bitikchi* or recorder, *Khazanadar* or treasurer, *Shiqdar* or executive officers of the *pargana* (group of villages), *karkun* an accountant and other minor officials.[12] The *Amil* fixed the assessment supervised the work of his subordinate officials and sent fortnightly reports of the income and expenditure to higher authorities. As soon as two lakh *dams* were collected, he arranged its transmission to the '*Amalguzar* of the *Sarkar* who in turn sent it to the treasury.[13]

The *Amil* acted as link between the peasant and the government, and one of his duties was to promote cultivation of crops and advance *taqavi* loans for reclaiming fallow land. His assistants such as *shiqdar, Karkun, Khazanadars* etc. had to execute bonds wherein the person appointed promised to discharge his duties faithfully and

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[10] *Deh-Ba-Dehi*, MSS No.373, APSA, Hyderabad, ff 187 ab, 206 a, 234b, 205 ab.

[11] *Administration of the Deccan*, op.cit, pp 47-49.

[12] P. Saran, The *Provincial Governments of the Mughals*, Bombay 1942, p 284.

[13] *Ibid*, p 241.

honestly, and to send monthly reports of the daily receipts of income and expenditure. For instance, when Mir Muhammad Sharif was appointed *Shiqdar* of the *pargana* of Chirikonda, *Sarkar* Devarkarda *Suba*, Hyderabad, he had to execute or bond dated 9 Rabi 11, 1142. The same was the case with Guru Das, *Karkun* of the some pargana whose bond is dated 22 *Shaban* 1142. Mir Mustafa Ali, *Waqia Nigar* and *darogha* of Khammamet *Sarkar* Elgandal, *Suba* Hydrabad had also made a like promise in 1143.[14]

Muhammad Shafi, *Diwan* of Hyderabad, arrived at the land revenue and other taxes in 1689-90.[15] He fixed the *Jama-i-Kamil* for the entire Mughal Deccan. The figures for each and every *pargana* and *Sarkar,* of all the six *Subas* of the Deccan compiled early in the 18th century (1705-1707) in the *Deh ba Dehi.*[16] The *Jama-i-Kamil* figures of *Deh-ba-Dehi* are identical with the documents of Aurangzeb's closing years. The *Jama-i-Kamil* figures listed in the *Deh ba Dehi* formed the basis of the land revenue administration of Nizam-ul-Mulk in the Deccan. These figures of *Deh-ba-Dehi* are identical with those given in the *Sawaneh-i-Deccan* compiled during the second half of 18th century.[17]

The *Jama-i-Kamil* figures of *Deh-ba-Dehi* are cited in the Persian Documents of Nizam-ul-Mulk's period as the opening basis of the *jamabandi* in the Deccan.

5.1a. Land Revenue and Other Taxes:

The taxes levied in the Mughal *Suba* of the Deccan under Nizam-ul-Mulk can be broadly classified into two heads *Mal* and *Wujuhat*, the latter is further divided into *jihat* and *Sair Jihat.* Whenever was imposed on cultivated land as per the schedule rate

[14] Document APSA, not catalogued.

[15] Document No.1/32/0-25 to 125, I.J.C, Delhi.

[16] Anonymous, *Deh ba Dehi,* Andhra Pradesh state Archives, Hyderabad, MSS. 373.

[17] Munim Khan, *Sawaneh-i-Deccan*, OMLRI, Hyderabad.

of assessment was termed as *mal*, the *jihat* were the taxes levied to meet the expenses of government incurred in making the assessment of *Mal*, and S*air Jihat* were the other taxes realized from the Market and transit duties.[18]

The various types of *wujuhats* levied and collected in the Deccan during the Nizam's viceroyalty were *Abi, Baghat, Bhat, Bhant, Chahurrum, Dastur, Gumashta, Itlaq, Kalali, Khurakh, Mahsuldari, Muhtarfa, Muqtadari, Muqarrari* or *Patta Muqarrari, Patti Qusur, Rahdari, Rusum Rusum-i-Sardeshmukhi, Sardeshmkhi, Sarf-i-Sihbandi, Siwai-teh-bazari, Srideh, Srisad, tabi, Tahir, Tasarruf-i-amil, tehbazari* etc.

But all these taxes were never levied simultaneously. They were exacted differently, at different places, for different purposes. There is not a single document which gives all the types of *wujuhat* exacted at the same time.

A document, of the *Mal-o-jihat* and *Sair-o-jihat*, pertaining to the *Mahals* of the *Sarkar*, pargana Uralkonda, *Sarkar* Nalgonda *Suba* Hyderabad gives receipts of the revenue from the beginning of *fasl kharif*. The collection (*tahsil*) was made by Muhammad Sharif Khan, *amin faujdar* and *shiqdar* of the *Sarkar*, for the period II *zilhijja* 1144/1735 to the end of *Rabi* II 1145F/1736 of the total amount of Rs 1096/10/3 collected from the said *Mahal* consisting of nine *Mauzas*, the land revenue *Mal* constituted 89.5%, while the remaining amount 10.5% consisted of three levies of *wujuhats, patta* (3.3%), *Muhtarfa* and *Kallali* (4.8%) and *Rahdari* (2.4%).[19]

The land revenue administration of the Deccan under the Nizam consisted mainly of two stages

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[18] Noman Ahmad Siddiqi, *Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals*, 1700-1750, Bombay 1970, p 155.

[19] Document No.47 dt. 1145F, APSA, Hyderabad.

1. *Tashkhis* (assessment of revenue)

2. *Tahsil* (actual collection of the assessed revenue).

The *Jama* or *Jamabandi* (actual assessment of land revenue) was the second stage figure in the process of land revenue collection. It was based on *Jama-i-Kamil*, an estimated income figure fixed during the reign of Aurangzeb. The *Kamil* figures became the basis of Nizam-ul-Mulk's *Jamabandi*. Lala Mansaram informs us that during Nizam-ul-Mulk's administration the *tashkhis-i-Jamabandi* was made every year, along with the receipts *(jama wasul baqi)*.[20] This system seems to be adopted by Nizam, because in his eyes the *Jama-i-Kamil* figures of Aurangzeb's time might be outdated or inflated, need fresh revenue assessment.

The earliest document mentioning the *Jamabandi*, conducted during 1726-27 to the 25 villages of Udaimari pargana, a *mahal* of *jagir* of Khwaja Lutfulla. The *Jamabandi* of the village was made *Bilmuqta* on the basis of the records and papers of the *Jagirdar*. The *Kamil* amount stated as Rs 27,880/12/3 while the figures of *Jamabandi* is Rs 7800/8. This works out to 27.97% of *Kamil* figures. This amount includes the share of *jagirdar* at Rs.5851/1/14 and the amount of *Chauth* at Rs.1950/10.[21]

In the following year 1727, the regular *Jamabandi* of the revenue accruing from *mal-wa-jihat* and *Sair-wa-jihat* was made for the same village and on the basis of the same *kamil* amount. The *Jamabandi* was fixed at Rs.14000/ i.e. 50% of the *Kamil* amount. This supplies that 50% of the value of the land revenue was left for the *Ra'aya* (cultivators), *Zamindars* and 50% was collected as the state's share. This

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[20] *Risala-i-Darbar-i-Asafiyah, Zabita* 62.

[21] Document No.33, dt.1138F, APSA, Hyderabad.

fixing of land revenue is in accordance with the Mughal rule of collecting half the land revenue by government as state and leaving half for cultivator.[22]

Documentary evidence shows that the method of revenue assessment by the revenue officials of Nizam-ul-Mulk was neither unilateral nor under compulsion. All the documents (*Tumar Jamabandi, Daul Jamabandi* and *Daul Tashkhis Amlak* etc.) pertaining to the revenue assessment bear evidence of the fact that the assessment was made, the amount of revenue the *Zamindars* agreed to pay was stated on paper, their signatures obtained in the presence of *deshmukh* and *Deshpandia* etc. and they all had to affix their seals.[23] Finally the *Qazi* used to authenticate the document with his seal with the endorsement '*ba-Iqrar-i-Zamindaram Muhar Namuda Shud*'.[24]

5.1b. Assessment for the Irrigation Tax (*Dasband*):

Though, the Mughal government itself took the construction of irrigation works, they adopted several measures to encourage construction of the irrigation works by private persons in the larger interests of agrarian development. Government paid compensation in cash to the owners of irrigation tanks where water have been utilized for the irrigation of Government lands or those of the *Zamindars* or other village. The amount so paid by the government to the private owners of irrigation works was at the rate of 10% and hence termed as *dasband*.[25]

For the payment of *Dasband* the government needed information or data regarding the area irrigated, particular of the owner whose land was irrigated etc. For

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[22] Document No.6708, APSA, Hyderabad.

[23] Document No.230 to 246, APSA, Hyderabad.

[24] Document No.42 to 52 APSA, The Seal thus read, 'with the consent of the Zamindars the seal has been affixed'.

[25] From das-meaning ten and band meaning water tank.

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the purpose the *amin* and *amil* would be entrusted with the responsibility of making investigation and assessment.

5.1c. Revenue from *Baghats*:

Though *Baghat* literally means gardens, in the Deccan it implied land or fields irrigated by water supplied from the wells and adopted to the cultivation of various useful and edible vegetables and fruits etc.[26]

A separate revenue assessment was made for the *baghats*. For this purpose demarcation of the *baghats*, called *zilabandi* was made in term of *Khata* (a plot). Thus in the *Suba* of Hyderabad, there were 147 *Khatas*, including one *Mahal* of *Jagir*, of the *baghat*.[27] The total *jama-i-kamil* of these *baghats* was fixed at Rs. 1, 17,141/6. On this *jama-i-Kamil* assessment was made and the *tashkhis* of 1139F/1729 amounted to 37,373/15 i.e. 31.9% out of these 57 *khatas*, including one *Mahal* of *jagir* , were assigned to Sadat Yar Khan *darogha* on *ta'ahud*. The *Jama-i-Kamil* of this was Rs. 21,960/ and the *tashkhis* was fixed at Rs. 11,029/3 i.e. 50%. For the 9 *Khatas* the *tashkhis* was fixed at Rs. 26,344/12 for the *Jama* of Rs. 95,181/6 i.e. 27.6%.[28] The *zila* of Lingampally had 35 *khatas* with a *Jama-i-Kamil* of Rs.53,628/8/- and *tashkhis* of Rs. 14,322/8/- for the year 1139F/1729 i.e. 26.7%.

On the basis of the documents it seems that the assessment of the *baghat* varied from 26.7% to 50%. The total annual revenue receipts from the *baghat* from the *Suba* of Hyderabad for year 1746-47 amounted to 1, 53,000/.[29]

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[26] *Agrarian system*, op.cit, p 226.

[27] Document I.J.C, No.VIII/35/649.

[28] Document No.VIII/35/649, I.J.C, Delhi.

[29] Document No.106 and 108, APSA, Hyderabad.

5.1d. Revenue from the *Peshkash* for various posts

In the Deccan *Suba*, the revenue also comes from the payment of reasonable sum of money in the name of *peshkash* for the appointments to different categories of offices. Generally, a person before seeking any appointment paid in advance a small portion of the amount of the *peshkash* with the mention of the condition that they will pay the balance in future.

A document of 1723 stated that Md. Fazil son of sheikh Sidhu submitted a petition staling that for the grant of a *Sanad* for the post of *Chaudhari* at Mandwi Jahanabad situated in the *Suba* Khandesh, he would pay an amount of Rs. 3,196/12 as peshkash *Sarkar-i-wala* and on grant on grant of the *Sanad*, he promised to pay ¼ of the amount in cash. Out of this amount he had credited Rs. 125 in the treasury with a promise to pay Rs. 750 on receipt of the *Sanad*.[30]

Peshkash at the rate of 1/6 of the pay was also exacted from the salary of certain offices. In one case the *Chaudhri* of the animals, on an amount of Rs. 77/4 Rs. 6/8 per month was exacted as 1/6 portion of the Share of *peshkash*.[31]

5.1e. Revenue from *Peshkashi* and *Mal Wajib* paying *Zamindars*

There is also another group from which the revenue was realized in the form of *peshkash* and they were referred to in the sources as *peshkashi Zamindars*. A *peshkashi Zamindars* was not subject to the detailed assessment of land revenue actually under cultivation as in the case of *Mal-Wajib* paying *Zamindars*. The villages who's *Zamindars* paid the land revenue were called *Khiraji*, while the villages where

[30] Document No.VIII/30/132-138, I.J.C., Delhi.

[31] Document No. VIII/1/2, I.J.C, Delhi.

Zamindars pail the *peshkash* were called *Ghair Amali.*[32]

The peshkash exacted from the *Nayaks* of Karnataka and *Polygars* of south India, was in nature of tribute as a token of the recognition of Mughal over lordship. These *Nayaks* and *Polygars* were termed as *Zamindars* in the Mughal documents and may be classified as *peshkashi Zamindars*. There were three categories of the *Peshkashi Zamindars* firstly, the *Zamindars* of an entire *Sarkar*, secondly the *Zamindars* of an entire *Pargana* or a large number of villages known as *Ismi Zamindars* and lastly petty *Zamindars* who were having small holdings or a few villages. All the *Peshkashi Zamindars* did not necessarily bear the title of *Raja* nor were they all Hindus.[33]

A document of 1736 (*parwana*) was issued in the name of Ali Dost Khan *Nazim* of Karnataka, for the collection of arrears of *peshkash* from Sarmaji, *Zamindar* of Tanjawar. The amount of peshkash due was Rs. 7 lakhs, out of which 2 lakhs were towards the *peshkash* of the Mughal emperor (*Sarkar*-i-*wala*) and Rs. 5 lakhs towards that of the (*Sarkar*-i-*Aali*), *Subedar* of the Deccan.[34]

The *Zamindars* who paid *peshkash* or tribute have been described in our sources as *peshkashi*[35], *Muqarrari*[36] and *ghair amali.*[37] There was a clear distinction between a *Zamindar* who paid *peshkash* and one who paid *Mal-wajib.*

According to Anand Ram Mukhlis, who was attached to the court of

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[32] *Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals* 1700-1750, op.cit, pp 25, 28-32.

[33] *Mirat-i- Ahmadi*, Supp, p 201.

[34] Document No.5, APSA, Hyderabad.

[35] *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khani,op.cit,* f 27a.

[36] *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*, op.cit, Vol II, p 768.

[37] *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, pp 190, 192, 200, 203, 307.

Muhammad Shah, the word '*Zamindar*' originally meant a person who possessed land, but in his own time it denoted a person who owned land in a village or town and carried or cultivation.[38]

The *Zamindars* who paid land revenue fixed on the basis of detailed assessment could be classified into several categories. In the first place there were *Zamindars* who were co-sharers in the *Zamindaris* referred to as *pattidari* and *bhaiyyachari* and *bissadari*.[39]

The land revenue paying *Zamindars* formed the most numerous classes among the subjects of the state who had some rights of propriety in land. Under the conditions prevailing at the time they were regarded as indispensable to the smooth working of the land revenue administration in the bulk of the imperial territory. It dealt with them in their two-fold position of subjects having rights of property in land and as intermediaries who collected land revenues assessed by the government officers and saw to it that the village was cultivated to its maximum capacity. It appears that the law fully recognized these two positions, quite independent of each other, and a village *Zamindar* did not lose his perquisites arising from his proprietary *Zamindari* rights if he chose not to engage for the assessed land revenue. It was this special position enjoyed by the *Zamindar* that raised his status above that of a mere intermediary and distinguished him from a farmer and gave an element of continuity to the institution of *Zamindari*. However, the *Zamindar* remained at the same time an intermediary as he engaged for the collection and payment of the land revenue

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[38] *Mirat-ul-Istilah*, f.122b, MF 135, CAS Department of History A.M.U, Aligarh.

[39] *Land Revenue Administration of British India.*

assessed on the cultivated land in his *Zamindari*.[40]

The most important functions of the village *Zamindar* were two, namely to ensure the cultivation of all cultivable land in his *Zamindari* and the collection of the assessed land revenue. In recognition of these services rendered to the state, the *Zamindar* was granted certain perquisites known as *Nankar* or subsistence allowance in the form of land granted to him for cultivation.[41] In fact it was a commission on the total collection and could be paid either in the form of land or in cash. Besides the *Nankar* the *Zamindar* received something for his rights of property in land when it was brought under cultivation. The proceeds of his proprietary rights were known as *Malikana*.[42] He was entitled to the *Malikana* even if he did not engage for collection and payment of land revenue. The form of payment and the percentage of proceeds differed from province to province.

The *Zamindars,* who paid land revenue on the basis of assessment of the individual holdings of the peasants, were hereditary *Zamindars*. The hereditary *Zamindar's* right could also be obtained by purchase. Besides these, there were land revenue paying *Zamindars* who were appointed by the state. This practice was necessitated by the turbulent attitude of a hereditary *Zamindar* who refused to pay the land revenue.[43] A suitable person, a loyal *Zamindar* in the payment of land revenue was appointed. The *Zamindar* appointed by the state and holding a rank seems to have been subject to *dagh* and *tashiha* regulations but in certain cases an exemption from

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40 *Land Revenue Administration*, p 31.

41 Khwaja Yasin, *Glossary of the Revenue terms*– Add 6603, f 7ab.

42 *Dastur-ul-Amal-i-Bekas,* f.52a, Yasin Khwaja, ff 51a.

43 *Dastur-ul-Amal-i-Bekas,* ff.45a, 88b, 89a, *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, op.cit., Vol.I, p 230.

these regulations was made.[44]

5.2. Methods of Land Revenue Collection:

Nizam-ul-Mulk preferred two methods of collection in the Deccan, direct and indirect. In the direct mode the government officials of revenue the *amalguzar* or the *amil* were responsible for collection, while in the second method, the *Ijaradars* were entrusted with the duty. For the purpose of collection of land revenue the *parganas/ mahals* were grouped together and were termed *ta'aluqa.* Sometimes the *ta'aluqa* consisted of only single *mahal,* and each *taluqa* was placed under the charge of *Amil.*

List of the *Amils* in charge of *Taluqa* in the *Suba* Muhammadabad dt. F. 1157/1748.[45]

S.No.	*Amil*	*Pargana*	*ta'aluqa* with number of *mahals*
1.	Anant venkat Ram	Nirmal	5 *Mahals*
2.	Husamullah Khan	Bhodan	7 *Mahals*
3.	Muhammad Husain	Madhol	2 *Mahals*
4.	Rajeshwar Rao	Andwar	2 *Mahals*
5.	Sahuk Chand	Hasanabad	3 *Mahals*
6.	Sharant Rao	Warwal	4 *Mahals*

[44] *Mirat-i-Ahmadi,* op.cit., Vol.I, pp 284, 285.

[45] Document No. 100-124, APSA.

7.	Sawarullah Khan	Feroznagar	6 *Mahals*
8.	Shaikh Ali	Bhasa	5 *Mahals*
9.	Ainullah	Chincholi	2 *Mahals Dehat*
10.	Md. Adil	Dehat of pargana Muhammadabad	1 *Mahals*
11.	Ghulam Hussain	Yalgarus	1 *Mahals*
12.	Khandar	Kankerli	2 *Mahals*
13.	Yalgar Beg	Latur	2 *Mahals*

On the basis of the table it can be inferred that the *taluqa* consisted sometime from 7 *mahals* to1 *mahal* and sometime the area under the category of *Dehat* was assigned to the *amils* for the collection of revenue. When the *deshmukhs* and *deshpandias* were entrusted with the duty of collecting revenues their territorial units were also termed as *taluqas*. In a document of the revenue receipts of *pargana* Bodchar, *Sarkar* Nalgonda, *Suba* Hyderabad, divides the *Mahals* of *Jagir* of the *Sarkar* into three *taluqa's* of the *deshmukhs* and *deshpandias*, *Taluqa* Sita Ram, *Taluqa* Rama Kishan and the *Taluqa* of Karlab Kinja.[46]

When an *Amil* was appointed, he had to give an under taking or *ta'ahud* for effective collection of the land revenue and for the deposit of the stipulated amount of the revenues. The documents assigning the duties of revenue collection, gives details

[46] Document No.40 dt. 1141 F/1732, APSA, Hyderabad.

of the amount of *Kamil* and the amount which the *amil* had accepted to collect as per the *ta'ahud.* They also furnish details of each of the *Mahals* from which the revenue was to be collected. The document appointing Ajaib Singh to the office of *amil* of *Sarkar* Machlipatam and *Sarkar* Nizampatam, states the *Kamil* amount of Rs. 7, 37,219 (for the *taluqa* of five *Mahals*). The amount of *Kamil* 4, 91,291 is from five *Mahals* of Machlipatam while 2, 46,000, *Kamil* is from one *Mahal* of Nizampada.[47]

The *amils* were not entrusted to exact the full amount of *Kamil* or the *Jamabandi*, but a lower figure was fixed as the *ta'ahud* amount for the collection, the defference of *Jamabandi* and *ta'ahud* was allowed as margin for the *amil* for his duties for e.g.

When Anwaruddin Khan was appointed for the *sarkar* Sikakul, the amount of *ta'ahud* fixed for the two years 1732-33, was Rs. 7, 70,000 from the *Kamil* 8,40,827/12, which is 91%. The *amil's ta'ahud* amount was for the next four year 1733-36 was Rs.11,90,000/ from the *Kamil* 16,12,258/1 and this works out to 73%, i.e. an amount of 27% was allowed for the *amil*.[48]

Besides the *amils*, for the collection of land revenue, special *tahsildars* or collectors were appointed for the purpose of the collection of *Chauth* payment to the Marathas as the Nizam made an agreement with the Marathas that instead of their agents collecting *Chauth*, Nizam appointed his own officers who remit the amount to the Marathas.

The entire amount collected was credited by the *amils* into the treasury after making deductions towards the *Sihbandi* and *huq-i-tahsil* etc. wherever permissible.

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[47] Document, No.71 dt. 1145 F. APSA, Hyderabad.

[48] Document No.47, APSA, Hyderabad.

A special feature of the system of collection of land revenue was that it was never exacted under compulsion, the consent and approval of the taxpaying *zamindars* with the consent of *Deshmukh, deshpandias* etc was first taken. All the documents of revenue receipts, *Jama-wasul-baqi* bear the consent of the *Zamindars* in Telugu/ Marathi/ Modi with their seals, attesting the payment of revenue and the balance to be paid. And it was attested with the seal of the *qazi* with the endorsement *ba-iqrar zamaindaran muhar namuda shud.*[49]

Another important thing to note here is that besides the *amils* appointed for the collection of revenue, in the *Khalisa Sharifa Karoris* were appointed to make collection of revenues. For example, during 1724-25 Md. Murad and Md. Siddiqui were appointed as *Karoris* at the *Khalisa Mahals* of Sikapul and Medak. They were appointed by the *sanad* of the *diwan* of the *Suba.*[50] Antaji was appointed *Karori* of *Khalisa* and *paibaqi mahals* of *pargana* Bayawal, *Sarkar* Asir, *Suba* Khandesh.[51] Allamchand was *Karori* of the *Khalisa mahals* of *pargana* Kandapur.[52] *Karoris* were also appointed for the collection of *Sair.* Anwarullah Khan was *Karori* of the *Sair* at the city of Burhanpur.[53]

Another method of Revenue collection was the *Ijara* or revenue farming. It was not on a very large scale but it was practiced either in the *Khalisa* or in the *jagir mahals* of Nizam-ul-Mulk in the case of the *Ijara* as well, the officer or person assigned has to sign the *ta'ahud* or *qabuliat* and they had accepted the responsibility

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[49] Document No. 26, 37, 88, 113-119, APSA, The Seal thus read, 'with the consent of the Zamindars the seal affixed'.

[50] Document No. VIIII/105 I.J.C, Delhi.

[51] Document No. VIII/52/982, I.J.C, Delhi.

[52] Document No.VIII/52/980, I.J.C, Delhi.

[53] Document No. VIII/30/133., I.J.C, Delhi.

as a contract (*ba tariqa-i-Ijara*).[54] Some time in the documents the term *Ijara* is mentioned.

A document dated 1739 (*Qabuliyat*), executed by Ali Quli Khan *mansabdar* of 7000/1000, accepting the revenue collection, (*mal and sair*) of the S*arkars* of Mustafanagar etc. *Mahals* of Machlipatam, for the year 1739-49, as a contract for five years *(ba Muddat-i-Panchsala ba tariqa-i-Ijara*) states that he would deposit the amount of Rs.6,64,171 from 19 *mahals* after deducting expenses towards *sihbandi* as per the previous practice of his predecessors, late Hasan Quli Khan. The fixed amount stated as 4,76,143.[55]

In the different documents the tenure for *ta'ahud* was varied, in some cases it was 5 years and in other it ranges from 4 to 1 year, depending upon the person who undertook the responsibility of collecting revenues. Thus there was no fixed for the *ta'ahud* or *Ijara*.

There is another practice, when the *Ijara* was terminated on its period expired, a letter of termination was issued to the *Ijaradar* when no amount was due from him. Md. Anwarullah *Faraqatti* be issued stating that *ta'ahud* had been terminated and no amount was due from Madan Singh was having the *ta'ahud* of *Sarkar* Sikakul for two years 1726-28.[56]

All the officials who undertook the responsibility of collecting revenue on behalf of the government had to execute *ta'ahud* promising to deposit regularly in the treasury the amount due to the government after deducting the expenditure of

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[54] Document No.3, *Daftar-i-Mal,* APSA, Hyderabad.

[55] Document No. 101 *Daftar-i-Mal,* APSA, Hyderabad.

[56] Document No. 73, *Daftar-i-Mal,* APSA, Hyderabad.

Sihbandi, if permissible. In certain cases *Sihbandi* was not allowed. The income derived in the name of *Sihbandi* was sufficient to maintain the *Sihbandi* of the *mansabdars* and they saved own expenditure towards their maintenance. For this benefit, the *mansabdars* holding executive posts rendered this additional service to the government and effected prompt collection of revenue as they very local officials and were effective within their own jurisdiction.

On the basis of the documental information we can say that during the 18th century, the *Jama-i-Kamil* or *Kamil* and *Jamabandi* were two different figures. The *Kamil* was always higher than the *Jamabandi,* the defference between these two; it appears was the share of the *Zamindars* for his livelihood. But in some cases the *ta'ahud* of the officer in charge of the collection was less than that of *Jamabandi* that shows that the former *Kamil* figures were inflated and out of the *Jamabandi* the official had to take his own share. The *Jamabandi* when realized became the established figure for collection (*Bilmuqta* or *Muqarrara hasil).*

Another thing in the case of *Jamabandi* is that they were not calculated on the basis of hypothetical assessment but on the factual assessment (*Kamil*) made earlier and became established figures. Since the *Jambandi* figures of Nizam-ul-Mulk's times were far below the *Kamil* figures of Aurangzeb's times, we may conclude that the actual revenue too decreased under the Nizam.

In the matter of collection it can be seen that the rule of 50:50 was not strictly followed and there was no uniformity in this. The rate varied from as low as 3.3% to as high as 68%. But the documents do not provide any explanation for such disparity. Generally, the rate is less than 50% but in some cases it exceeds too. The low fixing of less than 50% of the *Kamil* might have been made after considering the change

economic conditions or far a poor harvest.

It is also established that the *Jamabandi* once fixed was not fixed for life time. There are examples when the one year *Jamabandi* fell short at the time of collection, the further revisions made with the consent of *deshmukh* and *deshpandia.*

5.3. Revenues of the Six *Subas* of the Deccan:

In the *Deh-ba-Dehi,* the information of the revenues of the villages is given but in the preparation of the revenue tables, I have taken the aggregate of all villages, *parganas* or *mahals* and give it under the Sarkar. In the sources like *Sawaneh-i-Deccan* and *Khulasat-ul-Hind,* only the names and the revenue amounts of *Sarkars* and *parganas* or *Mahals* are mentioned, excluding the names of the villages and their sum of revenue.

The authors of *Sawaneh-i-Deccan* and *Haqiqat-hai-Hindustan/ Khulasat-ul-Hind* largely took use of the information available in *Deh-ba-Dehi* for their works. The archival sources also primarily supplement the revenue details of the Deccan provinces.

The table prepared has given the *Jama-i-Kamil* figures on which the Nizam made the *Jamabandi* for the land revenue collection, which was based on the figures of *Deh-ba-Dehi.* In the case of Bijapur I have prepared the table of revenues from *Sawaneh-i-Deccan.*

Table XV. Revenues of *Suba* Bijapur, (*jama/hasil*):

S.No.	*Sarkar*	*Mahals*	Amount Rs.-An-P	Sources
1.	*Sarkar* Bijapur	35	2401149-9-3	SD, f-126
2.	*Sarkar* Asadnagar	12	5350475	SD, f-133
3.	*Sarkar* Azamnagar	15	1354512-15-3	SD, f-132
4.	*Sarkar* Imtiyazgarh Adhoni	6	1785686-15	SD, f-134
5.	*Sarkar* Ahsanabad alias Gulbarga	1	715582-7-3	SD, f-129
6.	*Sarkar* Raibag	12	1141273-4-45	SD, f-139
7.	*Sarkar* Murtazabad	6	557 359 A15292356 An 1	SD, f-152
8.	Bijapur Karnatak	56	5292356-1	SD, f-145
9.	Zamindar of Karnatic	27	52561649-3	SD, f-147
10.	*Sarkar* Bankapur	16	1708002-1-1.5	SD, f-135
11.	*Sarkar* Torgal	16	1596070-14-1.5	SD, f-137
12.	*Sarkar* Ghazipur	29	930417-7-3	SD, f-140

13.	*Sarkar* Firoznagar	8	1326413-10-3	SD, f-135
14.	*Sarkar* Mudgal	13	969984-4-3	SD, f-150
15.	*Sarkar* Nusratabad Alias Sagar	5	1622096-3-4.5	SD, f-154
16.	*Sarkar* Parnalah	9	583039-4-3	SD, f-153
17.	*Sarkar* Muhammadnagar alias Ikkeri	7	937153-14-1.5	SD, f-149
18.	*Sarkar* Naldurg	8	1025363 An 1	SD, f-142
19.	*Sarkar* Mustafabad	8	16,91100 An 9	SD, f-151
20.	Ports of Mustafabad	13	1,1468000	SD, f-126
21.	*Pethas*	-	163412 An 8	*Khulasat-ul-Hind* f-369
22.	*Bazaar*	-	32232 An 12	Ibid.
23.	*Baghat*	-	11062 An 8	Ibid.
24.	*Mahalat*	-	120375 An 2	Ibid.

Table- XVI. Revenues of Aurangabad *Suba* (*jama/hasil*):

S.No.	*Sarkar*	*Mahals*	Amount	Source
1.	Sarkar Daulatabad	27	2427922	D.B.D. ff.105-106
2.	Sarkar Jalnapur	10	2314761	„
3.	Sarkar Ahmadnagar	11	3073711	„
4.	Sarkar Pattan	3	325946	„
5.	Sarkar Fatehabad	11	1647802	Ibid. ff.107-109
6.	Sarkar Parenda	19	14050863	„
7.	Sarkar Sholapur	3	275784	„
8.	Sarkar Junair	9	2330283	„
9.	Sarkar Sangamnir	11	1723900	„

Table XVII. Revenues of Muhammadabad Bidar (*Jama/Hasil*):

S.No.	Sarkar	Mahals	Amount	Source
1.	Muhammadabad Bidar	8	938498	D.B.D., ff.120-122
2.	Nanded	44	3998495	„
3.	Murtazanagar	14	912661	„

4.	Amhalkot	8	1425968	„
5.	Kalyan	2	207521	„

Table XVIII. Revenues of Khandesh (*Jama/Hasil*):

S.No.	*Sarkar*	*Mahals*	Amount	Source
1.	Sarkar Asir	46	7824019	D.B.D. ff.139-43
2.	Byagarh	35	1055002	„
3.	Baglana	27	381482	„
4.	Handia	17	467543	„

Table XXI. Revenues of Berar (*Jama/Hasil*):

S.No.	*Sarkar*	*Mahals*	Amount	Source
1.	Pathri	11	1050569	D.B.D. ff.187-89
2.	Basan	10	860570	„
3.	Baitalwadi	9	222144	„
4.	Mahur	20	878634	„
5.	Mahkar Berar Paynghat	11	1012994	„

6.	Gawail	45	2240896	„
7.	Kallam	24	851928	„
8.	Narnala	37	2306568	„
9.	Khedla	17	342781	„
10.	Ponar	4	92715	„

Table XX. Revenues of Farkhunda Bunyad Hyderabad (*jama/hasil*):

S.No.	*Sarkar*	*Mahals*	Amount	Source
1.	Muhammadnagar	12	1491221	D.B.D. ff.200-206
2.	Kolas	5	655617	„
3.	Khammamet	11	542075	„
4.	Koilkonda	13	1071498	„
5.	Ganpur	8	424829	„
6.	Devarkonda	13	899278	„
7.	Nalgonda	6	521751	„
8.	Pangal	2	433680	„

9.	Bhonger	11	773030	„
10.	Medak	12	1521086	„
11.	Malankur	3	174268	„
12.	Mustafanagar	24	1165849	„
13.	Murtazanagar	5 (1 diamond mine)	1167707	„
14.	Ellore	11	553251	„
15.	Raymundary	20	475866	„
16.	Elgandal	21	1227478	„
17.	Warrangal	15	718240	„
18.	Machlibandar	8	521280	„
19.	Nizampattam Sikapeel	4 (1 diamond mine)	1341822	„
20.	Sidhout	7	757131	„
21.	Ganjikota	15 (1 diamond mine)	1168865	„
22.	Gooty	13	896869	„

23.	Koram Konda	12	765453	„
24.	Khammam Painghat	18	1077098	„
25.	Odamkar	6	427266	„
26.	Sarvapalli	12	675637	„
27.	Kanchi	15	1015523	„
28.	Chingalpet	4	501415	„
29.	Chandragiri	10	504616	„
30.	Narsapur	11	582943	„
31.	Dandwari Mulk-i-Muftuha	3	484760	„
32.	Nusratgarh	8	719250	„
33.	Tarmamal	11	891120	„
34.	Palam Kotal	12	818665	„
35.	Walkon Dalwar	5	650200	„
36.	Vellore	8	847764	„
37.	Jagden	17	1857916	„
38.	Tanjawar	Under *zamindars*	14273546	„

39.	Trichnapalli	Under *zamindars*	18560000	„
40.	Dharur	9	924800	„

Table XXI. Showing the difference between the *Kamil* and *ta'ahud* amount[57]:

S.No.	*Sarkar/Talluqa*	*Kamil*	*Ta'ahud*	Difference
1.	*Sarkar* Sikakul	840827/15	705976/2	134851/13
2.	*Sarkar* Murtazanagar	1148610/14/9	130000	1018610/14/9
3.	*Talluqa* Bodhan	790162	788473	1689
4.	Madhol	91545/7/6	37245/7/6	54300
5.	Indur	247127/10/6	196819	50308/10/6
6.	Hasanabad	182666/6/9	113696/3	68970/3/9
7.	Bhaisa	83290/15/9	25000	58290

The difference amount obviously left for the cultivators, out of the difference 7% was paid to the *amils* for the deployment of *Sihbandi* and other maintenances. The reason for high differences may be for the deterioration in the cultivation or the changed economic conditions.

Table XXII; The *Peshkash* Received from the *Zamindars* on the Basis of *Jama*

[57] Document No.39 M.M. dt.1154-55F/1744-48.

from 1722-1738 (A.D.)[58]

S.No.	*Zamindars*	Year	*Jama*	*Peshkash* Amount
1.	Srirangapatan	1722	31,36,000	50,000
2.	Trichnapoly	1730	30,00,000	1,25,000
3.	Sonda	1736	30,00,000	2,50,000
4.	Sakkar	1734	4,42,553	50,000
5.	Kadar	1738	-	7,00,000
6.	Jinji and Madura	1738	1,85,60,000	92,80,000
7.	Tanjawar	1738	1,42,73,546	71,36,773

Table XXIII; *Jama/Hasil* of few *Parganas* of *Sarkar* Daulatabad *Suba* Aurangabad as per contemporary MSS and Documents.

S.No.	*Pargana*	*Deh ba Dehi*	*Sawaneh-i-Deccan*	Documents of *Hasil*
1.	Ellore	Rs.52,633/2/6	Rs.54,975/15/6	Rs.48667/0/0[59]
2.	Satara	Rs.15,196/12/0	Rs.15,274/0/5	Rs.10310/5/6[60]

[58] Document No. 2009, 2469, APSA, Hyderabad.

[59] Document No.1/32/0-183, I.J.C. Delhi.

[60] Document No.1/34/0-139, I.J.C, Delhi.

3.	Khammam	Rs.1,50,481/11/6	Rs.1,47,992	Rs.109899/1/6[61]
4.	Phulmari	Rs.1,89,298/12/6	Rs.1,92,861/3/0	Rs.153929/12/0[62]
5.	Antur	Rs.1,39,695/11/0	Rs.1,30,742/14/9	Rs.112351/9/6[63]
6.	Jatgaon	Rs.9132/5/0	Rs.9,166/6/9	Rs.7493/6/3[64]

Table XXIV; Difference in the Revenues of 1700 and 1720[65]:

S.No.	Suba	Revenue in 1700	Revenue in 1720	Increase(I)/ decrease(D)
1.	Khandesh	10,500,000	1,15,00,750	10,00,750 I
2.	Berar	2,31,63,625	2,25,60,000	6,03,625 D
3.	Aurangabad	2,95,93,375	2,95,00,002	93,373 D
4.	Bijapur	5,63,68,178	3,36,84,771	22,683,407 D
5.	Hyderabad	2,50,70,875	2,73,20,875	22,50,000 D
6.	Bidar	2,05,13,750	1,55,13,750	50,00,000 D

[61] Document No.1/33/0-37, I.J.C, Delhi.

[62] Document No.1/33/0-40, I.J.C, Delhi.

[63] Document No.1/34/0-140, I.J.C, Delhi.

[64] Document No.1/34/0-145, I.J.C, Delhi.

[65] Revenue Figures given in J. Sarkar *India of Aurangzeb*, p.XXVII based on *Dastur-ul-Amal and Chahar Gulshan.*

From the above table it can be inferred that in all the sources (whether it is *Sawaneh-i-Deccan, Deh ba Dehi or Chahar Gulshan*), there is a difference in the revenues of the closing years of Aurangzeb's reign and that of the beginning of Muhammad Shah's reign, which confirmed the fact that Nizam-ul-Mulk had made the revenues of Aurangzeb's time as the basis for *Jamabandi* of the six *Subas* of Deccan during his Subedari 1724-1748. It seems that the difference between the amounts of two periods is a result of Nizam-ul-Mulk's calculations that the *Jama* of Aurangzeb's period was highly inflated without commenting on the reasons behind it.

5.4. Distribution of Resources

5.4a. Assignment of Mansab and Jagir;

Under Nizam-ul-Mulk, it seems that the mansab system have undergone certain changes in the Deccan. It was not a deliberate attempt but modeled to suit local exigencies and the need of the times. However the basic structure and the principles of the Mughal Mansabdari system remained the same.

Generally the Mughal Emperor was the sole authority for appointing or dismissing a mansabdar, he could alone sanction the increase or decrease in his rank. However in the Deccan this prerogative was exercised by Nizam-ul-Mulk, first in 1720 and continuously after 1724. The mansabs were granted at his will and pleasure and there was no rigid rule for fixing the initial mansab of any person. The highest mansab granted was not more than 7000/7000 as the Nizam himself held the Mansab of 9000/9000. There was no rigid rule in granting enhancement in the mansab, one's mansab could be raised without any rule.

There are various documents showing the increment in the mansab of the nobles. There are certain cases like one Shahji Sul who held the mansab of 1500/500

was elevated to the mansab of 3000/2500.[66] In another case Rahim Khan who was having the mansab of 1000/200 got the increment of 500/100 in his rank and reached to 1500/300 in the 4th *Julus* of the Emperor Muhammad Shah.[67] Dargah Quli Khan's mansab was almost doubled from 700/500 to 1500/800.[68] Mir Faizullah's *Zat* rank was 25% increased while an assignment of fresh 140 *Sawars* was made to fulfil the requirement of the post of *Qiladari* and *Faujdari* of Antur.[69]

The system had been designed primarily to settle the precedence and fix the gradation of pay, and it implied that the officer was bound to perform any functions whenever assigned to him. Thus the higher strata of officials of the entire administrative machinery both civil and military held the rank and were paid salary either in cash or through jagir assignment.

The administrative appointment of mansabdars or increase in their ranks or assignment of posts which were made by the Subedar was issued by the Diwan of the Deccan provinces under their seal. These documents or orders were called *Parwanas* or *Inayatnamas* with the written words on the seal '*ba mujib dastakhat Umadat-ul-Mulk Sipahsalar sanad be dehant.*'[70]

Under the Mughals neither the mansab nor the jagir were hereditary. But Nizam-ul-Mulk shows some consideration for the sons or relatives of mansabdars by granting them suitable mansabs. There was hardly any document showing the demotion in the mansab in Deccan under the *Subedari* of Nizam-ul-Mulk.

After receiving the mansab, the *Mansabdar* was to be assigned a *Jagir* equal to his pay according to his rank. The *Tankhwah jagir* were of two natures, the first is

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[66] Document No VIII/19/604, I.J.C, Delhi.
[67] Document No VIII/47/92, I.J.C, Delhi.
[68] Document No VIII/10/742, I.J.C, Delhi.
[69] Document No VIII/47/868, 883, I.J.C, Delhi.
[70] Document No VIII/21/1203, 10th Julus, I.J.C, Delhi.

Darobast (whole) and the other *Shirkat* (jointly). In the case of *Shirkat jagir* there were three conditions

1. The *jagir* joint with the *jagir* of the *Subedar* or *Sarkar*.
2. Shared with the other *jagirdar*
3. And lastly with the group of *mansabdars* under the *jagirdar* himself

Suitable to the pay of the *mansabdar*, *jagir* whose revenue matched the pay was assigned. If the revenue of a single *pargana* was equal to the pay of the *jagirdar*, the entire *pargana* was assigned in *Darobast*. Sometime the number of *parganas* was more than one suitable to the *Tankhwah* of the *jagirdar*. For example, in 1725-26, three *parganas* Pangaon, Ghat Nandwar and Khilwahar, in *Sarkar* Fatehabad, *Suba* Aurangabad were assigned in *Darobast* as *Tankhwah jagir* to Shahji Sul whose rank was 3000/2500. The revenue of Rs 30, 323/13/- yielding from the above mentioned three *parganas* was as follows Rs 15, 392/6/-, Rs 9, 424/8/6 and Rs 5,556/14/- respectively.[71]

In the *Shirkat jagir* the amount of the revenue was shared according to the share or fixed rights of the individual *jagirdar*. Out of the 7 *jagir mauzas* in the *pargana* Wazirabad, *Sarkar* Devarkonda, *Suba* Hyderabad, the four *mauzas* were *Darobast jagirs* and three were in *Shirkat*, meaning to say that the revenue of the four *mauzas* was equal to the pay of some mansabdar while the three were given to one whose jagir was not equal to his pay and the balance was equated by these three *mauzas* given in *Shirkat*.[72]

In another case the jagir of Hayat Ali Khan was in the *Shirkat* in the *pargana* Marepalli, Sarkar Devarkonda, *Suba* Hyderabad with that of the *Sarkar* or Subedar.

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[71] Document No VIII/19/609, 610, APSA, Hyderabad.
[72] Document No 105, APSA, Hyderabad.

The *Kamil* amount of the said *pargana* was Rs 3, 703, out of this amount Rs 1614/9/6 was Hayat Ali's share while 2, 088/7/- was the *Sarkar's* share.[73]

Thus the *jamabandi* acceptable to the jagirdar was made within the *jagirs* by revenue officials of the Mughal government. The revenue assessment was not left to the discretion of the *jagirdar* to whom it had been assigned. The consent of the *Zamindars*, *Deshmukhs* and *Deshpandias* etc of the *jagir* territory was taken for the assessment and after their consent to pay the revenue their signatures with or without seal were taken on the documents and they all re affirm their consent for the assessment in the presence of *Qazi* who would then affix his seal on the assessment papers. The mode of assessment was so systematic that it did not give any chance to the *jagirdar* to make any excessive payment over and above the fixed one by the government. On the other hand it also restricted the evasion of the payment of revenue by the *Zamindars* as it was fixed with the mutual approval and acceptance of them.

The pay of the *jagirdar* was subject to certain deductions levied to discharge the accountancy expenditure of the *jagirs*. These deductions were 1/4, 1/5 or 1/6 of the total pay differing in different cases. Any one of these three deductions was to be made from different *mansabdars*. The document states '*minha shashum hissa baraye mahasibi jagirdari*'[74] In other document it is simply '*minha shashum hissa*'[75].

For the purpose of assessment the individual village was considered as the fiscal unit. In the case of *Darobast jagir* the share of the jagirdar was deducted and the *Chauth* was calculated on the *jamabandi*, while in the case of *Shirkat jagir*, the share of the *Sarkar* was deducted and *Chauth* was made on the *jamabandi*.

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[73] Document No 83 APSA, Hyderabad.
[74] Document No VIII/34/42, I.J.C, Delhi.
[75] Document No VIII/10/502, I.J.C, Delhi.

As we have seen that in the administration of Deccan, the forts occupied an important place with the separate administrative set up for their maintenance. In order to make it work properly and smoothly a system of reserving *jagir* for the officers in charge of forts was adopted in the Deccan, which secure the regular flow of finances for the proper maintenance of the *Ahshams* and the *Sihbandi* troopers posted in different forts. *Jagirs* were assigned and their revenue was used for the purpose.

The procedure for the grant of *Jagir-i-Ahsham* was almost same as the grant of jagir to a person. There were *Wakils* of the *Ahshams* like the *mansabdars* had. These *Wakils* appeal for the grant of *jagir* or for the transfer of jagir of the *Ahsham* of the fort.

When the jagir for the Tankhwah of any *Ahsham* of the fort was assigned, a Parwana was issued in the name of *deshmukh, deshpandia, muqaddam, ra'aya* and *muzaryan* in order to acknowledge the person on whose name the jagir was issued. In the 15th *Julus* of the Emperor Muhammad Shah, a *Parwana* was issued for *Pargana* Ahirbandi, *Sarkar* Sholapur, *Suba* Aurangabad communicating that the said *Pargana* has been assigned as *Tankhwah jagir* of the *Ahsham* of the fort of Kalyan.[76] A document of Andhra Pradesh Archives contains the information that in the *Pargana* Parbatpur, *Sarkar* Kalyan, *Suba* Muhammadabad out of the annual receipts of 4913/12/-, 3000/8/- was reserved for the *Ahshams* of the fort of Kalyan. Sometimes the *jagir* of the *Ahsham* was confiscated and resumed in the *Sarkar mahals*.[77]

5.4b. *Khalisa Sharifa;*

Lands whose income or revenues were reserved for the expenditure of the government were called *Khalisa Sharifa.* In the Deccan province large number of the

[76] Document No VIII/39/989, I.J.C, Delhi.
[77] Document No 33, APSA, Hyderabad.

Mahals was in the *Khalisa.* In the Sarkar of Rajmundry, out of 24 *Mahals* there were 19 *Mahals* in the *Khalisa* with the revenue of Rs 5, 34, 244/2/6.[78] The different categories of administrative officers of the Mughal Government were also appointed in the *Khalisa* lands to look after the collection and the cultivation.

The lands which were reserved for the fresh assignments formed a different category known as the *Paibaqi*. When the lands were confiscated after the death of the jagirdar or for some other purposes, the land was taken or resumed into *Khalisa Sharifa.* The *Khalisa* lands existed to a large extent in the Deccan especially in the *Suba* Hyderabad. In the *Suba* Hyderabad the revenue of the *Khalisa* lands was amounted to Rs 67, 51, 081/1/3 out of the total receipts of 1, 62, 79, 000/14/-.[79]

5.4c. *Madad-i-Ma'ash;*

When the revenue assignment of lands were made not against the mansab or rank nor with any service obligation, they were termed as *Inam jagirs* and they were rent free being exempted from payment of all kind of cesses. There are various documents available regarding the assignment of such *jagirs* in the Deccan under Nizam-ul-Mulk.

There is a document of 15th Julus of Muhammad Shah, an order issued by the Nizam to the *deshmukh*, *deshpandia*, *muqaddam*, *ra'aya* and *Muzarian* of the *Pargana* Mosarwak, *Sarkar* Ganji, Karnatak, *Suba* Hyderabad, mentioning that an amount of 1, 20, 000 *dams* (3000 Rs), accruing from the said *Pargana* had been granted in *Inam* to Khadija Khatoon, mother of Bahadur Khan deceased. [80]

In another order issued after the death of Turktaz Khan in the 16th Julus of the Emperor, the *jagir* of the deceased was given in *Inam Altamgha* as *Tankhwah* to his

[78] Document No 14, APSA, Hyderabad.
[79] Document No VIII/35/577, I.J.C, Delhi.
[80] Document No VIII/32/246, 247, I.J.C, Delhi.

wife. The *jagir's* value was Rs 6, 570 and was situated in the *Pargana* Khedla, *Sarkar* Daulatabad, *Suba* Aurangabad.[81]

Nizam-ul-Mulk had great regards and favour towards Saints and extended his patronage to the centers of worship and learning. The subsistence allowance granted was in two forms, *Wazifa* and *Milk* or *Madad-i-Ma'ash*. The *Wazifa* was in cash while the *Madad-i-Ma'ash* was through the assignment of land and its rent free revenue; both of them together were called as *Suyurghal*.

There are numerous documents in the Inayat Jung collection which furnished the information of the Grants of *madad-i-ma'sh* to the needy. In a Document related to the 6th Julus of Emperor Muhammad Shah the former maintenance allowance sanctioned during the reign of Alamgir for the maintenance of the mosque and tomb of Saiyyad Sadiq Hussaini, was renewed to Shariat Ali Khan son of the *Sadr-us-Sudur* Sayyad Ahmad Khan, and accordingly the *jagir* was allotted in the village of Sambhar, *Sarkar* Sangamner, *Suba* Aurangabad. The Tasdiqnama for the grant was also given and the names of Sher Muhammad Khan, Saiyyad Salauddin, Sadar Ali, Saiyyad Imamuddin and Saiyyad Allah Baksh with their signatures appeared in the Document.[82]

There is another document of the 6th julus of Muhammad Shah in which the daily allowance was sanctioned to Sultan-al-Nisa and the other ladies from the mahsul of *Pargana* Kandapur, *Sarkar* Daulatabad, *Suba* Aurangabad.[83] In the 5th julus orders were given to the mutassaddis of *Pargana* Kandapur, *Sarkar* Daulatabad, *Suba* Aurangabad for the payment of 2 Annas as the daily maintenance allowance to

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[81] Document No VIII/32/248, I.J.C, Delhi.
[82] Document No VIII/1/147, I.J.C, Delhi.
[83] Document No VIII/1/158, I.J.C, Delhi.

Muhammad Shahbaz with effect to his *Arzi* for the same.[84] In another Document of the same year an allowance of 4 Annas was sanctioned to Hafiz Hasan, the *Imam* of the mosque of *Pargana* Kandapur, *Sarkar* Daulatabad, *Suba* Aurangabad.[85]

In the 5th Julus on the *Arzi* of Fatima Bibi, the daily maintenance allowance of 4 Annas from the *Pargana* Kandapur, *Sarkar* Daulatabad, *Suba* Khujista Bunyad Aurangabad was released.[86] On the Arzi of Taj Bibi, daughter of Late Qazi Masud Khan, the orders were issued to the *mutasaddis* of Mandvi Sabsi for the release of her *Madad-i-ma'ash* from the said *Mahal.*[87]

The fact that Nizam had taken care of the families of the deceased can be inferred from the Document of the 26th Muharram, 4th Julus of Muhammad Shah, in which the amount of Rs.7853/ was paid to the relatives of the assassinated Hussain Ali Khan as their maintenance allowance.[88]

On certain occasions due to various reasons the Sarkars or Mahals assigned for the maintenance allowance or in Madad-i-Ma'ash were transferred from one place to another. There is such a Document related to the 11th julus of the Emperor Muhammad Shah that maintenance allowance of one rupee of Noor Muhammad Makki would be realized now instead of *Pargana* Nalgonda, *Sarkar* Karnatic, *Suba* Bijapur, it will be drawn from *Pargana* Imtiazgarh, Bijapur.[89]

Thus subsistence allowance was given to the men of wisdom, religious devotees, destitute and the weak, and to the widows and children of the deceased who had served the state loyally.

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[84] Document No VIII/1/78, I.J.C, Delhi.
[85] Document No VIII/1/75, I.J.C. Delhi.
[86] Document No VIII/1/80, I.J.C, Delhi.
[87] Document No VIII/1/195, I.J.C, Delhi.
[88] Document No VIII/1/85, I.J.C, Delhi.
[89] Document No VIII/1/199, I.J.C, Delhi.

5.4d. Cash paid officials (non mansabdars);

Staff of the lower rank like the *tahsildar, tahwildar, mushrif, futahdar, karkun, muahir* etc was belonged to the non-mansabdar category of officials who were not assigned jagirs against their pay but were given monthly cash salary for the services done by them. The salary for each office was fixed and they were paid accordingly. The *tahwildars* were paid Rs 15 to Rs 30 per month, irrespective of the *Mahals* under his charge. Gulab Ram tahwildar of three *Mahals* of the buildings of the fort of Shaharpara, Burhanpurwas paid Rs 15 per month while Brijlal *tahwildar* of one *Mahal* of *Bagh-i-Alam Ara* was paid Rs 12 per month. The *mushrifs* were paid Rs 10 per month.[90] Khushal Ram *mushrif* at Machlipatam, in charge of 8 *Mahals* was paid Rs 10 per month, while Abdul Qadr and Mirza Ali, *mushrifs* of Shahganj, having 6 and 3 *Mahals* under their charge were also paid Rs 10 per month.[91] Another Dakhini Ram of *Kotah-i-Tambaku* was paid Rs 30 per month for three *Mahals* under him.[92]

The *futahdar* was paid Rs 25 per month including salary for his assistant.[93] Kishan Chand *karkun* of three *Mahals* of Muzaffarnagar etc, *Suba* Muhammadabad was paid Rs 20 per month including his assistant's salary.[94] The *khazinadar* was paid Rs 7,[95] while a *farrash* and *daftarband* were paid Rs 5 per month.[96]

Besides the payment of resources to all the servants of the State a huge amount was going to the Marathas in the form of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* and to make arrangements for the security of *Suba* against the Maratha menace, which I have discussed in detail in the Chapter 6.

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[90] Document No VIII/240/307, VIII/5/396, I.J.C, Delhi
[91] Document No VIII/3/33, 35, I.J.C, Delhi.
[92] Document No VIII/3/3, I.J.C, Delhi.
[93] Document No VIII/3/33, I.J.C, Delhi.
[94] Document No 14, APSA, Hyderabad.
[95] Document No VIII/106, APSA, Hyderabad.
[96] Document No VIII/1/9, I.J.C, Delhi.


THE MUGHAL EMPIRE
IN
1748
Empire Boundary
Suba Boundary
Chauth and Sardeshmukhi Levied by Marathas
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UZBEK KHANATE'S
KALMYK KHANATE
THE DURRANIS
TIBET
ASSAM
Nepal
HURUNG
KASHMIR
MULTAN
DELHI
AGRA
AJMER
AWADH
NIZAMAT
BIHAR
BENGAL
MARATHA DOMINIONS
MALWA
GUJARAT
KHANDESH
BERAR
AURANGABAD
KARNATAK
MYSORE
ARABIAN SEA
BAY OF BENGAL
CEYLON
Laccadive Islands (To Malabar)
Indus R.
Kabul R.
Helmand R.
Jhelum R.
Chenab R.
Ravi R.
Sutlej R.
Ganges R.
Brahmaputra R.
Narbada R.
Tapti R.
Mahanadi R.
Godavari R.
Krishna R.
Tungabhadra R.
Kaveri R.
Kandahar
Srinagar
Kashmir
Sialkot
Lahore
Dipalpur
Sirhind
Multan
Delhi
Agra
Lucknow
Awadh
Jaunpur
Allahabad
Banaras
Patna
Akbarnagar (Rajmahal)
Dacca
Ghorgaon
Jodhpur
Ajmer
Bayana
Gwalior
Datia
Jhansi
Narwar
Bundi
Kota
Chitor
Orchha
Mandesar
Sarangpur
Shahjahanpur
Ujjain
Bhopal
Dhara Nalchha
Ahmadabad
Petlad
Baroda
Cambay
Mandu
Dabhoi
Surat
Broach
Daman
Burhanpur
Ellichpur
Deogarh
Nagpur
Cuttack
Aurangabad
Ahmadnagar
Nander
Jalna
Parenda
Bidar
Golkonda
Hyderabad
Satara
Panhala
Bijapur
Masulipatam
Goa
Bednur
Coorg
Calicut
Tanjavur
Madura
Colombo
Kandy

Chapter – 6

Maratha Inroads into the Mughal Territory of Deccan

6.1. Rise of the Marathas:

Maharashtra is a part of the geological division of India called the Deccan. It is the homeland of Marathas or Marathi speaking people. The topographical features of this land played a significant part in shaping the character of its people and shaping the history of this land.[1]

The dominating feature of the Deccan land is the western ghat or Sahayadri range, forming a towering wall along with the entire western edge of the peninsula between the ghats and the Indian Ocean lies a long narrow strip of land of varying breadth, called konkan (between Bombay and Goa) and Kanara (south of Goa). It is an area of certain and heavy rainfall from 100 to 120 inches in the year – with rice the predominant crop, and dense mango grover plantain orchards and coconut – palms adding to the beauty of the landscape and the wealth of the inhabitants. Here the districts of Thana, Kolaba and Ratnagiri (with the state of Savant vadi) – a total area of over 10,000 miles are now predominantly Marathi speaking. After crossing the Ghats eastwards we have a belt of land, some 20 miles in breadth, called Dang or Maval in the North and Mallad in the south (i.e. Kanara).[2]

It is extremely rugged, a series of table lands cut on every side by deep unending valleys. From the valleys hills of various heights and forms arise, terrace

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1 H.K. Sherwani, *History of Medieval Deccan*, Vol.I, Andhra Pradesh, 1973, p 549.

2 *History of Aurangzeb*, op.cit, Vol.IV, p 14.

above terrace, with steep sides often strewn with black basalt boulders – here and there are patches of ancient evergreen forests.[3]

This land, almost locked among the hills and open only in the east, is the Cradle of the Maratha kingdom. Originally Maharashtra was farmed by the Nasik, Puna and Satara districts, parts of Ahmadnagar and Sholapur, and the western corner of Aurangabad – a rough total of 28,000 square meters. East of the Ghats the rainfall decreases rapidly and is uncertain and insufficient for agriculture, while the soil ranges of bare rocky hills, which neither store water for cultivation, nor attract the rainfall. "The Deccan, generally speaking yields to much labor a bare subsistence".[4]

In the 7th century, the Chinese pilgrim Yuan Chwang noted the Marathas for being "proved spirited and warlike, grateful for favours and revengeful for wrongs".

It is difficult to say whether the term "Maratha" in the 17th century denoted the Maratha community, or the people of Maharashtra. Parmanand, the author of 'Shivbharat', makes a distinction between the Brahmans and Maratha of this region.[5] Sabhasad, a contemporary chronicler of Shivaji also distinguishes between the two when he refers to three Brahmans and three Marathas who would protect the state during the periods of crisis.[6] Under the Peshwas the term Maratha assumed a wider connotation, embracing all Marathi speaking people.

The rocky highlands which Khafi Khan describes as 'a specimen of hell', is the true Maratha country. The land there is dry as bone, with the *ghats* cutting off the

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3 *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol.XVIII, pt. I, pp.2 & 13.

4 *History of Aurangzeb*, op.cit., Vol.IV, p 15.

5 *Medieval Deccan*, op.cit, p 551.

6 Sabhasad, *Life of Shivaji*, ed. S.N. Joshi, Poona, 1960, p 109.

nurturing south-west monsoon. There were no highways in the Maratha country only foot paths, in the mountains the paths were so precipitous that even a led horse could keep its footing only with difficulty'.[7] In a military point of view, there is probably no stronger country in the word writes Grand Duff, the mid nineteenth century historian of the Marathas.[8] Jahangir in his memoirs noted that 'the Marathas are a very hardy race of people, who are great movers of opposition and strife.

The Marathas, a small body, no doubt, but they deadened the entire mass of the Deccani population. They dominated Deccan History for the century and a half that followed the accession of Aurangzeb and North Indian History for the last fifty year of the 18th century. The Marathas had been there from time out of mind, but since the 13th century they had lived dispersed through many states; as the subjects of aliens in the land of their birth without any political organization or states of their own. A genius was needed to unite these scattered units into a nation and drive them like a solid wedge into the Mughal Empire, shivering it to bits. The genius was Shivaji, the contemporary and antagonist of Aurangzeb.[9]

By the end of 17th century the Mughal Empire in India had come to embrace politically the whole sub-continent. As a result of Aurangzeb's campaign in the Deccan, the Mughal territory now stretched to the south as far as Trichnapally. But the war with the Marathas showed no sign of ending when Shivaji's younger son Rajaram left the fort of Jinji in Tamilnad in 1698 A.D. and returned to Maharashtra, Maratha influence in Tamilnad was virtually eliminated. But while Aurangzeb took

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7 *Muntakhab*, op.cit., Vol.II, p 636.

8 Grand Duff, *History of the Marathas,* London, 1912, Vol.I, p 187.

9 *History of Aurangzeb*, op.cit., Vol.IV, p 5.

the fatal decision of attacking the Maratha forts in person in 1699, the Marathas spread all over the Provinces of the Deccan from Narmada to Mysore and practically brought all Mughal administration to a stand still.[10]

In the latter half of the 17th century the rise of the Maratha ruler Shivaji was an episode of far reaching consequences. Shivaji began to acquire independent power in the western Maharashtra, on the borderland between the Mughal and Bijapur territories. His sack of Surat in 1664 was followed by an enforced accommodation with the Mughals that proved abortive and in 1674 Shivaji crowned himself at Raigarh. By the time he died (1680) he had carved for himself a kingdom comprising a long belt along the western coast, including konkan, the ghats and Kanara, and a detached portion in Tamil Nadu. He owed much of his success to his use of Maratha peasant soldiers (*bargis*).[11]

He established the system of *Chauth* or exacting a quarter of the revenue of any territory from the existing authorities as price of security from his attacks. Within his own kingdom (*Swarajya*), he attempted to build regular administration modeled after that of the Deccan Sultanates, but taxation within it was by no means light.[12]

Shivaji's death saw a momentary eclipse of the polity he had founded, as his son Shambhuji was captured and executed by Aurangzeb (1689). His other son, Raja Ram (1700) became a fugitive when the Mughals overran the Maratha possessions in Tamilnadu in the 1690's, yet there was revival of Maratha power under the regency of

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[10] *Eighteenth Century Deccan*, p vii.

[11] Irfan Habib, *Medieval India: The Study of Civilization*, Delhi, 2008, p 120.

[12] A.R. Kulkarni, *Maharashtra in the Age of Shivaji* 2nd ed., Pune 2002, pp.102-104. See Jadunath Sarkar, *Shivaji and his times*, 5th ed., Calcutta, 1952, for a complete biography of the Maratha ruler.

Raja Ram's widow Tarabai, and large areas passed under the control of different bands of troops led by Maratha Sardars (chiefs), who enlarge their resources by a rigorous collection of *Chauth* failing which they subjected the recalcitrant territory to plunder (*mulkgiri*) by the time Aurangzeb died (1707), after having been in the Deccan continuously since 1681, much of his work lay in ruins as Maratha armies broke through the troops of Mughals again and again.[13]

After nearly forty years of campaigning in the Deccan, Aurangzeb died (1707) at Auangabad, leaving Marathas and Maharashtra unconquered. The Mughal viceroy of the Deccan at the time of Aurangzeb's death for example, favored bringing the major Maratha leaders into the Mughal military system. Nimaji Shinde, who had been raiding Malwa and Khandesh, was brought in at the 7000 level along with his sons and grandsons. This was a very large maintenance grant and Mughal documents suggest that over 1000 Mughal grantees were displaced to make up Shinde's estates in the Aurangabad area.[14]

In the northern half of Maharashtra, Maratha bands regularly raided the Ahmadnagar area and plundered the suburbs of Burhanpur. In 1710 a band of defeated the Mughal governor of Aurangabad and plundered part of the city. In 1711, they killed the Mughal governor of Burhanpur. In the same year Maratha bands attacked Karnul, Sholapur and many other places in the Karnatak. By 1716 it was clear that Mughal troops in Maharashtra were not wining against the unifying Maratha bands.[15]

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[13] *Medieval India*, op.cit., p 120.

[14] Steward Gordon, *The Marathas 1600-1818*, Cambridge 1998, pp 103-104.

[15] Ibid, pp 105, 110.

Thus we can see that Shivaji who worked for the establishment of Maratha power was carried on by his successors in the preceding years.

1. Shivaji (1630-1680)
2. Sambhaji (1680-1689)
3. Rajaram's Regency (1689-1700)
4. Tara Bai's Regency (1700-1707)
5. Shahu (1708-1749)[16]

In the year 1707-8, Shahu with Bambaji etc. looted the outskirts of Aurangabad (on his way back to Maharashtra after escaping from Mughal captivity). Mansur Khan (deputy of Ghaziuddin Khan), Diyanat Khan (Diwan), Ali Quli Khan, Man Singh etc. came out of the city and fought the Marathas. People on both sides were killed and wounded. At length, the Marathas went away.[17]

Bahadur Shah was keen to befriend Shahu, and he had been restored to his mansab of 700/7000. An imperial *farman* along with 5 elephants and 50 horeses as present was sent to him at the same time. It was also stated that imperial servants had gone to help Shahu in his battle against Tara Bai.[18]

During the year 1711-12, the Marathas were particularly active in the Karnatak and the Hyderabad *Suba*. Towards the end of 1711, it was reported that the Marathas had besieged Qamar nagar, Sholapur, Berinagar etc., and that following the

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16 *History of Medieval Deccan*, Vol.I, pp 559-593.

17 *Dilkusha*, op.cit., f. 171b, *Muntakhab*, op.cit., Vol.II, pp 683-4.

18 Satish Chandra, '*Maratha Activities in the Deccan, 1700-1712*, Medieval India Quaterly, Vol.IV, 1961, p 36-37.

death of the Nazim, Yusuf Khan, the *Zamindars* had become very bold and had established their own *thanas* everywhere. The Emperor appointed Daud Khan to the governorship of Hyderabad. But it seems that the Mughals never succeeded from this time onwards in re-establishing their hold on the southern part of the Hyderabad *Suba* (Hyderabad Karnatak).[19]

It appears that Maratha activities in the Deccan began to be revived on an organized scale in 1710 after the return of Bahadur Shah from the Deccan, and that the *Subas* of Khandesh, Aurangabad, Berar and Bijapur were the main centers of their operations at first. Gradually they were extended to Bidar and the Hyderabad Karnatak also. The Marathas succeeded in establishing their *thanas* in many of these areas and appointed their agents for the collection of *Chauth* from the peasants and *rahdari* from the *caravans*.[20]

Thus after the death of Aurangzeb, when Chattrapati Shahu's release became apparent, his paternal aunt, Tarabai, who was at the helm of the struggling Maratha forces, fearing that his release might not only curtail the expanse of her kingdom, but even extinguish her rule altogether, applied to the Mughal Emperor for pardon and submission. But finding that Shahu had a stronger claim on Shivaji's *Swarajya* and that in Shahu's release there were better chances of stopping the decline of the Mughal Empire, her request was rejected by the Emperor.[21]

6.2. Historian's View about the Rise of the Marathas:

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[19] 'Maratha Activities in the Deccan 1700-1712', op.cit, p 42.

[20] *Muntakhab*, op.cit., Vol.II, p 778.

[21] Rajwade, Vol.VIII, No 56.

Grand Duff, the first comprehensive historian of the Marathas, attributed the rise of Maratha power solely to fortuitous circumstances, and compared it with the conflagration like those that occurred in the forests of Sahyadri Mountain.[22]

V.A. smith, the writer of *'The Oxford History of India'* (published in 1918), and an official historian of the British was the propounder of the 'Robber State' in his book. Indian historians also considered it as an 'authoritative peace' of work. His observation was 'the Maratha state at any stage whether during Shivaji's life time or in its later development under the Peshwas and the chiefs who replaced them as leaders never served any good purpose or conferred any benefit upon India. The Maratha independent rule in all its varieties until 1818 was the rule of professed robbers. About Shivaji he writes "A robber chief who inflicted untold misery on hundred and thousands of innocent people, Hindus and Mohammadans alike, merely for the sake of gain using without scruple all kinds of cruelty and treachery to attain his wicked ends".[23]

Irfan Habib in his well known book *'Agrarian system of Mughal India'* is more concerned about the image of Shivaji as leader of the peasants. With the help of Persian and English sources available to him he observes that Shivaji, the son of a great Nizamshahi noble and who began his career as a chieftain in konkan cannot be considered as leader of the peasantry. He argues 'there will be no greater mistake than to consider Shivaji and the Maratha chiefs as conscious leaders of a peasant uprising. In a way he supports the view that the state created by Shivaji was essentially a feudal state as 'the fiscal and political practices of the Marathas bore the deeper imprint of

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[22] J.G. Duff, *History of the Marathas*, OUP, London, 1921. Vol.I, p 220

[23] Smith, V.A., *Oxford History of India*, OUP, 1920, p 436.

their *Zamindari* origins.[24]

On the basis of the travelogue of John Fryer who visited the Maratha country during Shivaji's period, Irfan Habib observes that the peasants in the Maratha state were not free from oppression and that Shivaji demanded the revenue at double rates of former days. A Persian source '*Ahkam-i-Alamgiri*' which he has consulted regarded the Marathas as '*Ashqiya*' (robbers) by which name they were officially recognized.[25]

The latest work on this theme by a Dutch scholar Andre Wink entitled '*Land and Sovereignty in India*'. In this book Wink has analyzed the nature of Maratha sovereignty on the basis of a passage from the contemporary work '*Ajnapatra*' and concluded that for the Marathas sovereignty was a shared quality between the king and the *Watandars* who have been considered, *dayadas* (co-sharers) by the author of the '*Ajnapatra*'. The *Swarajya* therefore according to him is nothing but a 'replica of *Watan*'.[26]

Following the *Ajnapatra*, Wink maintains that as the *Watandars* were ambitious and never satisfied with the *Watan* they possessed did not have the intention to remain loyal to the lord of all land, the Raja. They were always interested in strengthening their power by acquiring more territory under their jurisdiction by encroaching upon others and creating 'sedition'. In short Wink's contention is that Shivaji's state, even after his coronation was not a sovereign state, but a feudal state having many co-sharers (*dayada*) called *Watandars* who were not always loyal to

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[24] Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India*, Bombay, 1963, p 347.

[25] Ibid., p 349-50.

[26] Andre Wink, *Land and Sovereignty in India*, Cambridge, 1986, p 186-90.

their feudal lord and either rebelled against him or their other brothers i.e. fellow *Watandars*.[27]

6.3. Nizam-ul-Mulk and the Growing Maratha Problem:

The first half of the 18th century saw the rapid emergence of Maratha power. This took place not under the direct authority of rulers of Shivaji's line but their principal ministers, the *Peshwas* whose office became hereditary.

1. Balaji Vishvanath (1714-1720)
2. Baji Rao I (1720-1740)
3. Balaji Baji Rao (1740-1761)
4. Madhava Rao (1761-1772)

They imposed their writ over the Sardars, made over conquered territories to their own nominees and relentlessly extended the circle of areas on which *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* were imposed.[28]

The arrival of Nizam-ul-Mulk as the governor of the Deccan was a significant event in the History of the Deccan. Brought up in the traditions of Aurangzeb, Nizam-ul-Mulk stands out prominently as a general, statesman and an administrator of the later Mughal Empire.[29]

The following extract from Orme shows how the Marathas built up their claim to the taxes they imposed. The matter is of importance since a great deal of the history

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[27] Andre Wink, op.cit, p 190.

[28] Irfan Habib, *Medieval India*, op.cit, p.122, The *Chauth* and Sardeshmukhi accounting together to over a one third of the total revenue collection.

[29] *Eighteenth Century Deccan*, op.cit, p x.

of the next fifty years turns upon it.

["The country of the Marathas lies between Bombay and Golkonda, its limits are not known with any degree of certainly to Europeans, and we are equally ignorant of the origin of the people. It is now a century that they have made a figure as the most enterprising soldiers of Hindustan, and as the only nation of Indians which seems to make war an occupation by choice, for the Rajputs are soldiers by birth. Of late years they have often been at the gates of Delhi, sometimes in army against the, at others in defense of the Afghans or Pathans. The strength of their armies consists in their numerous cavalry. Which is more capable of resisting fatigue than any in India, large bodies of them having been known to march 50 miles in a day? They avoid general engagements and seem to have no idea in making war but that of doing as much mischief as possible to the enemy's country. This they effect by driving off the cattle, destroying the harvest burning the villages and by exercising such cruelties as makes the people of the open country take flight on the first rumors of their approach. The rapidity of their motion leaves the Prince with whom they wage war little chance of striking a decisive blow against them, or ever of attacking with effect any of their detachments. Hence the expense of maintaining an army in the field, also of very little probability of even fighting such an enemy, and the greater detriment arising from the devastations they commit, generally induce the

governments they attack to purchase their retreat with money. Great parsimony in their expenses and continued collections of treasure by the means now described have been the principal causes of raising them in less than a century, from a people of inconsiderable note, to a nation which at present strikes terror into all the countries between Delhi and cape camorin. They often let out bodies of men, and sometimes whole armies, but the hiring of them is a dangerous resource, for the offer of better terms seldom fails to make them change sides, and they seldom relinquish their practice of plundering, even in the countries which they are hired to defend. But not withstanding their warlike character, they are, in other respects, the most sumptuous observers of religion of Brahma-never eating of anything that has life, nor even pilling the insects which most them, however, a buffalo sacrificed with many strange ceremonies, atones for the blood of their species which they shed in war"].[30]

From the above discussion, the character and strength of Marathas is very clear and it is very clear that a person with extra caliber is needed to meet with such a problem. And such person was Nizam-ul-Mulk it seems he worked with full strength for the eradication of Maratha problem.

His struggle with the Marathas lasted till his death in 1748 A.D. He tried his best to check the Marathas in every possible way. He supported Sarbhoji of Kolhapur

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[30] Orme, op.cit., *Description of the Mahrattas*, Vol.I, chapter 2.

as against Shahu who was the rightful ruler of the Marathas. He encouraged prominent Maratha chiefs like Jadhav and Nimbalkar to join his standard. He joined hands with the Dabhades of Gujarat as against the *Peshwa*. Again and again he called on the Central Government of Delhi to help him in checking the Marathas. He caused on open rupture with the Marathas in 1725 A.D. The whole period from 1719-1748 was the period of wars with Marathas, sometime the *Nizam* get success but at a next he was defeated and had to reconcile himself to the Maratha occupation in the Deccan.[31]

When Nizam-ul-Mulk arrived in the Deccan as the viceroy in 1713, he refused to accept Daud Khan's agreement for the payment of the *Chauth and Sardeshmukhi* of the Deccan to Shahu and ousted the *'Kamavisdars'* of Shahu from Aurangabad and several other districts.[32] Nizam-ul-Mulk inflicted a couple of defeats on them, but was not able to destroy the small mud forts (*Garhi-Chahs*) which they had built in every district and which serve as a base of attack or place of refuge to the Marathas, and was the real bases of their system of organized plunder in the Deccan.[33]

When Hussain Ali replaced Nizam-ul-Mulk in the Deccan as viceroy of the Deccan, he followed the same policy for some time. He refused to entertain the Maratha claim for *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi*, and resisted them whenever he could. In retaliation the Marathas started plundering activities and desolated every place. In 1715, Khande Dabhade inflicted a Gusting defeat on Husain Ali Khan's *Mir Bakshi*,

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31 *Eighteenth Century Deccan*, op.cit., p viii.

32 *Muntakhab*, op.cit., Vol.II, pp 743, 783.

33 Ibid, pp.738, 742-43.

Zulfiqar Khan.[34]

In order to take revenge, Raja Mukham Singh, the *diwan* of Husain Ali and Chandrasen, Nimaji etc. ravaged the Maratha country but it was not of much avail, the Marathas whenever got the opportunity to plunder, they did so without hesitation. This gave a set back to the authority of Husain Ali in the Bijapur and Haidarabad and the two Karnataks.[35]

Seeing the situation Husain Ali opened negotiations with the Marathas in the mid of 1717.[36] Further in 1718, Husain Ali reached an agreement with Shahu granting him the *Swarajya* of Shivaji with certain reservations,[37] and the right of collecting *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of the six Subas of the Deccan through his own collectors. The conquests by the Marathas in Berar, Karnatak and Gondwana were also confirmed.[38]

In return of these concessions, Shahu agreed to pay a *peshkash* of 10 lakhs, to maintain a body of 15,000 horse to be placed t the disposal of the viceroy and to make the country populous, and punish the wrong doers, and no other taxes were to be charged besides the established ones,[39] and it was specifically stipulated that *Rahdari*

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34 *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol II, pp 777-778.

35 *Muntakhab*, Vol.II, pp 780, 787-88.

36 A.G. Powar 'Some Original Documents of Mughal Maratha Relation' I.H.R.C., 1940, pp 204-212.

37 Duff, op.cit., Vol I, p.363. In lieu of Khandesh he had to get the adjoining districts of Pandhapur and Trimbak.

38 A.G. Powar, p 205-8.

39 *Muntakhab*, Vol II, p 784.

was not to be charged, but the Marathas continued to collect the *Rahdari* as before.[40]

As soon as the agreement had been concluded Husain Ali wrote to the emperor for its final and formal ratification but Farrukh Siyar could hardy be expected to confirm a pact clearly aimed against him. Besides, several well wishers of the state urged the Emperor that it is not good to make the enemy partners in matters of revenue and government.[41] So the emperor rejected the plea.

Meanwhile Shahu without waiting for the formal confirmation started collecting his dues.[42] He also sent 10,000 Maratha horse men under Santoji and Parsoji Bhonsle and Balaji *Peshwa* to join the viceroy according to the terms of agreement.[43] The quick political changes in Delhi resulting in the death of Husain Ali and the ascendancy of the Nizam put the Marathas in a difficult position. Sardesai has summed up "the Marathas all along tried to enforce the rights granted to then by the Emperor in 1719. The Nizam opposed them on the ground that they had been won by their unholy alliance with the Saiyads, who had defied the Emperor and ultimately put him to death.[44]

There had been considerable changes in the government at Delhi and a number of Emperors had been elevated to the throne and dethroned. It was this situation which made Balaji to go to Delhi to get the terms of treaty ratified. He remained at the

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40 *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol II p 785.

41 Ibid, p.786, *Umara*, op.cit.,Vol.I, p 329-30.

42 Rajwade, Vol.III, p 99-100.

43 Duff, op.cit., Vol.I, p 363.

44 S.G. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha people*, Vol.II, Bombay 1948, p.100.

capital till September 1719 when Muhammad Shah was elevated to the throne.[45]

Balaji's visit to Delhi not only strengthened the position of Shahu but also widened the vision of the Marathas. Balaji's son Baji Rao had accompanied his father to Delhi where came into contact with the Rajputs. Perhaps this visit and the detailed observation of political condition in Delhi inspired Baji Rao to found the Maratha Empire on the ruins of the Mughal Empire which he felt imminent.[46] Balaji died on 2nd April 1720.

The Treaty which Balaji concluded on behalf of Shahu with the Mughals in 1719 had become a subject of severe criticism among historians. Some regard it as high mark of statesmanship of Balaji, while others accuse him of converting the Maratha state into a vassal state of the Mughals. The supporters of Tara Bai claimed that while she was fighting for an independent Maratha state of Shivaji's type Balaji was working for a tributary dominion.[47]

Baji Rao (1720-1740) succeeded Balaji as the Peshwa. He wanted to break the narrow limits of Maharashtra and strike at the roots of the empire, and this he wished to begin with the conquest of Malwa. But this was opposed by the Dakhini party headed by Sripat Rao who advised Shahu to see that the conquest of Shivaji and his successors were consolidated and now that *Swarajya* had been recognized, it would be better to avoid any rupture with Delhi, Shahu however, impressed by Baji Rao's working and objectives and agreed with his forward policy a policy which he pursued

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45 Ibid, p 309.

46 Sherwani, *History of Medieval Deccan*, Vol.I, p 595.

47 Ibid, p 596.

throughout his long Peshwaship of twenty years.[48]

As Baji Rao was first confronted with the problems which his father could not resolve for want of time. The civil war between Shahu and Tara Bai, had sown the seeds of dissentions among the Marathas feudatories, who were trying to undermine the authority of Chatrapati. This had to be checked.[49]

The financial position of the Marathas was not satisfactory at that time. The party politics at the Mughal court provided for the *Peshwa* an opportunity to realize his ambitions in the North as each party in the Mughal court was anxious to seek his help for the fulfillment of their designs. On the other hand the *Peshwa* wanted to direct the attention of Maratha Sardars from internecine conflicts to rich prospects in the North. Baji Rao was succeeded in establishing the Maratha supremacy in the Deccan and political leadership in the North.[50]

The nature of Baji Rao's ambitious in the Deccan is indicated by an extant of paper containing important demands regarding the Deccan. The document entitled "Memorandum of Demands",[51] the demands were as follows:

1. Grants of *Swarajya, Chauthai* and *Sardeshmukhi* already granted under the imperial seal should be confirmed by royal *farman*, and the *peshkash* excused.[52]

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48 Duff, op.cit, Vol.I, p 359-63.

49 A.R. Kulkarni, *History of Modern Deccan*, Vol.I, Hyderabad 2000, p 121.

50 V.G. Dighe, *Baji Rao and Maratha Expansion in the North*, Bombay, 1944, pp 4-6.

51 *Section from Peshwa's Daftar* X, Sardesai, *New History of the Maratha people*, Vol.II, p 78-79.

52 In return for the grant of Swarajya Shahu had agreed in 1719 to pay a peshkash of Rupees ten lakhs and in return for Sardeshmukhi of Rs. 1,17,19,390 A.G. Powar, 'Some Original

2. The *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of Malwa and Gujarat should be granted by royal *farman.*

3. The kingdom of Tanjore which is an old Maratha kingdom and annexed by the Mughals should be restored.

4. The forts of Shivner, Chakan, Maholi, Karnala, Pali, Miraj, etc. under Mughal occupation and the territories dependent on these forts, i.e., these were Junner, Parner Rajangaon Akly and the 'Suba' of Miraj, Kotul and Dhadharphal should be restored.

5. The *deshmukhi* of Shivner should be granted to Shahu.

6. The appointment to the *Subadari* of Deccan should be made on their recommendation.

7. *Farmans* should be sent to the Deccani Pathans, Deler Khan Abdun Nabi Khan and Alaf Khan, that in order to help the royal business they should join the Maratha armies of Raja Shahu and chastise Nizam-ul-Mulk.

8. The *Subadars* of the Deccan should not treat with the Raja of Panhala.

9. Abdul Majid Khan, the younger son of Diler Khan should be granted the title of Diler Khan and confirmed in his jagir and Abdul Karim Khan the cousin of Abdul Majid Khan should be confirmed as the *Subadar* of Bijapur.

10. Deserters from their side should not be employed in Mughal service.

Documents of Mughal-Maratha Relation' I.H.R.C., 1940, pp 204-12, However not even ten lakhs out of this sum had been paid till 1724.

11. Ramji Goswami etc. petioners[53] should be granted a *farman* conferring (lands in) *Inam.*[54]

12. Maratha nobles from our side who have been given services by the Mughals should be sent back to us.

13. The Mughal and Maratha army appointed to the Deccan should be sent a farma that whoever exerted himself in chastising *Nizam*-ul-Mulk would be homoured and confirmed in his *mansab* and *jagir.*

14. Fateh Singh Bhonsle should be granted the *Subadari* of Hyderabad, with the mansab of 9000 and jagir for (the upkeep of) 20,000 troops.

15. The forts and territories captured by the Habshis should be restored to then, and if necessary the royal armies should chastise him and help the Marathas in occupying them.

16. Rupees fifty lakhs promised by emperor should be granted[55].

Thus the Marathas demanded the *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of Malwa and Gujarat and the complete Maratha domination of the Deccan along with a subvention of Rupees 50,000 and the withdrawal of help and recognition given to Shambhoji of Kolhapur.[56]

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[53] The Marathi word is "*dwago*" which is obviously the Persian word "Duago".

[54] *Inam* or gift was generally a hereditary grant of land, without any condition of military service.

[55] Cf. Sardesai, who has mentions the sum to be only Rs. 50,000.

[56] Shambhuji's predecessor, Shivaji II, the son of Tara Bai was granted the mansab of 3000/2000 and title of Anup Singh along with the *deshmukhi* of Hyderabad by Jahandar Shah at the instance of his wazir Zulfiqar Khan. It is not certain that similar recognition was extended to Shambhoji later by Farrukh Siyar.

The matter of discussion here is what was the occasion for these demands by the Marathas? It has been argued that the occasion was Nizam-ul-Mulk's battle with Mubariz Khan (Shakar Kheda) in 1724 and the Emperor attempted to seam the Maratha support for Mubariz Khan. However it seems strange that the name of Mubariz Khan has not appeared at any place in such an important document.[57]

But the other thing here to note is that this document might be a reply to a communication made to the Marathas for their support to Mubariz Khan, so it's not compulsory that the Marathas in their reply must use the name of a person concern. They just made their own demands in reply.

Clause 9 of the document suggests that the document was written after the death of Diler Khan who fought in the battle of 1724 while clause 15 suggests it was written at a time when the Marathas were contemplating action against the Sidis of Janjira 1731-32. But the former seems more relevant.

Nizam-ul-Mulk was not a new person in the Deccan politics when Baji Rao I became the *Peshwa*. Nizam's first aim was to establish order in his province. He had to battle constantly against the Marathas. His aim was to dislodge them from position they had established in the province. From his very first viceroyalty of Deccan (1713-1715) he opposed Shahu and supported Sambhaji of Kolhapur, he took advantage of the factions among the Maratha chiefs.[58] The ruling house of Kolhapur found their greatest partisan and supporter in Nizam-ul-Mulk.

In 1720 when Nizam again became the viceroy of Deccan, he challenged the

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[57] Satish Chandra, Mughal Religious Policies, Rajputs and Deccan, op.cit, p 165.

[58] P.V. Kate, *Marathwada under the Nizam's 1724-1948*, Delhi 1987, p 10.

Maratha claims to *Chauth* of the six Subas of the Deccan agreed upon earlier by the treaty of 1719.[59] After his successful rebellion against the Saiyids Nizam-ul-Mulk respected the imperial *farman* granting the *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of the Deccan to the Marathas, but resisted the stationing of Maratha agents in the neighborhood of the capital Aurangabad. On 4th January 1721, he had his first personal meeting with Baji Rao.[60]

Though Nizam-ul-Mulk established friendly relations with the young *Peshwa* no lasting agreement resulted. The most important point of conflict between them was Karnatak. Nizam-ul-Mulk claimed it as his while the Marathas regarded it as a kind of hunting ground which they were determined to plunder and to lay under contribution.[61] When Baji Rao realized that the Nizam and some people in Delhi were anxious to seek his assistance for their own interests, he revived his own demands. Nizam conceded some of his demands and promised him grant of large sum to meet the military expenses when the Nizam met him in 1724. Thus Nizam seemed the support of Shahu and his Peshwa against his rival Mubariz Khan in the battle of Shakar Kheda, Mubariz Khan was killed in the battle with the help of Baji Rao and his cooperation.[62]

The Nizam's determination to maintain good working relation is suggested in an angry exchange with his uncle Iwaz Khan (d.1731), upon learning that the nobleman had shown great disrespect towards the visiting Maratha representatives,

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59 Yusuf Husain, op.cit, p 56.

60 S.P.D. XXX, 266, No.909, x, 5, 10, 10, Dr. Powar, op.cit., p 204-15.

61 Yusuf Husain, op.cit, p 139-40.

62 *Muntakhab*, op.cit, Vol II, p.955, P.M. Rao Setu, op.cit, p 24.

the Nizam rebuked him for being uncomprehending (*nafahm*), lacking in wisdom (*nadan*) and shortsighted (*kamandesh*). The Nizam explained that the Marathas are the landholders of this country, who could not even be defeated by Emperor Aurangzeb, despite his immense army and expenditure of the entire treasure of the Hindustan. Due to the khan's lack of courtesy (*ta'azzum*), all of the Nizam's efforts to make them obedient and loyal to him through diplomacy are now threatened. Such behavior is 'inexcusable'.[63]

Often the Nizam sought justification to his conciliatory by invoking the memory of Emperor Aurangzeb's failure to militarily crush the Marathas despite being supported by vast resources of the Mughal Empire.[64]

Shahu believed that Nizam-ul-Mulk would be his trusted ally in his activities in the south. Between 1724-1727 the Maratha led two expeditions into the Karnatak, but the first expedition led by Fateh Singh Bhonsle, accompanied by Sripat Rao *Pratinidhi* and Baji Rao proved to be futile, Nizam gave his lukewarm support to the Marathas, but he secretly gave instruction to his officers to the plans of the Marathas in Karnatak and therefore Marathas could not realize their objective in that campaign.[65]

The second expedition was led by Baji Rao himself in October 1726, at this time then influence of the *Peshwa* was increasing in the court of Shahu due to his Malwa and Gujarat victory. In this expedition Baji Rao did not associate Pratinidhi as

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[63] *Masir-i-Nizami*, op.cit, ff 68b, 69b.

[64] *Gulshan-i-Ajaib*, op.cit, ff 18b, 19a, 83b, 117a, 123b.

[65] V.G. Dighe, op.cit., p.14. S.G. Sardesai, *New History*, op.cit, p 90-91.

he was secretly negotiating with the Nizam and got from him a jagir.[66] In this expedition the Peshwa besieged the fort of *Sri Rangapatan* and succeeded in levying *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* from the ruler of Mysore and Arcot.[67]

The hostility between the courts of Satara and a Kolhapur and the differences between the *Peshwa* and pratinidhi helped the Nizam. When the forces of the Marathas were at Karnatak, the Nizam suspended payment of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* on the ground of a dispute up on the matter between Shahu and Shambhaji (the Kolhapur Raja).[68]

Shahu, it seems was ready to accept Nizam-ul-Mulk's claims for arbitration. But Baji Rao decided on immediate war when he came back from Karnataka and rejected the peace negotiation made by Nizam-ul-Mulk who had no real desire for war.[69]

Nizam-ul-Mulk regarded Baji Rao as inordinately arrogant ambitious and the most untrustworthy leader in Maharashtra.[70] In order to deal with the *Peshwa*, Nizam-ul-Mulk resolved to utilize the prevalent rift among the Marathas for maintaining the territorial integrity of his own kingdom in this way he made friendly overtures to Sambhaji and also planed to actively support the Senapati against the Peshwa. Nizam aimed to get rid of the Maratha revenue collectors from his territories became they

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[66] S.P.D., Vol.X 39, XXX, 66, Yusuf Husain, op.cit, p 154.

[67] According to Marathi sources the Nawab of Arcot agreed to pay Rs. 1 lakh 75 thousand for *Chauth* and Sardeshmukhi to the Marathas, S.P.D, Vol.XXVIII, Nos.9, 10, 11.

[68] V.G. dighe, op.cit., pp.14-18, Yusuf Hussain 185-87. He apparently claimed the right to realize Sardeshmukhi from the Karnatak and regarded Shahu's expeditious in that was as encroachments.

[69] Duff, Vol.II, op.cit, p 40.

[70] S.P.D, X, 66.

were making the life of peasants in the village miserable.[71]

The problem with the Nizam was that he could not openly repudiate the commitment in regard to *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* with the Maratha authorities, he wanted to achieve his aim though an alliance with the adversaries of Shahu and Baji. Nizam concerted measures with his allies for an invasion of Poona and overthrow of the regime of Raja Shahu. Nizam get the opportunity in 1727, when the Maratha troops under the command of Baji Rao were away from the capital on an expedition in the Karnatak with the strong any accompanied by Sambhaji and other followers Nizam-ul-Mulk moved towards Poona, they entered without much resistance and installed Shambhaji as the *Chatrapati* of the Marathas.[72]

After receiving this news Baji Rao marched towards the south and ravaged Burhanpur and Aurangabad. Due to this move of the Peshwa, Nizam had to evacuate Poona hurriedly. Both the armies met at a place near Palkhed (32km., west of Daulatabad or 20 miles west Aurangabad), Baji Rao's army devastated the Nizam's army in a decisive contest. Baji Rao out off all the supplies of grain and water to Nizam and in such a acute condition Nizam had to sign a humiliating treaty on 6th March 1728. By the terms of the treaty Nizam agreed to withdraw his protection from Sambhaji and allow the Maratha officer to continue to collect the *Chauth* in the Deccan.[73]

By this defeat of the great Mughal chief, the Peshwa won for himself a place of confidence in the Raja's counsels which nothing could shake. The Kolhapur prince

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71 Malik Zahiruddin, op.cit, p 103.

72 *Hadiqat-ul-Alam,* op.cit., Vol.II, p.139-40, S.P.D. X, 50.

73 *Ahwal,* op.cit, f.199, S.P.D., X, 51, 53, 54, S.P.D. XV, 90-91.

having lost the support of the Nizam could no longer resist the superior claims of Shahu. He was defeated in 1730 and was at last persuaded to accept the position of an honorable vassal by the treaty of Warna concluded in 1731 April.[74]

The paper related to the demands made by Baji Rao and agreed to by Nizam-ul-Mulk at Mungi Shivgaon on Mach 6, 1728 reads as follows – "The administration of the Deccan should be handed over to us by God's grace, the task shall be carried out with loyalty and economy provided that loyalty (to the emperor) shall be observed through you".[75]

Grief at this blow to his power and prestige utterly prostrated Niza-ul-Mulk, Qasim Aurangabadi wites that for some days Nizam-ul-Mulk had given up taking meals.[76]

Battle of Palkhed thus resulted in the following concessions by the Nizam.[77]

1. Recognition of Shahu as the sole Maratha monarch.
2. Recognition of his right to *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of the Deccan.
3. Reinstating the Maratha collectors who had been driven out.
4. Agreement to pay the outstanding arrears of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi*.

The implications, however, were much more important, first in the military sphere; Baji Rao had defeated the best equipped Mughal army of the day under its best general. The tactics of cutting off supplies and rapid movement had defeated the

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[74] V.G. Dighe, Peshwa Baji Rao and the Maratha expansion, op.cit, p 20.

[75] S.P.D., XV, 89.

[76] *Ahwal*, op.cit., f 199.

[77] Steward Gordon, *The Marathas 1600-1818*, Cambridge, 1998, p 122.

Nizam's far superior artillery.[78]

The Treaty of Mungi-Shivgaon defeated in a decisive manner the attempt of the Nizam to challenge Marathas supremacy in the Deccan. The treaty of Warna closed forever the differences between Satara and Kolhapur, and strengthened the position of Shahu as the sovereign authority of the Maratha kingdom. The Nizam thus lost an important ally whom he was using as a weapon against Shahu. As *Peshwa* Baji Rao has outwitted him, he agreed not to interfere with his policy of expansion in the north and had even allowed a free passage to his forces heading towards north through his territory – Khandesh.[79]

The Nizam accepted the terms but he began to look around for means to neutralize the effects of this treaty of his diplomatic manipulations. The only means to affect this end was to drive the Maratha *Kamavisdars* from his dominions. It was to accomplish this end that he tried to win over the Maratha *Sardars* who were hostile to the Peshwa Baji Rao.[80]

This treaty is a landmark in the history of the Deccan. It shows that even a man like Nizam-ul-Mulk was obliged by the force of circumstances to accept the claims of the Marathas although in later years he succeeded in neutralizing the effects of the treaty infinitely enhanced Baji Rao's power and influence in the Maratha state.[81]

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[78] Z.U. Malik, '*Chauth* Collection in the Subah of Hyderabad 1726-1748', In. Ec. Soc. History Review , 4 (December 1971) p 395-414.

[79] G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, Bombay 1949, Vol.II, pp 156-57.

[80] M.V. Gujar, 'The Peshwa Baji Rao and Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf jah, 1730-1738', I.H.C., 1938.

[81] Yusuf Hussain, op.cit, p 159.

Sri Patrao *Pratinidhi*, Kanoji Bhonsle, Trimbakrao Dabhade *Senapati* and his associates felt humiliated at the success of the *Peshwa*. The *Pratinidhi* and Kanoji Bhonsle opened secret correspondence with the Nizam and demanded *Jagir* in Berar.[82]

This gave the Nizam an opportunity to utilize dissensions in the Maratha court. The Peshwa knew the far-reaching nature of Nizam's designs. The Nizam revived the internal dissensions of the Maratha leaders to strengthen his own position. At the end of October 1730, the opposition between the *Peshwa* and Trimbak Rao Dabhade – Senapati had grown more intense.[83]

After the treaty of Mungi Shivgaon, Sambhaji prepared for final struggle with the Peshwa. His commander in chief, Udaji Chauhan, opened secret correspondence with the Senapati, Trimbak Rao Dabhade, and Nizam-ul-Mulk in order to overthrow the ascendancy of Baji Rao who was determined to have the sovereignty of Shahu recognized by Shambhaji's party. Udaji Chauhan made preparations to test strength of Baji Rao. He led an incursion into Shahu's territory, demanding half of the Swarajya for his master. Taking this as an opportunity Baji Rao asked Shahu to crush Sambhaji once for all.[84]

Shahu gave his consent for the reason as he himself wanted to bring Shambhaji to his knees. And finally Shambhaji's forces were completely routed and defeated at Vishalgad in 1730, and Sambhaji had to come to terms with Shahu and accepted according to Warna settlement the sovereignty of Shahu. Shahu on his part

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[82] *S.P.D.*, X, 39, 81, 62.

[83] *S.P.D.* X, 66, 67, 68.

[84] Yusuf Husain, op.cit., p 159.

agreed to back his claim in the territory comprising also get some forts and military outposts. Thus the treaty of Warna (1731) settled the differences between Shahu and Sambhaji for the time to come.[85]

On the other hand Trimbak Rao Dabhade and his associates in Gujarat were compelled to open secret correspondence with the Nizam in order to strengthen their position. Trimbak Rao Senapati pressed the Nizam to join him to crush the *Peshwa.* With a view to keep the Peshwa busy with the internal difficulties, the Nizam wrote back to Senapati promising him all possible help. This secret correspondence commenced at the beginning of November 1730.[86]

The Nizam decided to avoid war as long as possible. In order to avoid the payment of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmuhi* in the six *Subas* of the Deccan, he seriously thought that measures should be taken to prevent the in charge of the revenue collection from entering the territory.[87] The *Nizam* also thought that he should give the Marathas free hand in Malwa and Gujarat so that the opposing Mughal forces would inflict enormous losses upon them.[88]

Shahu thus directed Baji Rao and his younger brother Chimnaji Appa to make ready for immediate military operations to prevent Trimbak Rao Dabhade's forces from joining Nizam-ul-Mulk, Baji Rao by forced marcher encountered Trimbak Rao Dabhade at Dabhoi. The latter, after an obstinate battle, was defeated and slain and all

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85 Ibid., p 160.

86 *S.P.D.*, X, 72.

87 The incharge were Dawalji Somwanshi and Fatehsingh Bhonsle.

88 S.P.D., X, 72.

his troops were dispersed.[89]

The internal dissentions among the Maratha Sardars played an important role in the Mughal Maratha relations of the period. One party was always eager to join hands with Mughals which the other was working against the former.

After the successful submission of Sambhaji to the authority of Shahu Baji Rao thought that now Trimbak Rao Dabhade is also removed from the scene after the defeat of the latter in the battle of Dabhoi, the Peshwa thought that Nizam-ul-Mulk was now left with no ally and was too busy in organizing the administration of his dominion in the Deccan and the Carnatic that he was not able to offer resistance and stand in the way of his ambitions in Malwa.[90]

In his great anxiety the emperor appointed Muhammad Khan Bangash, *Nawab* of Farrukhabad and *Subadar* of Allahabad to take the charge of Malwa and stop the tide of Maratha aggression.[91]

Nizam-ul-Mulk at that moment tried to develop friendship with Muhammad Khan Bangash in order to organize concerted measures against the growing power of the Marathas and their expansion in the Mughal territories. Muhammad Khan Bangash, in his report to the Emperor spoke very highly of Nizam-ul-Mulk's sincerity

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89 Kincaid and Parasnis, *A History of the Maratha People*, 1922, Vol.II, p.193. S.P.D., XII, 35, 39, 46.

90 Yusuf Husain, op.cit, p 161.

91 Muhammad Khan Bangash was the son of Muhammad 'Ain Khan who quitted his native country on the frontier of India in the reign of Aurangzeb, and came to Mau Rashidabad (known as Kaimganj at present and in the Farrukhabad district, Umara, Vol.III, pp.771-74.

and earnestness of purpose and his devotion to the cause the emperor.[92]

Nizam-ul-Mulk for the eight years (1724-1732) had been occupied in hostilities with the Marathas without any help from the imperial government. His plan to exploit the conflict among the Marathas for consolidating his hold over the Deccan had failed. With all the adverse conditions the Nizam realized that he could not cope with the situation and bowed to the unquestioned supremacy attained in the South as well as in Malwa by the Peshwa. Both the parties met and discussed the terms of settlement on 27 December 1732 at a place called Roh Rameshwar. The Nizam presented seven robes, costly pearls, two horses and one elephant to the Peshwa.[93]

The Nizam, who was not convinced of the futility of intriguing against the Peshwa, came to an agreement with him in 1732 and gave a free hand to the *Peshwa* in the north. The Peshwa too assured the Nizam that he would not interfere in his activities in the south. However this mutual assurance hardly lasted for a period of five years.[94]

Nothing definite is known about the exact terms of this momentous meeting, but its outcome was an entirely new relationship between the Nizam and the Marathas. Hyderabad no longer acted as a bulwark and a barrier against the northward drive, the Nizam, now devoted his energies to the well being of the people, the Nizam's policy of seeking relatively stable relation with the Marathas began to bear both political and financial fruits. The latter is borne out by the revival of agriculture across much of the Deccan; even regions like Khandesh that has been devastated by

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92 Yusuf Husain, op.cit., p 166.

93 S.P.D. XV, 94 XXX, 90, Duff J.G., *History of the Marathas*, Vol.I, London 1912, p 416.

94 A.R. Kulkarni, *The Marathas*, New Delhi, 1996, p 142.

decades of incessant warfare began to recover.[95] On the political front the Nizam had no longer in fear of the Maratha aggression in his absence.

The greatest significance however was the steady influx of the Maratha military men-like Rao Rambha Nimbalkar, who decided to join Nizam for rich opportunities of career advancement and wealth.[96] Besides bringing large contingents of Maratha troops with them, they brought badly needed fighting skills. The Nizam would use various Maratha commanders, including Rao Rambha to good effect against not only the Afghans and Berads of South India, but also the fellow Marathas.[97] Warfare however always remained a second option for the Nizam; whenever possible, he preferred to achieve his goal through diplomacy, compromise and financial incentives:

..... as far as possible, it is better to not take the initiative in war ...save yourself and your men as best as you can.[98]

After this for six years Hyderabad enjoyed peace and prosperity till the Nizam was called to the centre in 1738. Justifying his new policy of friendship with the Marathas, Nizam-ul-Mulk said, "God knows that I can destroy the race of these wretched people root and branch and wipe out all signs of their existence in one year only if I can be sure of the emperor's attitude. But what can be done if the earth be

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[95] Steward Gordon, 'Burhanpur: Entrepot and Hinterland 1650-1750' in Stewart Gordon, *Marathas, marauders and State Formation in the Eighteenth Century India*, Delhi 1994, p 173.

[96] H.k Sherwani, 'Deccan, the region of co-existence and integration' Medieval India-A Miscellany, Vol IV, Bombay 1977, p 148.

[97] *Ahwal*,op.cit, f 215b.

[98] The 10th clause of Nizam's will is explicit in its condemnation of war as the primary means of settling disputes. *Tuzuk-i- Asafiyah*, op.cit, p 42.

hard and the sky far off? When the Emperor himself is not serious what can his subordinates get done.[99]

Nizam in describing his severe position in the Suba and said that the central ministers like Khan-i-Dauran, Qamruddin Khan and Sadat Khan Possess' *jagirs* worth one crore of rupees, each of them has crores of rupees in cash. Their *jagir* are in no danger of being seized by the Marathas. They are secure and enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor. He, who is facing all the problems still doubted in his loyalty to the Monarch.[100]

The friendship between the Nizam and Muhammad Khan Bangash was not liked by the nobles at the court and they were trying every means to do away with their friendship. According to the author of *Ahwal-ul-Khawaqin*, the opponent group in Delhi had made Muhammad Khan Bangash to promise before his departure for Malwa that he will lead a campaign against the Nizam. This rumor was prevalent throughout the Deccan and when Nizam asked his soldiers to march towards Narmada, people were quite certain that he was going to attack Muhammad Khan Bangash.[101]

But their wishes were not fulfilled when the two of them (Nizam and Muhammad Khan Bangash) by direct intercourse established friendly relations and tried to chalk out a common plan of action against the Maratha invaders.

The emperor, lacking judgment and will, was easily made to believe that there was grave political danger to the empire from the union of two such powerful persons

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[99] *Ahwal*, op.cit, f 199.

[100] *Munshat-i-Mausavi Khan*, op.cit., f 152.

[101] *Ahwal*, op.cit, f 200.

as Nizam-ul-Mulk and Muhammad Khan Bangash. Thus the opponents secured the removal of Muhammad Khan Bangash, who was replaced in the Subedari of Malwa by Raja Jai Singh,[102] who continued from 1732 to 1737 in the post.

The Mughals were not successful in checking the Maratha invasions. In 1732-33the Maratha leaders Shinde, Holkar and Pavan defeated Sawai Jai Singh and compelled him to make peace and in 1733 a peace agreement was signed between the two parties, and Sawai Jai Singh agreed to pay 6,00,000 lakhs in cash and cede 28 *parganas* in lieu of *Chauth.*[103]

In the winter of 1733, Khan Dauran, Amir-ul-Umara Samsam-ud-Daulah decided to lead an expedition against the Marathas, but he wanted that someone else would take his place so he sent his brother Muzaffar Khan in February 1734. He had made preparations and left Delhi on 20th March 1734, he marched towards Malwa to drive away the Marathas across the river but he had moved towards the capital without fighting the Marathas.[104] The Nizam intended to attack the Marathas from the south, but the retreat of Muzaffar Khan frustrated his plan.

After the rains of 1734, Wazir Qamruddin Khan and the Bakshi Khan Dauran decided to lead expedition against the Marathas but due to the losses incurred they retreated and retuned to Delhi on May 9, 1735.[105]

Khan-i-Daman repeatedly suggested to the emperor that the only way to get away from the Marathas was to accept their demands. Sadat Khan intended to

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[102] Irvine, op.cit, Vol.II, p 255.

[103] S.P.D., op.cit, XIV, 2.

[104] Gujar, op.cit., Vol.II, p 467.

[105] S.P.D. op.cit., XIV, 21, 22, 23.

cooperate with the Nizam in his attempt to check Maratha inroads into the Deccan and into the imperial territory as well, but this cordiality of the two was misinterpreted to the Emperor and the Emperor was made to believe that they will be proved dangerous for the Empire. Khan Daman and Sawai Jai Singh desired to arrange a lasting peace between Marathas and the centre. From February to June 1736, continuous negotiations took place between the Emperor and the Peshwa through Khan-i-Daman and Jai Singh. The first and foremost demand put forward by the Peshwa was the grant of hereditary office of *Sardeshpande* of the Deccan. It was also discussed that 5% of the revenues of the Deccan will go to the post.[106] The *Peshwa* also demanded the *Jagir* of 50 lakhs in Khandesh, Aurangabad and Bijapur.[107]

Nizam-ul-Mulk resented to this proposed arrangement as a direct blow to his own authority in the Deccan. He argued that the grant of *Sardeshpandeship* of the six *Subas* to the Peshwa might in future result in his asking for the viceroyalty of Deccan.[108]

The *Peshwa* also demanded the appointment of crown prince to the viceroyalty of Deccan with himself as the prince deputy. The whole administration will be into his hand and any additional revenue collection made in Deccan will be shared half and half between the two parties.[109]

In short the Peshwa demanded the virtual ceding of the Deccan. The

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[106] S.P.D., op.cit., XV, 92, 95, 96. The emperor agreed to this put demand the sum of 6 lakhs Duff, Vol.I, p 433.

[107] Ibid., p 95.

[108] M.V., Gujar, 'The Peshwa Baji Rao and Nizam-ul-Mulk 1730-1738', I.H.C. 1938, second session.

[109] Ibid., pp 94, 95.

negotiations came to stand still on account of the exaggerated demands of the *Peshwa*. The Emperor had no other alternative left but to resort to force to prevent the Marathas from plundering the imperial territory. But in retaliation the Marathas started their plundering activities in the neighborhood of the town of Sambhal (two hundred miles from Delhi).[110]

Several skirmishes occurred in front of Delhi with varying success, but ending generally in the favor of the Peshwa Baji Rao, who had secured his demands approval and left for Deccan, where for some time he was busy in military operations with the Portuguese.[111]

The Emperor by this time realized that the only person who could fight with Marathas was Nizam-ul-Mulk, who had all through his career been a devoted servant of the Emperor and had always tried to check the Maratha menace into the Mughal territory.[112]

Baji Rao was also aware of the Nizam's power and in his anxiety he wrote to his brother Chimnaji Appa to watch carefully the movements of the Nizam, who was threatening their base in the Deccan. He wrote "if he (Nizam-ul-Mulk) attempts to cross the Narmada, fall instantly on his rear and put feel ropes on him".[113]

Muhammad Shah, the Mughal Emperor invited the Nizam in 1737 and asked him to punish the Peshwa. The Nizam made a plan to sandwich the Marathas by attacking them from both North and south. The Nizam left Burhanpur on April 7th,

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[110] *Siyar*, op.cit., Vol.II, p 467.

[111] J.D.B., Gribble, *A History of the Deccan*, Vol.II, London, 1924, p 10.

[112] Yusuf Husain, op.cit., p 174.

[113] Grant Duff, op.cit., Vol.II, p 443.

1737, he crossed Narmada in May. The news of Nizams coming to Delhi spread in Malwa and the *Zamindars* of the province became recalcitrant and refused to pay dues to the Maratha agents. Yar Muhammad Khan son of post Muhammad Khan of Bhopal and some other Zamindars joined his party.[114]

On May 29, left Sironj and the Nizam reached the neighborhood of Delhi by July 1737. Before leaving for Delhi, Nizam made his son Nasir Jung deputy *Subedar* of the Deccan during his absence. He stationed Abdul Rahim Khan and Anwarullah Khan with 5000 troops at Aurangabad. He appointed Shujat Khan as Subedar in Berar. Orders were issued by the Nizam to the entire high official and the nobility to offer their allegiance to Nasir Jung.[115]

Being apprised of the Nizam's movement the *Peshwa* made straight for Sironj at the head of 80,000 troops crossed the Narmada and surprised the Nizam near Bhopal where he was camping. They created disorder in the Mughal army by continuously throwing burning rockets into the front. The Marathas surrounded and sorely straitened the supplies of the Nizam's army. There was famine in the Nizam's camp. Elephants and horses of his camp starved. The Nizam was completely isolated and shut in Bhopal as Chimnaji Appa at the suggestions of his brother had already taken up post on the Tapti in order to prevent any help from Nasir Jang, to his father's rescue.[116]

On January, 5 the Muslims ate up the artillery oxen while the Rajputs utterly

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[114] S.P.D, XV, 27, 40, 42.

[115] *S.P.D*, XV, 26, M.V. Gujar, 'The Peshwa Baji Rao and Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah 1730-1738; I.H.C., 1938, p 621.

[116] Parasnis D.B., *Life of Brahmendra Swami Dhavad Shiphon,* Bombay, 1900, Letter No.35, p 51.

starved. The Nizam now decided to make peace. He called Ayamal the *Diwan* of Jaipur and sent him with Saiyyad Lashkar Khan and Anwarullah Khan to the Maratha camp to discuss terms of peace with the *Peshwa*.[117] Thus the *Nizam* agreed to the following terms[118] on 7th January, 1738 near Duraha Sarai

1. Grant of *Subedari* of Malwa and the whole of it in *Jagir* to the Peshwa.
2. The Peshwa was allowed to collect his dues from the tract of country beyond the Jamuna and the Chambal as before, in consultation with Raja Ayamal the minister of Raja Jai Singh Sawai.
3. The Nizam to obtain *Sanads* of confirmation from the Emperor for the above and further.
4. To use every endeavor to process the payment of 50 lakhs for war expenditure in return of which he agreed.
    (a) Not to allow any other Maratha general to cross the Narmada.
    (b) To punish the Emperor's enemies with 12000 horses out of which the expenses of 8000 horses were paid by the emperor.
    (c) To send his representatives with five hundred horse to wait upon the Emperor.
    (d) Not to demand any more money.[119]

Bhopal campaign was the last encounter of the *Peshwa* with the Nizam by the treaty of Bhopal; Baji Rao obtained confirmation of the most important of his

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[117] *S.P.D*, XXX 207, XV, 56-59, XXII, 368, 369.

[118] *S.P.D*, XV, 87.

[119] *Persian Sources of Indian History*, Vol.IV, No.18, 19.

demands presented to the emperor in 1736, except those relating to Deccan. It has been rightly pointed out that the struggle between the Marathas and the Nizam by 1738 virtually became a struggle for the dominion of India both northern and southern.[120]

However the contemporary historian Yusuf Muhammad Khan does not make even a reference to the Bhopal campaign.[121] The victory of Bhopal marks the zenith of the Peshwa's triumphant career.[122] By the end of 1739 by crossing the Godvari River, Nasir Jung the ablest son of the Nizam entered into Peshwa's territory in retaliation for his father's discomfiture at Bhopal. He was chased by Baji Rao, Chimnaji Appa and a crushing defeat was inflicted on him. As a result of this victory Baji Rao got Handia and Khargaon in Nemad region south of the Narmada from Nizam.[123]

After the Nizam's departure, the *Peshwa* set about to punish those Rajas who helped the Mughal cause Ranoji Sindhia and Holkar were sent against Kotah to which *Peshwa* advanced about 6th February, laid waste the district and besieged the town. The Rao fled to Gagron and made peace by promising to pay a tribute of ten Lakhs Rupees.[124]

From Kotah Baji Rao entered into the country of Ahirs and it was over run by

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120 Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, op.cit., p 233.

121 P.M., Setu, op.cit., p 44.

122 Dighe, op.cit., *Peshwa Baji Rao and the Maratha Expansion*, p 149.

123 Sardesai, G. S., *New History of the Marathas*, Bombay 1949, Vol.II, pp 156-57.

124 S.P.D., XV, 68.

him and Kurwai was invested.[125]

After that turn came for Datia and Orcha and then the *Peshwa* retired to the Deccan reaching Poona on 15th July. This was his last and most important expedition.[126] By defeating the imperial armies at Bhopal, the *Peshwa* established the supremacy of Maratha armies in India and announced the birth of a new imperial power.

6.4. *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi,* its Quantum and Collection in the *Subas* of Deccan

The major source of income for the Maratha state was land revenue taxes, direct and indirect including custom *Chauth,*[127] a quarter of the revenue of any territory from the existing authorities as price of security from the attack and *Sardeshmukhi*[128] from the *Swarajya.*[129]

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[125] S.P.D., XV, 69.

[126] S.P.D., XXII, 380.

[127] Shivaji established the system of *Chauth,* which was the tax amounting to ¼ of the revenue realized by the state. It should be remembered that Shivaji was not the originator of this by called *Chauth.* Earlier, the Koli Raja of Ramnagar was collecting it from the protuguese who had their territories of Div, Daman in his proximity, A.R., Kulkarni, *Maharashtra in the Age of Shivaji,* 2nd ed., Pune, 2002, p.153, Sarkar, *Shivaji and his Times,* 5th ed., Calcutta, 1952, p 108.

[128] It was a conventional levy of 10% imposed by the Marathas on the whole revenue of Suba under Swaraj and was based on the supposed principle that Shivaji was the hereditary *Sardeshmukh* of the province. This was claimed for the first time in 1648. As against *Chauth,* Sardeshmukhi was regarded as a matter of right and Sabhasad has estimated it at one crore huns. Sabhasad, as translated in *Source Book of the Maratha History* ed. Rowlinson and Patwardhan, Bombay, 1929, p 123.

[129] *Swarajya* was established in the western Deccan when the thanas, the garrison or military posts where the revenue officials stationed, were under Maratha control for as Grand Duff

As the Maratha power increased during the 18th century under the direct authority of the *Peshwas* whose office became hereditary with the passage of time. They devised special administrative machinery to collect the *Chauth* and often they had to do it by employing military force.[130] The Marathas also used to extend their territory beyond the *Swaraj*, a letter from '*Selection from the Peshwa's Daftar*' reveals the presence of Balaji Vishwanath in the provinces beyond the *Swaraj* territory as early as 1704.[131]

Nizam-ul-Mulk from his very first viceroyalty of the Deccan (1713-1715) opposed Shahu and supported Shambhaji of Kolhapur. He challenged the claims of Marathas to *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of the six Subas of Deccan.[132] But the Marathas obtained a legal right to levy *Chauth* in 1719, when the diplomacy of Balaji Vishwanath secured for Shahu an imperial recognition of that often repeated claim, and nothing but a strong army could ensure the punctual payment of their claims.[133]

According to the terms of 1719, the Marathas get three *Sanads* from the emperor Muhammad Shah for *Chauth, Sardeshmukhi* and *Swarajya.*[134]

It is time that Shahu had in return for the grant bound himself to maintain a

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says 'cultivators consider him their master who is in possession of the thana, J.G. Duff, *History of the Marathas*, Vol.I, p 506.

130 A.R., Kulkarni, *The Marathas 1600-1848,* p 50.

131 *Selected from Peshwa's Daftar,* New Series, ed. P.M., Joshi, Bombay 1957, letter No.2, p 2.

132 Yusuf Husain, op.cit., p 56.

133 S.N., Sen, *Administrative System of the Marathas,* Calcutta, 1925, pp 113-14.

134 The original grants are in the possession of Raja of Satara, they one in the name of Muhammad Shah, dtd. 22nd Rabi-ul-Akhir and for the Sardeshmukhi, 4th Jammadi-ul-Awwal, Duff, op.cit., Vol.I, pp 323-24.

body of 15000 horses in the Emperor's service and to maintain peace and order. But neither Shahu nor the *Peshwa* ever cared to assist the *Subedars* of the Deccan unless it served their own interest.[135]

Grand Duff in his '*History of the Marathas*' has compiled from the original Maratha records a statement showing the revenues of the six Deccan *Subas* or Divisions over which the Marathas claimed the right of levying *Chauth* at 25% and *Sardeshmukhi* at 10%. The six *Subas* yielded the revenues[136]:

Suba	**Revenue, Rs, Ana, Paisa**
Aurangabad	12, 376, 042, 11, 3
Berar	11, 523, 508, 14, 3
Bidar	7, 491, 879, 12, 3
Hyderabad	64, 867, 483, 0, 0
Khandesh	5, 749, 819, 0, 3
Bijapur	78, 508, 560, 14, 1

It was upon this revenue that the Marathas demanded their claim. As against *Chauth*, *Sardeshmukhi* was not levied with name regularity and force, (Chauth) which was supposed to be a payment for the protection of the villages from raid and rapine. This protection was abandoned when the *Chauth* was not punctually paid; they raided the villages until it was produced.[137]

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[135] S.N., Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas, op.cit., p 115.

[136] Duff, op.cit., pp 323-24.

[137] Duff, op.cit, p 324.

As regards to the quantum of the *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* Marathas were to receive 35% of the total Mughal revenues. Most of the modern historians agreed to this amount of collection. However different documents Preserved in the Andhra Pradesh State Archives give different rates of actual collection. A document[138] states the rate of Maratha levies at Rs.32/8 per 100 Rs. of the Mughal revenues. The balance, i.e. 67/8 out of 100 is stated as Sarkar's share or *Monglai.* Another document[139] gives the rate of *Chauth* at Rs.33/5/3 out of 100 that is 33% and not 25% but the document does not give any reason for this increased rate.

Several leaders settled in Khandesh carved out territories for themselves, for example, Khanderao Dabhade established a live of posts along the Burhanpur Surat route and charged one quarter on the value of all goods on the road.[140] The Marathas were to receive *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* from the *abwabs* called *faujdari, Shiqdari* and *Ziyafat* and other charges as shown in the gross account of the collections.[141] Further the Marathas exacted *Rahdari* transit duties in each district of the Mughal provinces at the rate of ½ Rupee or 1 Rupee, for each bullock and can not from the merchants and whatever they pleased from other persons.[142]

Besides the exactions upon mal, *Rahdari* and *Abwab* the Marathas sometimes exacted *Nazr* in the name of the Peshwa.[143] They also collected 5% on account of

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138 Doc. No. 112, APSA Hyderabad.

139 Doc. No.229, APSA Hyderabad.

140 Steward Gordon, *Marathas, Marauders and State formation in 18th century,* Bombay, 1994, p 136.

141 *Muntakhab*, op.cit., Vol II, p 786.

142 *Muntakhab*, Vol II, op.cit,p 787.

143 Doc. No. 94, 89, 915, APSA.

Kaodana or *Ghasdana*, in 1700, Bhimsen while commenting on Maratha depredations probably refers, though indirectly to the origin of *Ghasdana*. He writes, "The troops of the Maratha leaders who come in for the sake of plundering the country, extort money from every *pargana* and all places in accordance with their desire, and let their horses graze upon the cultivated fields".[144] The Marathas whenever they were on military expedition, never carried provisions and it was usually collected from the raiyat who failed or could muster no more resistance.

According to Surendra Nath Sen "*Ghasdana* accounted to 5% of the revenue" of the area,[145] but the documents in the *Peshwa Daftar* and the *Peshwa Diaries* did not assert the percentage of this levy at 5. In a document, dated 1738 we find that in *Pargana* Adavad, *Suba* Khandesh Rs.750 were fixed an account of *Ghasdana* and it was raised to 1500 next year but the *raiyat* objected to that and the petition was filed which was accepted and the amount was reduced to 750 again. This shows that it probably was charged at lump sum but once levied took the customary nature for years to come.[146]

Another document dated 1735 gives the rate of *Ghasdana* at 6½% of the total revenue from Narwar.[147] Regarding to the question who was responsible for the collection of *Ghasdana* and how it was collected, there are several documents which specifically mention that at village level *Muqaddan* or *Patil* and *Kulkarni* were

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[144] *Dilkusha*, op.cit., f 139b.

[145] S.N. Sen, *Military System of the Marathas*, pp 52-57.

[146] Vad, Parasnis, D.B., *Selection from the Satara Rajas and the Peshwa's Diaries*, Bombay and Poona 1905-11, vol.III, pp 352-53.

[147] S.P.D., XXIII, p.12. On the Revenue of 60,000, 4000 was taken as Ghasdana which constituted 6½%.

entrusted with this duty.[148] At the *pargana* level *Deshmukhi* and *Deshpande* were responsible for its collection.[149] In another document dated 1738 there is mention that *pargana* official was directed to collect the amount from *Zamindars*.[150]

Sometimes we have informed that the Marathas used to undertake military expeditions for no other reason than the realization of *Ghasdana*.[151]

In one of the letter's Nizam wrote that 'Raja Shahu was given all the concessions on condition of maintaining law and order, and that he would not increase his demand beyond 1/3 of the revenue of the *Suba* as laid down in the Sanads. But the Marathas not satisfied with this amount and disturbing the peace for obtaining more than that. Where they see the *Jagirdars* are not so much powerful they leave from 1/3 to 1/10 for the land holders, who were helpless. They also seize the grain and fodder from the people.[152] Whatever was the amount or percentage of the collection of Maratha levies, it was no way simple as it appeared. The total amount of the *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* on the basis of the assessment agreed at was not paid in a lump sum to the Marathas from the Mughal treasury. The Marathas were allowed to exact the amount of *Chauth* from the individual *Zamindars* and *Jagirdars*.[153]

Khafi Khan writes that the Marathas demanded *Chauth* from the revenue officers and *Zamindars*. "The *Zamindars* and *Muqqadams* through fear of loot and plunder welcomed the invading army and promised to pay *Chauth* on the condition of

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[148] S.P.D., VII, Doc. No 30.

[149] Peshwa's Diaries, op.cit, Vol.III, Doc. No. 499, p 354.

[150] Ibid., Doc.No. 497, pp 352-53.

[151] *S.P.D.*, XXX, Doc. No 204.

[152] *Munshat*, op.cit., ff 147-48.

[153] *Munshat*, op.cit, f 148.

protection. They would take the Maratha agents for examining the fields and crops, the assessment of the produce was made and ¼ of the produce was settled. If the *Zamindars* and *faujdars* did not agree to pay the *Chauth*, they faced inevitable onslaught and plunder in their territories".[154]

After the sanction of the levies in 1719 by the emperor, *Peshwa* Balaji Vishwanath appointed in every *Mahal* two officers, one *Kamaishdar*, who was the in charge of the collection of *Chauth* and another *Gumashta* for that of *Sardeshmukhi*.[155]

Nizam-ul-Mulk, when become viceroy of the Deccan in 1720, her tried to crush the Maratha power and repudiated the Maratha right to *Chauth* but he was not able to stay for long as he had to leave to take up the office of *Wazir* and he left for Delhi. In his absence under Mubariz Khan, the policy of resistance was continued but the Marathas were able to thwart all the handles from their way and they continued to exact tribute from Karnataka, Balaghat and Khandesh.[156]

Nizam-ul-Mulk, when had taken the viceroyalty of Deccan for the third time in 1724, conciliate with the Marathas for the payment of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* but it was lost soon when Baji Rao launched expeditions into Karnatak during 1725-26, it came as a direct blow to Nizam's authority and he realized the *Peshwa*'s expansionist designs on his territory.[157]

The decisive defeat of Nizam at the battle of Palkhed against the Marathas changed the whole course of events. A convention was signed at Mungi Shivgaon

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[154] *Muntakhab*, op.cit. Vol II, pp 782-84.

[155] Ibid., p 785.

[156] Ibid, Vol II op.cit., p 963.

[157] *Peshwa Baji Rao I and Maratha Expansion*, pp 14-15.

according to which the Nizam conceded the demands of the Marathas to collect their dues through their own officers in al the provinces of the Deccan excluding Hyderabad. Qasim Aurangabadi writes "Asaf Jah was aware of the ill will of the emperor against him and the intrigues at the court against him to destroy him, the *Nizam* concluded peace with the Marathas and agreed to pay *Chauth* to them.[158]

Thus following this arrangement of 1728, Nizam-ul-Mulk organized administrative machinery for the collection of *Chauth* from the provinces of Deccan. He created the post of *Tahsidar-i-Chauth.*[159] Different officials such as *faujdar, shiqdar, qaladar, tahsildar, amin, amil* and *rahdar*, besides their own offices were given the additional duty of Tahsildari *Chauth.* Even *jagirdars*, *Inamdars* and *mansabdars* were entrusted with the collection of *Chauth.*[160] Generally the *jagirdars* themselves came forward voluntarily to take up the responsibility of collecting *Chauth* within their own *jagirs.*[161]

The usual practice was to assign the collection of *Chauth* on contract or *Ijara* for a few years.[162] If during this period *Tahsildar-i-Chauth* was transferred another person was assigned to the contract.[163] The contractor who undertook the contract for collecting *Chauth* should have to submit a *Qabuliyat* or deed of acceptance.[164]

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158 *Ahwal*, op.cit., f 240b.

159 Doc. No. C 11, C36, C29, APSA, Hyderabad.

160 Doc. No. C 121, C103, C189, (*Daftar-i-Mal*) APSA, Hyderabad.

161 Doc. No. C 29, C52, C83, APSA, Hyderabad.

162 Doc. No. C 7, A.P.S.A. Hyderabad.

163 Doc. No. C 2, C72, A.P.S.A. Hyderabad.

164 For the patent terms of contract see, Munshi Nand Ram, Siyaqnama, Lucknow, 1879, pp 28-29.

The *tahsildar* generally engaged irregular infantry for the prompt collection and 7% of *Chauth* was fixed as amount of *Sihbandi* or *Haqq-i-Tahsil* by the Nizam to the collectors.[165] Sometimes the high status *mansabdars* and *jagirdars* were not allowed to claim this amount of 7% due to their higher status.

Khafi Khan informs us that on the rolls of the collection of land revenue the signature of the Maratha official of the *Sardeshmukhi* was placed first.[166] The Maratha collectors went to the fields in the Mughal provinces and settled the assessment of *Jama* and *hasil* on the basis of standing crop and fixed the amount of the levies and took sureties from the *Zamindars* for its payment.[167]

The system of cash payment to the Marathas in lieu of *Chauth* by the Nizam was also introduced in the *Khalisa* lands in the Deccan. The Nizam appointed his on revenue officials to collect it from the crown lands and paid cash to the Marathas.[168]

When the Marathas collected the levies directly through their own agents, they used to exact whatever amount they could at a time in a lump sum. When the provincial Mughal official failed to remit the amount in the time from the places Nizam undertook the responsibility, the Marathas claimed it direct from the provincial headquarters of the Mughal government. Sometimes they threatened that the amount be paid by the *Sarkar* within a time or they will take over by themselves.[169]

The fixation and revision of the levies was made when the Marathas desired in

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[165] Doc. No. C 31, C41, C48.

[166] *Muntakhab*, op.cit. Vol II, p 486.

[167] Ibid, p.782.

[168] Doc. No. 1072 to 1076, A.P.S.A. Hyderabad.

[169] Doc. No. C 12, APSA, Hyderabad.

order to get a higher amount due to the increase in the receipts of revenue.[170]

From places where the Maratha collectors made direct collection they charged expenses of their *Mamlatdars* (C11.7%), expenses of troops (28.4%), *Sihbandi* 33.8%), *Tankhwah of Mokasdars* (21%) and *Karkuni* (15.9 or 16%), towards the maintenance of accounts of arrears. But all these expenses were not charged at the same time. Thus the average comes out at 14% at a time. The total collection of the Maratha levies and their expenses amounts to 54%.[171]

The amount comes at 56% when it was collected by the Mughal authorities. There was *tahsildari-Chauth* (6%) *haq-i-tahsil* (6%), *havaldari* (6%), *rusum-i-zamindar* (2%), *sihbandi* (7%). This works out to 32%, but again all these expenses were not changed at a same time. So the average if takes it will 16% as the cost of collection.[172]

Thus the average percentage of the Maratha levies and expenses incurred for collection works out to 55% of the total receipts of the Mughal. Khafi Khan's statement that "they (the Marathas) were to receive nearly half of the total revenue (of the Mughals) recorded in the government rent roll," seems very true.[173]

The direct mode of collection of the levies had given Marathas unrestricted freedom to roam about in the Mughal territory along their troops. Consequently the influence of the Mughal revenue officials was gradually paralyzed and power fell into

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[170] Doc. No. C 252, APSA, Hyderabad.

[171] 25% *Chauth*, 10% *Sardeshmukhi*, 5% *Kaodara*, 14% cost of Collection. Doc. No. 894/3, 901/2, 1095/1, APSA.

[172] 25% *Chauth*, 10% *Sardeshmukhi*, 5% *Kaodana* and 16% changes of collection. Doc. No. C98, APSA.

[173] *Muntakhab*, op.cit. Vol II, p 786.

the hands of the Marathas who had established a quasi-military control over the Deccan in the order to protect their collectors and collection. All these practices resulted in the unique system of dual Mughal Maratha land revenue administration in the Mughal Deccan except the province of Hyderabad and *Khalisa* lands where Nizam-ul-Mulk undertook the responsibility to collect and pay cash to the Marathas.

6.5. Causes of the Maratha Success:

A Maratha soldier, in his region was superior to a Mughal soldier who was fit for fighting in the plains. Thus the geographical factor was in favour of the Marathas. The hilly region, the deep valleys, the difficulties involved in transport and above all the guerilla tactics of the Marathas harassed and exhausted the Mughals. The forts which have been captured by the Mughals with difficulty were recaptured by the Marathas in no time. This rendered defense impossible for the Mughals. The continuous warfare also lowered the moral of the Mughal army almost to a breaking paint. Away from home for years, and that too in a distant rugged land where prospects of success were bleak, the Mughals sometimes bought peace by bribing the Marathas.[174]

Between 1714 and 1748 the most basic development was the increasing militarization of the western Deccan. Visible from the mid of 17th century that the military recruitment in the region had taken different pattern. For improving their position they start using Arabian Sea for military staves from east Africa and war horses from the Persian Gulf, or they recruited both horses and cavalrymen from their

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[174] A.R. Kulkarni, *The Marathas 1600-1848*, New Delhi, 1996, p 67.

own locality. Actually they did both.[175]

We see that in between 1720 to 1740 there was change in the nature of warfare. The general failure of the Mughal fighting method was that they relied on heavy cavalry, large slow moving armies and decisive plains battles. Forts were places of strength and retreat cities the bases of administration. After the Marathas discovered that the weakness of Mughal armies was supply, they rained the out of raising warfare to a high ant. With this now the Maratha bands used to bring the Mughal armies into unfavorable areas, where they were made short of the supplies and made them suffer. Another important point to note is that the number of Maratha soldiers from 1700-1720, to 1720-40 period, they increased from 5000 men to 10,000, 20,000. Thus they were getting bigger in number and more professional.[176]

Strategy and tactics changed dramatically during the period under study. The older Maratha tactics were of course avoiding a pitched battle with a major army in the field, instead the Marathas cut off supplies communication and foraging and let the slow moving any starve. These strategies had been effectively used by Raghuji Bhonsle in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in the 1740's had been eminently successful against the Nizam in the battle of Bhopal in 1738.[177]

On the other hand the administration of the imperial army owing to the expansion of its civil side had become so complicated and unwieldy that a bankrupt and distracted government of Muhammad Shah could not exercise effective control over its branches and enforce orders regarding military operations throughout the vast

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[175] Richard Eaton, *A Social History of the Deccan*, 1300-1761, CUP, 2005, p 187.

[176] Steward Gordon, *The Marathas* 1600-1818, CUP, Delhi, 1998, p 129.

[177] Ibid, p 130.

empire.

Following the invasion of Nadir Shah, the system of mister and branding.[178] Owing to the incessant fighting with Marathas, the war expenditure rose enormously while the sources of income diminished.[179]

The contemporary accounts of the Mughal-Maratha struggle gave a very uncomplimentary picture of the Mughal strategy and military organization and of the poor quality of leadership. The Mughal generals displayed no enthusiasm and spirit of self sacrifice for the cause. The lack of resources also played a significant role in the failure of the Mughal armies because they were not able to raise and equip large army. When the generals did not have the armies, they were proved incapable of moving as swiftly as their foe.[180]

The imperial government was not able to raise and maintain the required cavalry and artillery. Except the big mansabdar, the nobles did not pay any heed towards the maintenance of their army. Sarbuland Khan, Mir Jumla, Amir Khan and several other nobles kept the pay of their soldiers in an ears, this undermined the morale of the soldiers. Afflicted by poverty they sold their horses and confined themselves to their houses, while some of them joined the ranks of thieves and highway robbers and some took up service under *Afghan* chiefs Marathas, Rajput chiefs and governors of the province.[181]

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[178] *Dag* and *Chehra* which were very effective in keeping the soldiers and horses upto date for the purpose of military.

[179] Z.U. Malik, op.cit., p 374.

[180] *Ahwal*, op.cit, f 183.

[181] M. Baksh Ashub, *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah,* op.cit., f 105.

The two arms of the Mughal army artillery and infantry were not of great military value as compared to the cavalry, which played an important role in the battles fought during the medieval period and continued to play a dominant role till the mid of 18th century. The infantry with rapidly firing muskets, equipped with gun-powder and organized on European model threw it into oblivion. The Mughal cavalry had lost its vigor and mobility as it was once reputed. Their artillery was also not very advanced; it was too heavy to be moved quickly from place to another during a battle. It could fire only once in half an hour and after the first charge it became inactive for quite some time. The heavy guns were dragged by 250 oxen aided by five or six elephants.[182]

During the Mughal Maratha struggle Nizam-ul-Mulk had always urged the central government to give him substantial assistance in men and money for the elimination of the Marathas from the areas they have conquered. Nizam-ul-Mulk had always emphasized the joint campaigns to face the Marathas.[183]

Nizam-ul-Mulk was aware of the fact that if Marathas pressured the Emperor, he might reach some settlement with Baji Rao at his expense, the effects of which would be disastrous for him. One of the demands put before the Emperor by the Peshwa was "the grant of 50 lakhs of rupees in the six Subas of Deccan to the Peshwa. The *Subas* have to be transferred in the name of the Emperor's son and Baji Rao should be asked to act for the absentee governor".[184]

If the said demand would be entertained by the Emperor, it will surely lead to

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[182] W. Irvine, *The Army of Indian Mughals*, Delhi, 1962, p.119-20.

[183] *Munshat*, op.cit, ff 140, 141, 157, 158.

[184] S.P.D., op.cit, XV, 95-96.

the complete downfall of the Nizam. To forestall such a settlement he must become the spearhead of a counter attack against the enemy and save his territory. The ambitious of Nizam-ul-Mulk were completely destroyed by the Marathas under the Peshwa Baji Rao. In the campaign of Palkhed (1728), Baji Rao forced Nizam-ul-Mulk to accept Shahu as the rightful king of the Marathas and thus entitled to *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi*. After the Bhopal campaign (1738) against the *Peshwa*, he had to reconcile himself to the Maratha occupation of Malwa.

Thus the central issue facing the nobility was the threat posed by the Marathas to the territorial integrity of the Mughal Empire. When the Marathas expanded their horizon, the weakness of the Mughals politico- administrative and military became revealed. And taking the advantage of this weakness, the Maratha troops over run the fertile and extensive territories under Mughal possession. In those towns and villages they replaced Mughal officers by their own men as revenue collectors.[185]

It was in Tamil Nadu, however, that Nizam-ul-Mulk successfully ousted the Marathas. In 1740, after a lapse of forty two years, the Marathas had returned to this province. But Nizam-ul-Mulk descended into the province and by his capture of Trichnapally in 1743, he removed Maratha influence in that region. At the time of his death in 1748 Nizam-ul-Mulk left to his successors a very extensive realm from the Narmada to Trichnapally.

6.6. Nizam's relation with Afghans, Telugus and Berads:

Nizam-ul-Mulk faced bitter military resistance from various *Afghan*, *Berad* and

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[185] Z.U. Malik, op.cit, p 95

Telugu groups. This was despite efforts at reconciling high ranking individuals in each group. Summing up the failure of his conciliatory policies vis-a-vis the Afghans, for example, the Nizam stated:

Izd-ud-Daula, i.e, Iwaz Khan (Nizam's Uncle), wrote to me that I should win over and ally myself with the Afghans ..... His advice was reasonable. I did my best to give them proper advice. In spite of my efforts, however, the Afghans did not listen to me.....it is then that I realized the danger in waiting for this duplicitous group since the Marathas have already entered into an unholy alliance with them.[186]

Between 1725 and 1730, the Nizam launched military campaigns against not only the *Afghans*, but also the *Berads* and *Telugus* as well, all were defeated. The Nizam however, generally eschewed calls to destroy their power.[187] The Nizam instead settled on a policy of deliberately including them within his circle. Thus the Afghans were confirmed as military personnel (*faujdars*) and the fort commandants (*qiladars*) in areas where they had previously dominance, such as Cudappah, Savanur and Kurnool.[188]

Only those individuals who proved particularly recalcitrant like Subbana Rao, the Vellama Reddy Chief were defeated and killed. The Nizam's patience undoubtedly was affected by Subbana Rao's long standing willingness to fight any assertion of authority by any non local. The Nizam likely was irritated by the strong support extended by Subbana Rao and his brother Appa Rao of Nuzvid to a rebellion (17245) by Kazim Khan, *Faujdar* of Bhongir, who remained an unapologetic loyalist

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[186] *Gulshan-i-Ajaib*, op.cit, ff 135b, 136b.

[187] Yusuf Hussain, op.cit, p 137.

[188] *Ahwal*, op.cit, ff 234b-235a.

of the deceased Mubariz Khan.[189]

In similar fashion more than dozen Telugu little kingdoms (*Samsthans*) were allowed to retain their autonomy within the *Suba* as long as they paid an annual tribute, contributed a certain number of troops for military campaigns, and occasionally sent representatives to attend the Court.[190] The Nizam's generous treatment of the Telugu *Nayaks* marked a clear departure from the earlier policies pursued by Mubariz Khan in 1720s.[191] However the Nizam handled the Berads slightly differently, because they proved the toughest group to subjugate. The Nizam refused to leave former strongholds like the fortresses of Wakinkheda, Sagar, Devdurg which were in the possession of their *Nayaks*.[192] While he allowed a large number of *Berad* chiefs to become *Peshkashi Zamindars* and *Mal Wajib Zamindars*.[193]He also recruited *Berads* into the army and accommodated them within the lower ranks of the land revenue administration in the southern India.[194] Large number of *Telugus* was also accommodated within the lower ranks of the bureaucracy.[195]

The slow absorption of groups like *Afghans*, *Telugus* and *Berads* and *Marathas* within the *Suba* of Hyderabad is absolutely crucial for its survival. With it

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[189] Yusuf Hussain, op.cit, p 137-38.

[190] *Ahwal*, op.cit, ff 202b, 214b.

[191] Ibid, f 215a.

[192] Syed Hussain Bilgrami and C. Willmott , *Historical and Descriptive Sketch of His Highness the Nizam's Dominions*, Vol II, Bombay 1884, p 438.

[193] Ibid, p 674,727.

[194] *Masir-i- Nizam*i, op.cit, f 77b.

[195] *Mughal Administration in the Deccan*, op.cit, pp 198-202.

started the process by which the cultural chasm between an almost exclusively Persian speaking elite and non Persian speaking majority was slowly bridged through the use of locally based state approved intermediaries. In the following periods they slowly but surely used to learn Persian in order to qualify or retain administrative jobs. Secondly with the absorption of the local elite into potentially lucrative administrative jobs, we see the signs of political and military investments in the survival of the Suba. In 1740s, when the Nizam waged a difficult military campaign against the Marathas in the southern region of Arcot, Nizam's victory was largely credited to the strong *Afghan, Telugu* and *Berad* support.

Although Hyderabad's share of all important land revenue was compromised by its bargain with the local powerful group, it however gained access to a regular flow of income that helped it maintain its critical financial position through the 1740s.[196]

[196] *Masir-i-Nizami*, op.cit, f 65b.

CONCLUSION

The 18th Century saw the far reaching changes and developments in the political as well as administrative spheres. The successive wars of succession amongst the sons of the emperors turned the court into hot bed of intrigues where everyone was busy in consolidating his own position at the cost of the others. The political game played by the Saiyyad brothers during the first two decades of 18th Century had tarnished the image of the monarchy, the brutal execution of Farrukh Siyar and elevation of emperors one after another changed the course of history. In a span of two months three Emperors were put to the throne and finally in 1719, emperor Muhammad Shah was enthroned by the Saiyyad brothers. At the time of Muhammad Shah's reign the Mughal Empire was at the zenith of its territorial expansion but the integrity of the Empire was shattered.

The crisis in the *jagirdari* system affected the efficiency of the administrative system at various levels, because the *thanadars*, the *faujdars* and the *subadars* were in great financial distress owing to the poor yields from their *jagirs*. Dissatisfied and frustrated *jagirdars* could not be expected to perform their executive or military duties efficiently as they could neither muster the required contingents nor adequately maintain the essential staff. It also led to the exploitation of the peasantry. Highly inflated *Jama* figures compelled the *jagirdars* to assess their *jagir* for a *Jama* which could not be normally realised from the *Zamindars*. The *Zamindars* in their own turn either refused to engage for the increased land revenue or transferred the burden on to the peasants. In case they refuse to engage for the land revenue , the necessary

condition for the appearance of the *Ijaradars* as an intermediary were created, which led to more intensive exploitation of the peasantry.

The unique feature of the Deccan *Suba* was its vastness, the Deccan *Suba* had six sub-*Subas* in itself and we do not find such type of divisions in any other *Suba* of the Mughals during the period under review. Nizam-ul-Mulk's territory comprising the six *Subas* of the Deccan extended from the river Narmada in the north to Rameshwaram in the extreme south; from east of Poona in the west, to the east coast. On the west, the strongholds and possessions of the Marathas, viz, Satara, Panhala, Kolhapur and from the Konkan coast to the Malabar were excluded from the Mughal provinces. No doubt it was more difficult to administer such a large *Suba* than the others which were not as vast as the Deccan, and Nizam-ul-Mulk from his first viceroyalty till his death was busy in bringing peace and order in his *Suba.*

Upon his arrival in the Deccan, the Nizam faced a number of problems. The most threatening was the political and military strength of the Marathas. The growing Maratha power could not be crushed with the meagre resources of the Subedar, who was constantly asking the centre for help in both men and money but he get nothing out of the imperial treasury or any military help. The emperor himself was facing the economic problem set in, in the preceding years. The *Jagirdari* problem, financial bankruptcy and the court politics left no space for the Emperor to turn his attention towards the growing Maratha problem in the Deccan Suba.

We can divide the period of study (1719-1748) that is Muhammad Shah's reign into two parts 1719-1724 and 1724-1748. In the first part the problem was that the Mughal officers were fighting among themselves in order to get control of the *Suba,* among them Hussain Ali Khan, Mubariz Khan and Nizam-ul-Mulk were the

main figures, Mubariz Khan however backed by the Emperor against the Nizam. Nizam-ul-Mulk who left the *Wizarat* in disgust after his scheme of reform at the centre was not implemented now he wanted to live far from the centre where he can do the things in his own ways, on the other hand the other nobles also get attracted towards the Deccan because the growing weakness of the centre present before them the opportunity to carve out an independent kingdom for themselves. In such a struggle Mubariz Khan lost his life.

In the second phase the problem of fighting amongst them was solved when Nizam-ul-Mulk gets hold of the *Suba* for the third time and all the rivals were removed from the scene. In this period the Maratha menace have grown too much that they started encroaching into the Mughal provinces of Deccan and collected *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* which constituted the half of the revenue of the *Suba* mentioned by Khafi Khan and corroborated with the documental evidences. In both the phases the administration was naturally neglected, however the contemporary sources mentions that Nizam-ul-Mulk on his part tried to bring back the peace and order in the Deccan specially in those areas where the refractory *Zamindars* were creating problems like Waginkheda, *Parganas* of Gawan and the Sarkar of Elgandal. Nizam-ul-Mulk tried to make the passages and traders safe from the loot of the Marathas.

We can see that the death of Aurangzeb created a vacuum in the Mughal prestige, and the weak successors were not able to take stands against the growing fractional politics, same was the case with the Emperor Muhammad Shah who was all the time busy in the court politics and did not have time to pay attention to the growing problems either at the centre or at the provinces. His personal character was such that he was guided by his favourites in all the matters of the court. The extent of

his negligence resulted in the external attack by Nadir Shah in 1739 which further diminish the prestige of the monarchy.

Warid Tehrani the contemporary writer mentions about the state of affairs in these words, "whenever the news of any Maratha incursion reached to the court from the Deccan, the Emperor instead of finding solution to the problem went to the plains for hunting or in the gardens to see the blooming flowers and fish in the ponds to soothe his heart."

Thus the period under study (1719-1748) witnessed the growing problems in the administration at the centre which in turn disturbed the peace and tranquillity at the provincial level on one hand and the failure on the part of the Emperor to deal with these growing problems give set back to the prestige of the monarchy and fighting among the nobles for their selfish motives become a recurring feature of the time. Taking advantage of the situation the enemy of the empire tried hard to finish the declining empire and built their own upon the ruins and within a very short time Marathas carved an independent kingdom for themselves. The Nizam lost the battle of Bhopal to the Marathas in 1738, he faced a rebellion of his son soon after Nadir Shah's attack, but through his efforts by the mid of 1740's passed back into the control the Nizam.

The Marathas were only one of the many problems faced by the Nizam. The other active groups were the Afghans, Berads and Telugus. They saw the Nizam and his supporter as their political rival in the Deccan. And they were not easily going to sacrifice their political and economic autonomy in the region without giving tough competition to the emerging power.

In these circumstances it was not possible for the Nizam to solely rely on the Mughal institutional structures in the Deccan to implant his authority. The condition of the *Suba* was also not satisfactory because of the incessant war in the region in the previous times. Another serious problem before the Nizam was to bridge the cultural differences between the new ruling elite and the many of their subjects. The Nizam was fully aware of their different historical, political and cultural traces, and it was not possible to apply the same approach to all the groups.

But the Nizam had deep personal knowledge of the region's political, social and economic networks which helped him in dealing with all the odds, this insight came from the time spent in the region as we all know that the Nizam served the Deccan thrice as a governor. The Nizam had full idea of which groups had to deal with diplomacy and which through the use of violence. Here the armed strength of the Nizam played a vital role. Nizam had a group of loyalists as well on his side, despite the ethnic diversity the Nizam's supporters proved their cohesiveness and loyalty. Although the *Turanis* were important supporters of the Nizam, his household forces also include many *Afghans*, *Shaikhzadas*, *Khatris*, *Kayasthas*, *Bundelas*, *Rajputs* and *Dakhinis*.

After losing the *Wizarat*, the Nizam was not very sure of his political career at the court and moved to Deccan his recent viceroyalty for the second time and now he started building a base for himself in the Deccan and appointed family members and imperial loyalists on important posts across the Deccan. High *mansabs* and fertile *jagirs* were given to them and direct control over the revenue and intelligence department was established which was out of the reach of previous governors. The tribute extracting expeditions were launched in order to gain economic stability.

Till the end of his life and was all the time busy in maintaining law and order in his province and partly succeeded in his scheme. However the Suba constantly broke the basic imperial administrative rules like officials were not transferred as frequently as required. The multiple posts were combined within a single person, complex process of bargaining rather than surveys tended to determine the revenue payments by *Zamindars*, many of the revenue offices were allowed to turn hereditary and revenue farming (*ijaradari*) was accepted.

Mansaram in his contemporary account *Masir-i-Nizami* gives the Nizam's quote stating that 'for the efficient administration of the *Suba* it is absolutely essential that three communities should be avoided..... first Afghans, second Deccanis and the third Marathas.' While in his last testament Nizam advised his successors that, 'it is necessary for the ruler of the Deccan who desires his own safety, peace from the war and prosperity of his country to have peace with Marathas who are the landholders of this region.' Nizam's changing attitude can be seen in these two statements which he experienced in his journey from the first viceroyalty till his death. And it also shows the gravity of the problem faced by the Nizam in the Deccan *Suba*.

The death of Nizam in1748, produce an immediate succession disputes of the heirs of the Nizam and they became part of a larger war between the English and the French. The allegiance which was shown by the Nizam towards the Mughal Emperor was not retained by his successors and the Hyderabad state became an independent under the rule of the Asafjahi dynasty which was carried out after the name of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I and his successors continued to rule until it was finally annexed.

GLOSSARY

Abwabs- taxes imposed in addition to the regular assessment on the land.

Ahsham- the foot soldiers of the infantry garrison in the forts

Amalguzar- collector of revenue

Amil- collector of revenue, with civil, military and financial powers

Amin- a commissioner, revenue assessor of pargana

Asli- original village which has its inhabitants intact; in opposition to the *dakhili*, the subordinate or included

Babti- Maratha levy, 25% of Chauth amount reserved for the Maratha Sardars

Baghat- irrigated land, unit of land revenue in the Deccan

Balda- city

Bhant- fee of sipahgir, a person in charge of guarding or protecting the village

Bhat- an advance given to cultivators without any interest

Bilmuqta- fixed, stipulated

Chabutra Kotwali- police office or station

Chakla- a large division of a country, comprehending a number of pargana

Chauth- Maratha levy of ¼ exacted from the territories of the Mughal provinces

Dakhili- villages include in to the other after being deserted

Dam- a small coin, the 40th part of a rupee

Darbar- court of the Subedar

Darogha- superintendent of any department

Darogha-i-dak *chauki*- superintendent of postal system

Darul Zarb- a mint

Darul-Adl- court of justice

Darul-qaza- court of justice under the early Nizams, it was more or less high court of the state

Dastur-ul-amal- manual

Deh- village in the sense of a definite area of agricultural holdings with houses upon it

Deshmukh- a hereditary officer responsible for revenue

Deshpandia- a mahal officer, hereditary revenue accountant

Diwan- minister of finance

Farman- a royal order

Faujdar- an officer with the charge of the police and jurisdiction in all criminal matters

Faujdari- office of the Faujdar

Fidwi- the term used by Nizam in his seals meaning sub-ordinate, servant

Garhi- a small fort, a hill fort, a mud fort; used by the Marathas for shelter

Gumashta- agent's fee, especially for the Maratha agent responsible for the collection of Sardeshmukhi

Gumashta- an agent, specially appointed by Marathas for collecting Chauth

Haq-i-*Tahsil*- perquisite for collection of revenue

Harkara- postal runner

Haveli- Suba headquarter

Hissa-i-*Sarkar*- share of government

Ijara- contract revenue farming to a person for specified period of time

Ijaradar- the person given contract

Itlaq- fee for delivering summons

Jama- assessment, revenue demand

Jamabandi- actual assessment of land revenue

Jama-i-*Kamil*- an estimated income or revenue

Jama-wasul-baqi- revenue demand, receipt and the balance

Jarib- survey, measurement

Jazia- a payment by which the non-muslims get exemption from compulsory military service in the Islamic state

Kachehri- office, court

Kalali- fee paid by the villagers to inferior servants employed for the collection of fort dues

Kan-i-Almas- diamond mine

Karkun- a clerk, a writer, manager of financial and revenue collection

Karori- executive officer collector of revenue at pargana

Khalisa sharifa- crown lands

Khatib- a reader of prayers at a mosque

Khilat- a robe of honour

Khurak-i-*Dawwab*- feed of horse, animals, allowance for food

Kotwal- superintendent or chief of police

Kulkarni- the village registrar and accountant, who maintained revenue accounts

Mahsul- collected, customs

Mahsuldari- collection fee

Mal- land revenue tax

Mal wajib- fixed revenue or government's share which is customary to pay

Mal-o-*jihad*- a general or collective term for the collected from the land

Mauza- small village

Mohalla- locality

Muchalka- an undertaking

Muftuha- city or conquered territories

Muhtarafa- a tax levied on trades and professions on the artificers of a village on their implements, on tradesmen and their shops and stalls

Mukasa- Maratha levy- 66% of the total amount of Chauth

Muqaddam- headman of the village

Muqarrari- revenue fixed to be paid to the government

Muqtadar- agent's fee

Mutasaddi- clerk

Naib- deputy, a practice adopted by the Mughal subadars of the Deccan to appoint naib subadars and remained themselves at the court

Nayak- Chief

Nazar- peshkash, present, offering

Nazim- provincial governor, viceroy of the Suba

Paibaqi- lands available for assignment

Panchayat- arbitration bty five

Patwari- a village official

Peshkash- tribute

Peshkashi zamindar- tribute paying zamindar

Piyadagan- footman

Pura- town

Qabuliat- acceptance specially in the case of paying stipulated revenue

Qaid khana- jail

Qanungo- village and district revenue officer who maintained revenue records

Qasba- a large village

Qazi- a judicialofficer

Qazi-i-*balda*- a judge of the city court

Qazi-ul-quzzat- lord chief justice

Qiladar- administrator of the fort

Qusur- deficiency, faults, a discount of 5%

Ra'aya- cultivators

Rahdari- transit duties

Rahdari- transit duties

Rozina- daily allowances

Rusum- a proprietory fee

Rusum-i- *Sardeshmukhi*- a proprietary due for the sardeshmukh's service

Sadrath- office of chief judge

Sadrath-ul-Aulitya- the chief ecclesiastical court

Sahotra- Maratha levy, division of the Chauth

Sair- taxes other than land revenue

Samasthan- small telugu holdings in the Deccan

Sardeshmukhi- the Maratha levy of 10% extracted from the Mughal territories

Sarf-i-*sihband*- expenditure incurred towards the deployment of sihbandi or irregular troops

Sarkar-i-*ali*- Mughal subedar of the Deccan

Sarkar-i-*wala*- Mughal emperor

Sihbandi- irregular troops

Siwai- revenue derived from all taxes except those rose from the land

Siwai-teh bazari- revenue from the tax levied on the sellers of articles in a bazaar

Srideh- tax collected from the cultivators and paid to the qazi

Srisad- cash amount fixed or granted at the rate per village

Suba- province

Ta'hud- contract, lease, agreement

Tabi- the hot weather crops, sown in cold and reaped in the hot weather

Tahrir- fee levied to meet the village expenses and paid to the mutassadis

Tahsil- the actual collected revenue

Talab- salary

Talluqa- a division of the province, a circle or group of villages formed for administrative purposes

Tasarruf-i-*Amil*- property money of the Amil or revenue collector

Tashkhis- assessment of revenue

Thana- a military post

Tumar- fiscal document, an account

Waqia-nawis- news reporter

Wasul- collection, money realised by the government

Wujuhat- cess, tax other than land revenue

Zat- personal rank of the mansabdar

Ziladari- a territorial division

Ziledar- head of the small force

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Appendix I

Daftar-i-Diwani-Mal-wa-Mulki and the Specimen of the Documents Preserved in the Andhra Pradesh State Archives under various *Dafatir*

Daftar-i-Diwani wa Mal wa Mulki[1]

Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I who is known to be the founder of *Asafjahi* Dynasty in the Deccan, Hyderabad had organised the administration on his own lines. In order to maintain the separation of various official works, different offices or *Daftars* had been established and all the works were done through the respective Daftars. *Daftar-i-Diwani* and the other offices associated with it occupied the special and important place in the administrative set up of the *Asafjahis* and remained the prime organ of administration. The details of the offices are as follows:

1- Daftar-i-Diwani

2- Daftar-i-Mal

3- Daftar-i-Mulki

4- Daftar-i-Darul- Insha'

5- Daftar-i-Istifa'

6- Daftar-i-Mua'hir

7- Daftar-i-Mansab and Khatabat

8- Daftar-i-Salatin-i-Mughlia

The *Daftar-i-Diwani* which was established in order to systemize the administration was split into two; in the *Suba* Khujista Bunyad Aurangabad, Berar, Bijapur and Burhanpur all the works related to the army and finance like *nigehdasht, jami'at, taqarrur, tai'nati, ahadnamah, taqarrur ummalan and ta'ahuddari,* and further financial works like *waqia' nigari, hisabat, jama' wa kharch, Ijara-i- isnaad,*

[1] The documents from all the offices and of all the categories are now in the Andhra Pradesh State Archives, Hyderabad.

ata'- jagir and inam wa Tankhwah etc were discharged through the *Daftar-i-Diwani*, while in the *Suba* Farkhunda Bunyad and Muhammadabad Bidar , all the above mentioned were performed through *Daftar-i-Mal.*

The officers who were entrusted to perform the duties of these offices were known as the *Daftardars* or *Sar Daftar*. And gradually with the growing need other offices were also established but the importance of the *Diwani* remained intact.

The variety and categories of the old important papers of the *Daftar*-i-*Diwani* have always been exceeding. There are various varieties and categories of these papers, some of them are as follows;

1- *Ahkam*; papers related to decrees, orders, judicial decisions, ordinances

2- *Akhbar;* a news paper, gazettes

3- *Akhrajat;* list of the expenses, revenues or tribute

4- *Arhsatta;* revenue records

5- *Isnads;* warrants, deeds or documents of grants

6- *Istadah*; list of an ensign staff

7- *Ishtehar;* public notices, notifications or proclamations

8- *Itlaq*; orders of dismissal or application

9- *Afradnamah;* the counting list

10- *Altamas;* petitioning, request

11- *Amdani*; papers related to income, finances, import duties etc

12- *Andazah*; a specimen, copy, quantity

13- Awarjah; a cash book or a book of receipts

14- *Bar Awardah*; orders of elevation, raise up or to repair, restore, to produce

15- Bar Tarfinamah; dismissal letter or discharge

16- *Badhotri;* excess

17- Baqaya; receipts of balance arrear, dues

18- Baynamah; a bill of sale

19- *Patrak;* letter

20- Parwanah; an order issued under the seal from men in power(high noble),a licence

21- *Peshkash*; details of the tribute

22- Tarikh; chronicle, a calendar, chronogram

23- *Taqidat;* formal recommendation, confirmation letter, reminder for something

24- Tajwiz; approval, permission or inquiry orders

25- *Tehreer;* written statenment

26- *Tashkhis*; valuation, estimation, identification

27- Tasdiq; verification, confirmation, certificate

28- Ta'ahud; agreement, acceptance

29- *Tafwiz;* recommendation

30- Taqawi; papers of the loan given for the agriculture purposes

31- *Taqarrurat;* appointment letter

32- Taqsim namah; allotment or partition papers

33- *Tamassuk;* a bond

34- *Jamabandi;* an account of the quantity of land and number of houses, a rent roll

35- *Jama wasul baqi*; the record of assessment, collection and arrears or dues

36- Jama kharch; accounts of income and expenditure

37- Chitthi; letter

38- *Chauth;* papers of the ¼ amount of the revenues to be given to the marathas

39- *Chehra;* descriptive roll of the soldiers

40- Hasil; list of the actual collection

41- Hazir zamni; a bond for personal appearance

42- *Haziri;* muster roll

43- Haqiqat; narration of something

44- Hukum shud; command given, directions

45- Hokum namah; a warrant or written order

46- *Khatoot;* letters exchanged, notes

47- Dakhil Sarkar; a warrant from government, deed of possession

48- Dagh namah; description of a mark branded upon the royal horses

49- Dastak; passport, licence or permit

50- Dastur-ul-amal; regulations, a model

51- Razi namah; a deed acknowledging one to be satisfied for a debt, resignation or an agreement

52- Rasid; an acknowledgement of receiving, a receipt

53- *Roz namchah;* a journal of daily transactions, a daily account book

54- Rehen namah; depositing

55- Sabil bandat; through a medium of some other person

56- Saqti namah; a casuality list of horses that have died in a cavalry

57- Sawal; a petition, demand, or a paper stating some problem

58- Sawal wa jawab; dialogue, question and answer

59- Siyah; a written account or a list

60- Zamanat namah; bail bond

61- Tumar; an account book, household account

62- Arzi; a petition, humble representation

63- Inayat namah; a certificate or grant in written

64- Farrakhati; release letter or discharge

65- Fazlat; privilege, prerogative

66- *Faramin*; orders of emperors, mandates

67- Farmaish; commands, will, order

68- *Fauti namah;* a list of killed

69- *Farokhat;* selling receipts

70- *Fehrist;* list prepared for some purpose

71- Faisla namah; an instrument denoting that a decree has been settled

72- *Faislajat;* decrees, decision

73- *Qabalat;* any contract especially of bargain and sale

74- *Qabz;* arrest warrant, seizing orders

75- *Qabz-ul-wasul;* acknowledgement, a receipt

76- *Qabuliyat;* acceptance, agreement

77- *Qismatnamah*; a deed of partition

78- *Qalam bandi;* an agreement

79- *Qaul*; promise, contract, setting forth the principles and rules by which the demands of government on the land are to be regulated

80- *Qafalat namah;* a bail bond

81- *Kaifiyat;* detailed circumstances

82- *Guzarish;* request, explanation, a quitting

83- *Guzashtan;* to pay a debt or fine

84- *Goshwari;* aggregate amount, abstract of an account

85- *Mahiyanah*; monthly pay or pension receipts

86- *Muchalka*; promise, note of hand, a bond

87- *Madakhil-makharij;* income and expenditure receipts

88- *Maratib;* particulars of the rank

89- *Matloobjat;* required or demanded

90- *Muahidah;* alliance, treaty, association

91- *Muawzah;* repair amount

92- *Muntakhabahjat;* extracts

93- *Moqufat;* donations, pious bequests

94- *Mehranah*; fee of qazi at the time of muslim wedding

95- *Mizan;* to balance an account

96- *Nadarad;* exhortation

97- *Nazranah;* gift received or given

98- *Narkh namah;* a price current

99- *Nakhshajat;* maps description of places

100- *Nawazish namah;* complimentary letters

101- *Wajib-ul-arz;* a written representation or petition

102- Wasilat; the total collection under every description

103- Wasiat namah; last will or tastament

104- Waqai'; talk of various kind

105- Wakalat namah; an ambassador's credentials, a power of attorney

106- *Yaddasht*; a memorandum, a note

These papers or documents are important not only because they are very old but because of the fact that they bear the treasures of history and history writings which made them priceless. On the basis of these papers the history of the Deccan and Asafiya dynasty as well as of the Hindustan can be written with authenticity. Their genuineness made them unique and primary source of historical information. The *Daftar-i-Diwani* had some rare manuscripts as well which could not be found in any other libraries.



Document No 75, Andhra Pradesh State Archives, Hyderabad. Specimen of the pay Bill of the military personnel posted at the Mahuli fort and his pay is stated in the Document as 45 Rs/ per month.



Doc No VI/475, APSA, Hyderabad. The Document is a *Fautinama* (Death Certificate) of Hiraman S/O Haridas, employee of *Sarkar Khalisa Sharifa.*



Document No IV/1180, APSA, Hyderabad. *Daghnama-i-Aspan*(branding Certificate of the horses) of the horses and the troopers of Inayat Khan, mansabdar of 400 Zat.



Document No IV/228, APSA, Hyderabad. The Document is *Siyah-i-Waqia* (daily news report) of *Suba* Khujista Bunyad Aurangabad. It is informed in the Document that the orders were received by Amanat Khan, prohibiting the nobles posted in the Deccan from collecting the *Rahdari* and submit the agreement bond for that.



Document No 1/1262, APSA, Hyderabad. *Tumar* (fiscal papers, pay bill), of Mihrab Beg and his 5 troopers(*tabinan*). The pay of the troopers is recorded as 30 Rs per month.



Remaining part of the Document 1/1262.



Document No 75, Andhra Pradesh State Archives, Hyderabad. Specimen of the pay Bill of the military personnel posted at the Mahuli fort and his pay is stated in the Document as 45 Rs/ per month.



Doc No VI/475, APSA, Hyderabad. The Document is a *Fautinama* (Death Certificate) of Hiraman S/O Haridas, employee of *Sarkar Khalisa Sharifa.*

Appendix II

Seals of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I on the Documents of the period 1719-1748 A.D

A- Seal of Nizam-ul-Mulk starting with the name of the emperor Muhammad Shah, Fateh Jung *Sipahsalar* Nizam-ul-Mulk, *Murid* FalakwarShah (*Falaknuma*), Muhammad Shah.

B- Seal of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah starting with the name of Nizam-ul-Mulk with the *Julus* of the Emperor Muhammad Shah inscribed on it. (meher 461)

C- Another seal of Asaf Jah with the word *Humraz* wa iin *Fidvi Asaf Jah*.

D- Seal with the inscription, Asaf Jah NIzanm-ul-Mulk, having *Julus* of the Emperor and word Fidvi on it.